Jonathan Richens

Zachary Kenton, Ramana Kumar, Sebastian Farquhar et al. · deepmind, oxford

Causal models of agents have been used to analyse the safety aspects of machine learning systems. But identifying agents is non-trivial -- often the causal model is just assumed by the modeler without much justification -- and modelling failures can lead to mistakes in the safety analysis. This paper proposes the first formal causal definition of agents -- roughly that agents are systems that would adapt their policy if their actions influenced the world in a different way. From this we derive the first causal discovery algorithm for discovering agents from empirical data, and give algorithms for translating between causal models and game-theoretic influence diagrams. We demonstrate our approach by resolving some previous confusions caused by incorrect causal modelling of agents.

Khimya Khetarpal, Gheorghe Comanici, Jonathan Richens et al.

Full models of the world require complex knowledge of immense detail. While pre-trained large models have been hypothesized to contain similar knowledge due to extensive pre-training on vast amounts of internet scale data, using them directly in a search procedure is inefficient and inaccurate. Conversely, partial models focus on making high quality predictions for a subset of state and actions: those linked through affordances that achieve user intents~\citep{khetarpal2020can}. Can we posit large models as partial world models? We provide a formal answer to this question, proving that agents achieving task-agnostic, language-conditioned intents necessarily possess predictive partial-world models informed by affordances. In the multi-task setting, we introduce distribution-robust affordances and show that partial models can be extracted to significantly improve search efficiency. Empirical evaluations in tabletop robotics tasks demonstrate that our affordance-aware partial models reduce the search branching factor and achieve higher rewards compared to full world models.

Jonathan Richens, Tom Everitt

It has long been hypothesised that causal reasoning plays a fundamental role in robust and general intelligence. However, it is not known if agents must learn causal models in order to generalise to new domains, or if other inductive biases are sufficient. We answer this question, showing that any agent capable of satisfying a regret bound under a large set of distributional shifts must have learned an approximate causal model of the data generating process, which converges to the true causal model for optimal agents. We discuss the implications of this result for several research areas including transfer learning and causal inference.

Jonathan Richens, David Abel, Alexis Bellot et al.

Are world models a necessary ingredient for flexible, goal-directed behaviour, or is model-free learning sufficient? We provide a formal answer to this question, showing that any agent capable of generalizing to multi-step goal-directed tasks must have learned a predictive model of its environment. We show that this model can be extracted from the agent's policy, and that increasing the agents performance or the complexity of the goals it can achieve requires learning increasingly accurate world models. This has a number of consequences: from developing safe and general agents, to bounding agent capabilities in complex environments, and providing new algorithms for eliciting world models from agents.

Tom Everitt, Cristina Garbacea, Alexis Bellot et al.

To what extent do LLMs use their capabilities towards their given goal? We take this as a measure of their goal-directedness. We evaluate goal-directedness on tasks that require information gathering, cognitive effort, and plan execution, where we use subtasks to infer each model's relevant capabilities. Our evaluations of LLMs from Google DeepMind, OpenAI, and Anthropic show that goal-directedness is relatively consistent across tasks, differs from task performance, and is only moderately sensitive to motivational prompts. Notably, most models are not fully goal-directed. We hope our goal-directedness evaluations will enable better monitoring of LLM progress, and enable more deliberate design choices of agentic properties in LLMs.

David Abel, André Barreto, Michael Bowling et al. · deepmind

Agency is a system's capacity to steer outcomes toward a goal, and is a central topic of study across biology, philosophy, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence. Determining if a system exhibits agency is a notoriously difficult question: Dennett (1989), for instance, highlights the puzzle of determining which principles can decide whether a rock, a thermostat, or a robot each possess agency. We here address this puzzle from the viewpoint of reinforcement learning by arguing that agency is fundamentally frame-dependent: Any measurement of a system's agency must be made relative to a reference frame. We support this claim by presenting a philosophical argument that each of the essential properties of agency proposed by Barandiaran et al. (2009) and Moreno (2018) are themselves frame-dependent. We conclude that any basic science of agency requires frame-dependence, and discuss the implications of this claim for reinforcement learning.

David Abel, Michael Bowling, André Barreto et al. · deepmind

Agents are minimally entities that are influenced by their past observations and act to influence future observations. This latter capacity is captured by empowerment, which has served as a vital framing concept across artificial intelligence and cognitive science. This former capacity, however, is equally foundational: In what ways, and to what extent, can an agent be influenced by what it observes? In this paper, we ground this concept in a universal agent-centric measure that we refer to as plasticity, and reveal a fundamental connection to empowerment. Following a set of desiderata on a suitable definition, we define plasticity using a new information-theoretic quantity we call the generalized directed information. We show that this new quantity strictly generalizes the directed information introduced by Massey (1990) while preserving all of its desirable properties. Under this definition, we find that plasticity is well thought of as the mirror of empowerment: The two concepts are defined using the same measure, with only the direction of influence reversed. Our main result establishes a tension between the plasticity and empowerment of an agent, suggesting that agent design needs to be mindful of both characteristics. We explore the implications of these findings, and suggest that plasticity, empowerment, and their relationship are essential to understanding agency

Alexis Bellot, Jonathan Richens, Tom Everitt

As the complexity of AI systems and their interactions with the world increases, generating explanations for their behaviour is important for safely deploying AI. For agents, the most natural abstractions for predicting behaviour attribute beliefs, intentions and goals to the system. If an agent behaves as if it has a certain goal or belief, then we can make reasonable predictions about how it will behave in novel situations, including those where comprehensive safety evaluations are untenable. How well can we infer an agent's beliefs from their behaviour, and how reliably can these inferred beliefs predict the agent's behaviour in novel situations? We provide a precise answer to this question under the assumption that the agent's behaviour is guided by a world model. Our contribution is the derivation of novel bounds on the agent's behaviour in new (unseen) deployment environments, which represent a theoretical limit for predicting intentional agents from behavioural data alone. We discuss the implications of these results for several research areas including fairness and safety.

Albert Buchard, Baptiste Bouvier, Giulia Prando et al.

Medical Triage is of paramount importance to healthcare systems, allowing for the correct orientation of patients and allocation of the necessary resources to treat them adequately. While reliable decision-tree methods exist to triage patients based on their presentation, those trees implicitly require human inference and are not immediately applicable in a fully automated setting. On the other hand, learning triage policies directly from experts may correct for some of the limitations of hard-coded decision-trees. In this work, we present a Deep Reinforcement Learning approach (a variant of DeepQ-Learning) to triage patients using curated clinical vignettes. The dataset, consisting of 1374 clinical vignettes, was created by medical doctors to represent real-life cases. Each vignette is associated with an average of 3.8 expert triage decisions given by medical doctors relying solely on medical history. We show that this approach is on a par with human performance, yielding safe triage decisions in 94% of cases, and matching expert decisions in 85% of cases. The trained agent learns when to stop asking questions, acquires optimized decision policies requiring less evidence than supervised approaches, and adapts to the novelty of a situation by asking for more information. Overall, we demonstrate that a Deep Reinforcement Learning approach can learn effective medical triage policies directly from expert decisions, without requiring expert knowledge engineering. This approach is scalable and can be deployed in healthcare settings or geographical regions with distinct triage specifications, or where trained experts are scarce, to improve decision making in the early stage of care.