Glenn Sun

Paul Beame, Glenn Sun

Because CDCL produces proofs in the Resolution proof system, problems provably hard for Resolution are also provably hard for CDCL. Exponentially shorter proofs can sometimes be found using stronger proof systems such as $\text{Res}(\oplus)$, a generalization of Resolution to XNF formulas, whose constraints are disjunctions of parity equations ("linear clauses") such as $(x \oplus y) \lor \lnot (y \oplus z)$. While some modern solvers like CryptoMiniSAT reason on Boolean clauses with separate parity equations, reasoning about more general linear clauses is less explored. We present $\text{CDCL}(\oplus)$, a generalization of CDCL to XNF formulas, and prove a bidirectional connection with $\text{Res}(\oplus)$: $\text{CDCL}(\oplus)$ not only produces $\text{Res}(\oplus)$ proofs, but also polynomially simulates $\text{Res}(\oplus)$ given nondeterministic decisions and restarts, mirroring the classical relationship between CDCL and Resolution. Our key technical tool is a new set of inference rules for $\text{Res}(\oplus)$ that helps us translate Resolution-based subroutines such as 1-UIP clause learning. Altogether, $\text{CDCL}(\oplus)$'s parity reasoning includes branching on arbitrary parity equations, linear-algebraic reasoning during unit propagation, and learning linear clauses through conflict analysis. We provide a proof-of-concept implementation of $\text{CDCL}(\oplus)$ called Xorcle, which includes adaptations of existing CDCL heuristics to XNF formulas and an extension of LRUP proof logging that we call $\text{LRUP}(\oplus)$. On a selected suite of benchmarks focusing on native XNF formulas, Xorcle outperforms existing solvers such as Kissat and CryptoMiniSAT. Additionally, on Tseitin formulas written in CNF, even without preprocessing, Xorcle's running time appears to scale nearly polynomially.

Paula Kayongo, Glenn Sun, Jason Hartline et al.

In many real-world strategic settings, people use information displays to make decisions. In these settings, an information provider chooses which information to provide to strategic agents and how to present it, and agents formulate a best response based on the information and their anticipation of how others will behave. We contribute the results of a controlled online experiment to examine how the provision and presentation of information impacts people's decisions in a congestion game. Our experiment compares how different visualization approaches for displaying this information, including bar charts and hypothetical outcome plots, and different information conditions, including where the visualized information is private versus public (i.e., available to all agents), affect decision making and welfare. We characterize the effects of visualization anticipation, referring to changes to behavior when an agent goes from alone having access to a visualization to knowing that others also have access to the visualization to guide their decisions. We also empirically identify the visualization equilibrium, i.e., the visualization for which the visualized outcome of agents' decisions matches the realized decisions of the agents who view it. We reflect on the implications of visualization equilibria and visualization anticipation for designing information displays for real-world strategic settings.