Nicolas Gast

Nicolas Gast, Bruno Gaujal, Jean-Yves Le Boudec

We study the convergence of Markov Decision Processes made of a large number of objects to optimization problems on ordinary differential equations (ODE). We show that the optimal reward of such a Markov Decision Process, satisfying a Bellman equation, converges to the solution of a continuous Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation based on the mean field approximation of the Markov Decision Process. We give bounds on the difference of the rewards, and a constructive algorithm for deriving an approximating solution to the Markov Decision Process from a solution of the HJB equations. We illustrate the method on three examples pertaining respectively to investment strategies, population dynamics control and scheduling in queues are developed. They are used to illustrate and justify the construction of the controlled ODE and to show the gain obtained by solving a continuous HJB equation rather than a large discrete Bellman equation.

Mathieu Molina, Nicolas Gast, Patrick Loiseau et al.

We consider the problem of online allocation subject to a long-term fairness penalty. Contrary to existing works, however, we do not assume that the decision-maker observes the protected attributes -- which is often unrealistic in practice. Instead they can purchase data that help estimate them from sources of different quality; and hence reduce the fairness penalty at some cost. We model this problem as a multi-armed bandit problem where each arm corresponds to the choice of a data source, coupled with the online allocation problem. We propose an algorithm that jointly solves both problems and show that it has a regret bounded by $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{T})$. A key difficulty is that the rewards received by selecting a source are correlated by the fairness penalty, which leads to a need for randomization (despite a stochastic setting). Our algorithm takes into account contextual information available before the source selection, and can adapt to many different fairness notions. We also show that in some instances, the estimates used can be learned on the fly.

Romain Cravic, Nicolas Gast, Bruno Gaujal

We propose the first model-free algorithm that achieves low regret performance for decentralized learning in two-player zero-sum tabular stochastic games with infinite-horizon average-reward objective. In decentralized learning, the learning agent controls only one player and tries to achieve low regret performances against an arbitrary opponent. This contrasts with centralized learning where the agent tries to approximate the Nash equilibrium by controlling both players. In our infinite-horizon undiscounted setting, additional structure assumptions is needed to provide good behaviors of learning processes : here we assume for every strategy of the opponent, the agent has a way to go from any state to any other. This assumption is the analogous to the "communicating" assumption in the MDP setting. We show that our Decentralized Optimistic Nash Q-Learning (DONQ-learning) algorithm achieves both sublinear high probability regret of order $T^{3/4}$ and sublinear expected regret of order $T^{2/3}$. Moreover, our algorithm enjoys a low computational complexity and low memory space requirement compared to the previous works of (Wei et al. 2017) and (Jafarnia-Jahromi et al. 2021) in the same setting.

Nicolas Gast, Bruno Gaujal, Adrien Obrecht

In this paper we consider a M/G/1 queue for which we want to minimize the expected response time. We show how to compute indices from $n$ samples of the job size distribution such that the corresponding index policy is asymptotically optimal as $n$ grows. This construction is based on a discretization of the bounded support of the job size distribution and a shift of the samples to their nearest discrete point to the right. We show that the Gittins index of the empirical distribution of these shifted samples is close to the Gittins index of the original distribution. This translates to the asymptotic optimality of the corresponding index policy for minimizing the expected response time. Numerical comparison with other approaches further confirm the efficiency of our approach.

Sebastian Allmeier, Nicolas Gast

We study stochastic approximation algorithms with Markovian noise and constant step-size $α$. We develop a method based on infinitesimal generator comparisons to study the bias of the algorithm, which is the expected difference between $θ_n$ -- the value at iteration $n$ -- and $θ^*$ -- the unique equilibrium of the corresponding ODE. We show that, under some smoothness conditions, this bias is of order $O(α)$. Furthermore, we show that the time-averaged bias is equal to $αV + O(α^2)$, where $V$ is a constant characterized by a Lyapunov equation, showing that $\mathbb{E}[\barθ_n] \approx θ^*+Vα+ O(α^2)$, where $\barθ_n=(1/n)\sum_{k=1}^nθ_k$ is the Polyak-Ruppert average. We also show that $\barθ_n$ converges with high probability around $θ^*+αV$. We illustrate how to combine this with Richardson-Romberg extrapolation to derive an iterative scheme with a bias of order $O(α^2)$.

Vitalii Emelianov, Nicolas Gast, Krishna P. Gummadi et al.

