Debeshee Das

Jie Zhang, Debeshee Das, Gautam Kamath et al.

We consider the problem of a training data proof, where a data creator or owner wants to demonstrate to a third party that some machine learning model was trained on their data. Training data proofs play a key role in recent lawsuits against foundation models trained on web-scale data. Many prior works suggest to instantiate training data proofs using membership inference attacks. We argue that this approach is fundamentally unsound: to provide convincing evidence, the data creator needs to demonstrate that their attack has a low false positive rate, i.e., that the attack's output is unlikely under the null hypothesis that the model was not trained on the target data. Yet, sampling from this null hypothesis is impossible, as we do not know the exact contents of the training set, nor can we (efficiently) retrain a large foundation model. We conclude by offering two paths forward, by showing that data extraction attacks and membership inference on special canary data can be used to create sound training data proofs.

Debeshee Das, Julien Piet, Darya Kaviani et al.

Memory systems enable otherwise-stateless LLM agents to persist user information across sessions, but also introduce a new attack surface. We characterize the Trojan Hippo attack, a class of persistent memory attacks that operates in a more realistic threat model than prior memory poisoning work: the attacker plants a dormant payload into an agent's long-term memory via a single untrusted tool call (e.g., a crafted email), which activates only when the user later discusses sensitive topics such as finance, health, or identity, and exfiltrates high-value personal data to the attacker. While anecdotal demonstrations of such attacks have appeared against deployed systems, no prior work systematically evaluates them across heterogeneous memory architectures and defenses.We introduce a dynamic evaluation framework comprising two components: (1) an OpenEvolve-based adaptive red-teaming benchmark that stress-tests defenses and memory backends against continuously refined attacks, and (2) the first capability-aware security/utility analysis for persistent memory systems, enabling principled reasoning about defense deployment across different usage profiles. Instantiated on an email assistant across four memory backends (explicit tool memory, agentic memory, RAG, and sliding-window context), Trojan Hippo achieves up to 85-100 percent ASR against current frontier models from OpenAI and Google, with planted memories successfully activating even after 100 benign sessions. We evaluate four memory-system defenses inspired by basic security principles, finding they substantially reduce attack success rates (to as low as 0-5 percent), though at utility costs that vary widely with task requirements. Because of this substantial security-utility tradeoff, the effective real-world deployment of defenses remains an open challenge, which our evaluation framework is specifically designed to address.

Alex Mathai, Kranthi Sedamaki, Debeshee Das et al.

Machine Learning (ML) for software engineering (SE) has gained prominence due to its ability to significantly enhance the performance of various SE applications. This progress is largely attributed to the development of generalizable source code representations that effectively capture the syntactic and semantic characteristics of code. In recent years, pre-trained transformer-based models, inspired by natural language processing (NLP), have shown remarkable success in SE tasks. However, source code contains structural and semantic properties embedded within its grammar, which can be extracted from structured code-views like the Abstract Syntax Tree (AST), Data-Flow Graph (DFG), and Control-Flow Graph (CFG). These code-views can complement NLP techniques, further improving SE tasks. Unfortunately, there are no flexible frameworks to infuse arbitrary code-views into existing transformer-based models effectively. Therefore, in this work, we propose CodeSAM, a novel scalable framework to infuse multiple code-views into transformer-based models by creating self-attention masks. We use CodeSAM to fine-tune a small language model (SLM) like CodeBERT on the downstream SE tasks of semantic code search, code clone detection, and program classification. Experimental results show that by using this technique, we improve downstream performance when compared to SLMs like GraphCodeBERT and CodeBERT on all three tasks by utilizing individual code-views or a combination of code-views during fine-tuning. We believe that these results are indicative that techniques like CodeSAM can help create compact yet performant code SLMs that fit in resource constrained settings.

Debeshee Das, Jie Zhang, Florian Tramèr

Membership inference (MI) attacks try to determine if a data sample was used to train a machine learning model. For foundation models trained on unknown Web data, MI attacks are often used to detect copyrighted training materials, measure test set contamination, or audit machine unlearning. Unfortunately, we find that evaluations of MI attacks for foundation models are flawed, because they sample members and non-members from different distributions. For 8 published MI evaluation datasets, we show that blind attacks -- that distinguish the member and non-member distributions without looking at any trained model -- outperform state-of-the-art MI attacks. Existing evaluations thus tell us nothing about membership leakage of a foundation model's training data.