David Marn

Shruthi Gorantala, Rob Springer, Sean Purser-Haskell et al.

Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) is an encryption scheme which enables computation on encrypted data without revealing the underlying data. While there have been many advances in the field of FHE, developing programs using FHE still requires expertise in cryptography. In this white paper, we present a fully homomorphic encryption transpiler that allows developers to convert high-level code (e.g., C++) that works on unencrypted data into high-level code that operates on encrypted data. Thus, our transpiler makes transformations possible on encrypted data. Our transpiler builds on Google's open-source XLS SDK (https://github.com/google/xls) and uses an off-the-shelf FHE library, TFHE (https://tfhe.github.io/tfhe/), to perform low-level FHE operations. The transpiler design is modular, which means the underlying FHE library as well as the high-level input and output languages can vary. This modularity will help accelerate FHE research by providing an easy way to compare arbitrary programs in different FHE schemes side-by-side. We hope this lays the groundwork for eventual easy adoption of FHE by software developers. As a proof-of-concept, we are releasing an experimental transpiler (https://github.com/google/fully-homomorphic-encryption/tree/main/transpiler) as open-source software.

Vijay Kamble, Nihar Shah, David Marn et al.

A major challenge in obtaining evaluations of products or services on e-commerce platforms is eliciting informative responses in the absence of verifiability. This paper proposes the Square Root Agreement Rule (SRA): a simple reward mechanism that incentivizes truthful responses to objective evaluations on such platforms. In this mechanism, an agent gets a reward for an evaluation only if her answer matches that of her peer, where this reward is inversely proportional to a popularity index of the answer. This index is defined to be the square root of the empirical frequency at which any two agents performing the same evaluation agree on the particular answer across evaluations of similar entities operating on the platform. Rarely agreed-upon answers thus earn a higher reward than answers for which agreements are relatively more common. We show that in the many tasks regime, the truthful equilibrium under SRA is strictly payoff-dominant across large classes of natural equilibria that could arise in these settings, thus increasing the likelihood of its adoption. While there exist other mechanisms achieving such guarantees, they either impose additional assumptions on the response distribution that are not generally satisfied for objective evaluations or they incentivize truthful behavior only if each agent performs a prohibitively large number of evaluations and commits to using the same strategy for each evaluation. SRA is the first known incentive mechanism satisfying such guarantees without imposing any such requirements. Moreover, our empirical findings demonstrate the robustness of the incentive properties of SRA in the presence of mild subjectivity or observational biases in the responses. These properties make SRA uniquely attractive for administering reward-based incentive schemes (e.g., rebates, discounts, reputation scores, etc.) on online platforms.