Chang Xia

Huimin Wang, Leilei Ouyang, Chang Xia et al.

Generating long-horizon music videos (MVs) is frequently constrained by prohibitive computational costs and difficulty maintaining cross-shot consistency. We propose AllocMV, a hierarchical framework formulating music video synthesis as a Multiple-Choice Knapsack Problem (MCKP). AllocMV represents the video's persistent state as a compact, structured object comprising character entities, scene priors, and sharing graphs, produced by a global planner prior to realization. By estimating segment saliency from multimodal cues, a group-level MCKP solver based on dynamic programming optimally allocates resources across High-Gen, Mid-Gen, and Reuse branches. For repetitive musical motifs, we implement a divergence-based forking strategy that reuses visual prefixes to reduce costs while ensuring motif-level continuity. Evaluated via the Cost-Quality Ratio (CQR), AllocMV achieves an optimal trade-off between perceived quality and resource expenditure under strict budgetary and rhythmic constraints.

Ying He, Zhili Shen, Chang Xia et al.

Outsourced deep neural networks have been demonstrated to suffer from patch-based trojan attacks, in which an adversary poisons the training sets to inject a backdoor in the obtained model so that regular inputs can be still labeled correctly while those carrying a specific trigger are falsely given a target label. Due to the severity of such attacks, many backdoor detection and containment systems have recently, been proposed for deep neural networks. One major category among them are various model inspection schemes, which hope to detect backdoors before deploying models from non-trusted third-parties. In this paper, we show that such state-of-the-art schemes can be defeated by a so-called Scapegoat Backdoor Attack, which introduces a benign scapegoat trigger in data poisoning to prevent the defender from reversing the real abnormal trigger. In addition, it confines the values of network parameters within the same variances of those from clean model during training, which further significantly enhances the difficulty of the defender to learn the differences between legal and illegal models through machine-learning approaches. Our experiments on 3 popular datasets show that it can escape detection by all five state-of-the-art model inspection schemes. Moreover, this attack brings almost no side-effects on the attack effectiveness and guarantees the universal feature of the trigger compared with original patch-based trojan attacks.