Martino Trevisan

Nikhil Jha, Martino Trevisan, Luca Vassio et al.

To protect users' privacy, legislators have regulated the usage of tracking technologies, mandating the acquisition of users' consent before collecting data. Consequently, websites started showing more and more consent management modules -- i.e., Privacy Banners -- the visitors have to interact with to access the website content. They challenge the automatic collection of Web measurements, primarily to monitor the extensiveness of tracking technologies but also to measure Web performance in the wild. Privacy Banners in fact limit crawlers from observing the actual website content. In this paper, we present a thorough measurement campaign focusing on popular websites in Europe and the US, visiting both landing and internal pages from different countries around the world. We engineer Priv-Accept, a Web crawler able to accept the privacy policies, as most users would do in practice. This let us compare how webpages change before and after. Our results show that all measurements performed not dealing with the Privacy Banners offer a very biased and partial view of the Web. After accepting the privacy policies, we observe an increase of up to 70 trackers, which in turn slows down the webpage load time by a factor of 2x-3x.

Nikhil Jha, Thomas Favale, Luca Vassio et al.

With the advent of big data and the birth of the data markets that sell personal information, individuals' privacy is of utmost importance. The classical response is anonymization, i.e., sanitizing the information that can directly or indirectly allow users' re-identification. The most popular solution in the literature is the k-anonymity. However, it is hard to achieve k-anonymity on a continuous stream of data, as well as when the number of dimensions becomes high.In this paper, we propose a novel anonymization property called z-anonymity. Differently from k-anonymity, it can be achieved with zero-delay on data streams and it is well suited for high dimensional data. The idea at the base of z-anonymity is to release an attribute (an atomic information) about a user only if at least z - 1 other users have presented the same attribute in a past time window. z-anonymity is weaker than k-anonymity since it does not work on the combinations of attributes, but treats them individually. In this paper, we present a probabilistic framework to map the z-anonymity into the k-anonymity property. Our results show that a proper choice of the z-anonymity parameters allows the data curator to likely obtain a k-anonymized dataset, with a precisely measurable probability. We also evaluate a real use case, in which we consider the website visits of a population of users and show that z-anonymity can work in practice for obtaining the k-anonymity too.