Ian C. Moore

Ian C. Moore

We introduce the State Twin: a typed, in-memory, replayable replica of an on-chain automated market maker (AMM) pool that serves as a substrate for agentic reasoning over decentralized finance (DeFi) protocols. Agentic DeFi stacks today couple reasoning to chain time, since every "what if?" query incurs a new RPC read or a real transaction, so the agent's effective action space is bounded by block confirmation latency and gas. We argue this coupling is a structural problem rather than a performance one, and that the missing layer is an off-chain substrate that preserves the protocol's exact mathematics while admitting the operations on-chain state cannot: forking, replay, branching, counterfactual rollout. We formalize each AMM family (Uniswap V2, V3, Balancer, Stableswap) as a discrete-time controlled dynamical system, prove a quantitative fidelity bound on the divergence between twin and chain, and give the open architecture used in DeFiPy v2, an open-source Python toolkit that ships the State Twin substrate and a reference Model Context Protocol server exposing typed analytical primitives as LLM tools. The same primitive (i.e., one Python class, one calling pattern) serves a notebook quant, a backtest, and an LLM agent without modification. We close with a fork-and-evaluate worked example: a single live RPC read seeds N independent in-memory twins under distinct price-shock scenarios, in sub-second wall-clock time. The contribution is the substrate, not a particular agent, which is what the specification of what an agentic DeFi substrate must look like

Ian C. Moore

We present a formal treatment of provenance trees, directed acyclic graphs of artifact registrations anchored immutably on a public blockchain, and introduce the operator trust problem: when a single privileged operator submits all on-chain registrations on behalf of users, the on-chain record alone cannot distinguish user-initiated registrations from unilateral operator actions. We resolve this through a dual-layer cryptographic commitment scheme in which two commitments derived from a single client-side secret key, binding the key to the tree root and to each unique registration identifier, make false attribution claims strictly dominated strategies. We prove correctness under standard cryptographic assumptions and establish honest behavior as the unique Nash equilibrium without relying on operator trust. We further introduce and analyze the tree poisoning problem: adversarial attacks on users' provenance trees via fraudulent root registration, malicious child attachment, and tree identity spoofing. We characterize the closure properties of each attack variant and prove that a complete provenance tree integrity model requires three distinct mechanisms: cryptographic priority, governance cascade, and contract enforcement, each necessary and none individually sufficient. The construction is deployed on Base (Ethereum L2) as AnchorRegistry, an immutable on-chain provenance registry. We provide gas complexity analysis demonstrating O(1) cost invariant to registry scale, and a trustless reconstruction algorithm recovering the complete registry from public event logs alone.

Ian C. Moore, Jagdeep Sidhu

EIP-1559 is a new proposed pricing mechanism for the Ethereum protocol developed to bring stability to fluctuating gas prices. To properly understand this as a stochastic process, it is necessary to develop the mathematical foundations to understand under what conditions the base fee gas price outcomes behave as a stationary process, and when it does not. Understanding these mathematical fundamentals is critical to properly engineering a stable system.