John Preuß Mattsson

2papers

2 Papers

CRDec 1, 2021
Quantum-Resistant Cryptography

John Preuß Mattsson, Ben Smeets, Erik Thormarker

Quantum-resistant cryptography is cryptography that aims to deliver cryptographic functions and protocols that remain secure even if large-scale fault-tolerant quantum computers are built. NIST will soon announce the first selected public-key cryptography algorithms in its Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standardization which is the most important current effort in the field of quantum-resistant cryptography. This report provides an overview to security experts who do not yet have a deep understanding of quantum-resistant cryptography. It surveys the computational model of quantum computers; the quantum algorithms that affect cryptography the most; the risk of Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computers (CRQCs) being built; the security of symmetric and public-key cryptography in the presence of CRQCs; the NIST PQC standardization effort; the migration to quantum-resistant public-key cryptography; the relevance of Quantum Key Distribution as a complement to conventional cryptography; and the relevance of Quantum Random Number Generators as a complement to current hardware Random Number Generators.

CRMay 21, 2021
Nori: Concealing the Concealed Identifier in 5G

John Preuß Mattsson, Prajwol Kumar Nakarmi

IMSI catchers have been a long standing and serious privacy problem in pre-5G mobile networks. To tackle this, 3GPP introduced the Subscription Concealed Identifier (SUCI) and other countermeasures in 5G. In this paper, we analyze the new SUCI mechanism and discover that it provides very poor anonymity when used with the variable length Network Specific Identifiers (NSI), which are part of the 5G standard. When applied to real-world name length data, we see that SUCI only provides 1-anonymity, meaning that individual subscribers can easily be identified and tracked. We strongly recommend 3GPP and GSMA to standardize and recommend the use of a padding mechanism for SUCI before variable length identifiers get more commonly used. We further show that the padding schemes, commonly used for network traffic, are not optimal for padding of identifiers based on real names. We propose a new improved padding scheme that achieves much less message expansion for a given $k$-anonymity.