Federica Pascucci

Gabriele Oliva, Stefano Panzieri, Federica Pascucci et al.

Localization is a fundamental task for sensor networks. Traditional network construction approaches allow to obtain localized networks requiring the nodes to be at least tri-connected (in 2D), i.e., the communication graph needs to be globally rigid. In this paper we exploit, besides the information on the neighbors sensed by each robot/sensor, also the information about the lack of communication among nodes. The result is a framework where the nodes are required to be bi-connected and the communication graph has to be rigid. This is possible considering a novel typology of link, namely Shadow Edges, that account for the lack of communication among nodes and allow to reduce the uncertainty associated to the position of the nodes.

Riccardo Colelli, Chiara Foglietta, Roberto Fusacchia et al.

Critical Infrastructures (CIs) such as power grid, water and gas distribution are controlled by Industrial Control Systems (ICS). Sensors and actuators of a physical plant are managed by the ICS. Data and commands transmitted over the network from the Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) are saved and parsed within the Historian. Generally, this architecture guarantees to check for any process anomalies that may occur due to component failures and cyber attacks. The other use of this data allows activities such as forensic analysis. To secure the network is also crucial to protect the communication between devices. A cyber attack on the log devices could jeopardize any forensic analysis be it for maintenance, or discovering an attack trail. In this paper is proposed a strategy to secure plant operational data recorded in the Historian and data exchange in the network. An integrity checking mechanism, in combination with blockchain, is used to ensure data integrity. Data redundancy is achieved by applying an efficient replication mechanism and enables data recovery after an attack.

Riccardo Colelli, Filippo Magri, Stefano Panzieri et al.

Over the past decade, industrial control systems have experienced a massive integration with information technologies. Industrial networks have undergone numerous technical transformations to protect operational and production processes, leading today to a new industrial revolution. Information Technology tools are not able to guarantee confidentiality, integrity and availability in the industrial domain, therefore it is of paramount importance to understand the interaction of the physical components with the networks. For this reason, usually, the industrial control systems are an example of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). This paper aims to provide a tool for the detection of cyber attacks in cyber-physical systems. This method is based on Machine Learning to increase the security of the system. Through the analysis of the values assumed by Machine Learning it is possible to evaluate the classification performance of the three models. The model obtained using the training set, allows to classify a sample of anomalous behavior and a sample that is related to normal behavior. The attack identification is implemented in water tank system, and the identification approach using Machine Learning aims to avoid dangerous states, such as the overflow of a tank. The results are promising, demonstrating its effectiveness.