Chamsi Hssaine

Siddhartha Banerjee, Chamsi Hssaine, Sean R. Sinclair

We consider a practically motivated variant of the canonical online fair allocation problem: a decision-maker has a budget of perishable resources to allocate over a fixed number of rounds. Each round sees a random number of arrivals, and the decision-maker must commit to an allocation for these individuals before moving on to the next round. The goal is to construct a sequence of allocations that is envy-free and efficient. Our work makes two important contributions toward this problem: we first derive strong lower bounds on the optimal envy-efficiency trade-off, demonstrating that a decision-maker is fundamentally limited in what she can hope to achieve relative to the no-perishing setting; we then design an algorithm achieving these lower bounds which takes as input (i) a prediction of the perishing order, and (ii) a desired bound on envy. Given the remaining budget in each period, the algorithm uses forecasts of future demand perishing to adaptively choose from one of two carefully constructed guardrail quantities. We demonstrate our algorithm's strong numerical performance, and state-of-the-art, perishing-agnostic algorithms' inefficacy, on simulations calibrated to a real-world dataset.

Chamsi Hssaine, Yichun Hu, Ciara Pike-Burke

Points-based rewards programs are a prevalent way to incentivize customer loyalty; in these programs, customers who make repeated purchases from a seller accumulate points, working toward eventual redemption of a free reward. These programs have recently come under scrutiny due to accusations of unfair practices in their implementation. Motivated by these concerns, we study the problem of fairly designing points-based rewards programs, with a focus on two obstacles that put fairness at odds with their effectiveness. First, due to customer heterogeneity, the seller should set different redemption thresholds for different customers to generate high revenue. Second, the relationship between customer behavior and the number of accumulated points is typically unknown; this requires experimentation which may unfairly devalue customers' previously earned points. We first show that an individually fair rewards program that uses the same redemption threshold for all customers suffers a loss in revenue of at most a factor of $1+\ln 2$, compared to the optimal personalized strategy that differentiates between customers. We then tackle the problem of designing temporally fair learning algorithms in the presence of demand uncertainty. Toward this goal, we design a learning algorithm that limits the risk of point devaluation due to experimentation by only changing the redemption threshold $O(\log T)$ times, over a horizon of length $T$. This algorithm achieves the optimal (up to polylogarithmic factors) $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret in expectation. We then modify this algorithm to only ever decrease redemption thresholds, leading to improved fairness at a cost of only a constant factor in regret. Extensive numerical experiments show the limited value of personalization in average-case settings, in addition to demonstrating the strong practical performance of our proposed learning algorithms.

Chamsi Hssaine, Sean R. Sinclair

We study a censored variant of the data-driven newsvendor problem, where the decision-maker must select an ordering quantity that minimizes expected overage and underage costs based only on offline censored sales data, rather than historical demand realizations. Our goal is to understand how the degree of historical demand censoring affects the performance of any learning algorithm for this problem. To isolate this impact, we adopt a distributionally robust optimization framework, evaluating policies according to their worst-case regret over an ambiguity set of distributions. This set is defined by the largest historical order quantity (the observable boundary of the dataset), and contains all distributions matching the true demand distribution up to this boundary, while allowing them to be arbitrary afterwards. We demonstrate a spectrum of achievability under demand censoring by deriving a natural necessary and sufficient condition under which vanishing regret is an achievable goal. In regimes in which it is not, we exactly characterize the information loss due to censoring: an insurmountable lower bound on the performance of any policy, even when the decision-maker has access to infinitely many demand samples. We then leverage these sharp characterizations to propose a natural robust algorithm that adapts to the historical level of demand censoring. We derive finite-sample guarantees for this algorithm across all possible censoring regimes and show its near-optimality with matching lower bounds (up to polylogarithmic factors). We moreover demonstrate its robust performance via extensive numerical experiments on both synthetic and real-world datasets.

Daniel Freund, Chamsi Hssaine

We study a decision-maker's problem of finding optimal monetary incentive schemes for retention when faced with agents whose participation decisions (stochastically) depend on the incentive they receive. Our focus is on policies constrained to fulfill two fairness properties that preclude outcomes wherein different groups of agents experience different treatment on average. We formulate the problem as a high-dimensional stochastic optimization problem, and study it through the use of a closely related deterministic variant. We show that the optimal static solution to this deterministic variant is asymptotically optimal for the dynamic problem under fairness constraints. Though solving for the optimal static solution gives rise to a non-convex optimization problem, we uncover a structural property that allows us to design a tractable, fast-converging heuristic policy. Traditional schemes for retention ignore fairness constraints; indeed, the goal in these is to use differentiation to incentivize repeated engagement with the system. Our work (i) shows that even in the absence of explicit discrimination, dynamic policies may unintentionally discriminate between agents of different types by varying the type composition of the system, and (ii) presents an asymptotically optimal policy to avoid such discriminatory outcomes.