Discrimination in selection problems such as hiring or college admission is often explained by implicit bias from the decision maker against disadvantaged demographic groups. In this paper, we consider a model where the decision maker receives a noisy estimate of each candidate's quality, whose variance depends on the candidate's group -- we argue that such differential variance is a key feature of many selection problems. We analyze two notable settings: in the first, the noise variances are unknown to the decision maker who simply picks the candidates with the highest estimated quality independently of their group; in the second, the variances are known and the decision maker picks candidates having the highest expected quality given the noisy estimate. We show that both baseline decision makers yield discrimination, although in opposite directions: the first leads to underrepresentation of the low-variance group while the second leads to underrepresentation of the high-variance group. We study the effect on the selection utility of imposing a fairness mechanism that we term the $γ$-rule (it is an extension of the classical four-fifths rule and it also includes demographic parity). In the first setting (with unknown variances), we prove that under mild conditions, imposing the $γ$-rule increases the selection utility -- here there is no trade-off between fairness and utility. In the second setting (with known variances), imposing the $γ$-rule decreases the utility but we prove a bound on the utility loss due to the fairness mechanism.

Nicolas Gast, Bruno Gaujal, Kimang Khun

We study learning algorithms for the classical Markovian bandit problem with discount. We explain how to adapt PSRL [24] and UCRL2 [2] to exploit the problem structure. These variants are called MB-PSRL and MB-UCRL2. While the regret bound and runtime of vanilla implementations of PSRL and UCRL2 are exponential in the number of bandits, we show that the episodic regret of MB-PSRL and MB-UCRL2 is $\tilde{O}(S\sqrt{nK})$ where $K$ is the number of episodes, $n$ is the number of bandits and $S$ is the number of states of each bandit (the exact bound in S, n and K is given in the paper). Up to a factor $\sqrt S$, this matches the lower bound of $Ω(\sqrt{SnK})$ that we also derive in the paper. MB-PSRL is also computationally efficient: its runtime is linear in the number of bandits. We further show that this linear runtime cannot be achieved by adapting classical non-Bayesian algorithms such as UCRL2 or UCBVI to Markovian bandit problems. Finally, we perform numerical experiments that confirm that MB-PSRL outperforms other existing algorithms in practice, both in terms of regret and of computation time.

Vitalii Emelianov, George Arvanitakis, Nicolas Gast et al.

The rise of algorithmic decision making led to active researches on how to define and guarantee fairness, mostly focusing on one-shot decision making. In several important applications such as hiring, however, decisions are made in multiple stage with additional information at each stage. In such cases, fairness issues remain poorly understood. In this paper we study fairness in $k$-stage selection problems where additional features are observed at every stage. We first introduce two fairness notions, local (per stage) and global (final stage) fairness, that extend the classical fairness notions to the $k$-stage setting. We propose a simple model based on a probabilistic formulation and show that the locally and globally fair selections that maximize precision can be computed via a linear program. We then define the price of local fairness to measure the loss of precision induced by local constraints; and investigate theoretically and empirically this quantity. In particular, our experiments show that the price of local fairness is generally smaller when the sensitive attribute is observed at the first stage; but globally fair selections are more locally fair when the sensitive attribute is observed at the second stage---hence in both cases it is often possible to have a selection that has a small price of local fairness and is close to locally fair.

Nicolas Gast, Stratis Ioannidis, Patrick Loiseau et al.

Linear regression is a fundamental building block of statistical data analysis. It amounts to estimating the parameters of a linear model that maps input features to corresponding outputs. In the classical setting where the precision of each data point is fixed, the famous Aitken/Gauss-Markov theorem in statistics states that generalized least squares (GLS) is a so-called "Best Linear Unbiased Estimator" (BLUE). In modern data science, however, one often faces strategic data sources, namely, individuals who incur a cost for providing high-precision data. In this paper, we study a setting in which features are public but individuals choose the precision of the outputs they reveal to an analyst. We assume that the analyst performs linear regression on this dataset, and individuals benefit from the outcome of this estimation. We model this scenario as a game where individuals minimize a cost comprising two components: (a) an (agent-specific) disclosure cost for providing high-precision data; and (b) a (global) estimation cost representing the inaccuracy in the linear model estimate. In this game, the linear model estimate is a public good that benefits all individuals. We establish that this game has a unique non-trivial Nash equilibrium. We study the efficiency of this equilibrium and we prove tight bounds on the price of stability for a large class of disclosure and estimation costs. Finally, we study the estimator accuracy achieved at equilibrium. We show that, in general, Aitken's theorem does not hold under strategic data sources, though it does hold if individuals have identical disclosure costs (up to a multiplicative factor). When individuals have non-identical costs, we derive a bound on the improvement of the equilibrium estimation cost that can be achieved by deviating from GLS, under mild assumptions on the disclosure cost functions.