Zeta Avarikioti

Zeta Avarikioti, Eleftherios Kokoris Kogias, Ray Neiheiser et al.

The security of many Proof-of-Stake (PoS) payment systems relies on quorum-based State Machine Replication (SMR) protocols. While classical analyses assume purely Byzantine faults, real-world systems must tolerate both arbitrary failures and strategic, profit-driven validators. We therefore study quorum-based SMR under a hybrid model with honest, Byzantine, and rational participants. We first establish the fundamental limitations of traditional consensus mechanisms, proving two impossibility results: (1) in partially synchronous networks, no quorum-based protocol can achieve SMR when rational and Byzantine validators collectively exceed $1/3$ of the participants; and (2) even under synchronous network assumptions, SMR remains unattainable if this coalition comprises more than $2/3$ of the validator set. Assuming a synchrony bound $Δ$, we show how to extend any quorum-based SMR protocol to tolerate up to $1/3$ Byzantine and $1/3$ rational validators by modifying only its finalization rule. Our approach enforces a necessary bound on the total transaction volume finalized within any time window $Δ$ and introduces the \emph{strongest chain rule}, which enables efficient finalization of transactions when a supermajority of honest participants provably supports execution. Empirical analysis of Ethereum and Cosmos demonstrates validator participation exceeding the required $5/6$ threshold in over $99%$ of blocks, supporting the practicality of our design. Finally, we present a recovery mechanism that restores safety and liveness after consistency violations, even with up to $5/9$ Byzantine stake and $1/9$ rational stake, guaranteeing full reimbursement of provable client losses.

Zeta Avarikioti, Matteo Maffei, Yuheng Wang

Layer 2 (L2) protocols, payment channels, sidechains, and rollups, are central to blockchain scalability, enabling off-chain execution while preserving on-chain security. Despite growing deployment, existing security models remain protocol-specific and monolithic, hindering compositional reasoning and principled comparison of assumptions and requirements. We present a general security framework for L2 protocols in the IITM-style Universal Composability (iUC) model. At its core is a modular ideal functionality F_layer2 that abstracts mechanism-specific details while capturing the essential structure of L2 systems through composable subroutines for joining, submission, updating, reading, and settlement under adversarial conditions. This yields uniform definitions of safety, liveness, and data availability across a broad class of L2 protocols. We demonstrate generality by instantiating the framework for three representative constructions: the Brick payment channel, the Liquid sidechain, and the Arbitrum Nitro rollup. Each case study yields a protocol-specific ideal functionality derived from F_layer2 and tailored to its assumptions. Our analysis (i) establishes security via simulation-based proofs, (ii) exposes inherent trade-offs among safety, liveness, and data availability, and (iii) derives lower bounds characterizing fundamental limitations of each design class. Finally, we illustrate the framework as a design tool by presenting FRoll, the first optimistic rollup protocol with fast-finality guarantees, together with a security analysis in our model, showing how the framework supports requirement-driven design of L2 protocols.

Zeta Avarikioti, Ray Neiheiser, Krzysztof Pietrzak et al.

Over the last years, Ethereum has evolved into a public platform that safeguards the savings of hundreds of millions of people and secures more than $650 billion in assets, placing it among the top 25 stock exchanges worldwide in market capitalization, ahead of Singapore, Mexico, and Thailand. As such, the performance and security of the Ethereum blockchain are not only of theoretical interest, but also carry significant global economic implications. At the time of writing, the Ethereum platform is collectively secured by almost one million validators highlighting its decentralized nature and underlining its economic security guarantees. However, due to this large validator set, the protocol takes around 15 minutes to finalize a block which is prohibitively slow for many real world applications. This delay is largely driven by the cost of aggregating and disseminating signatures across a validator set of this scale. Furthermore, as we show in this paper, the existing protocol that is used to aggregate and disseminate the signatures has several shortcomings that can be exploited by adversaries to shift stake proportion from honest to adversarial nodes. In this paper, we introduce Wonderboom, the first million scale aggregation protocol that can efficiently aggregate the signatures of millions of validators in a single Ethereum slot (x32 faster) while offering higher security guarantees than the state of the art protocol used in Ethereum. Furthermore, to evaluate Wonderboom, we implement the first simulation tool that can simulate such a protocol on the million scale and show that even in the worst case Wonderboom can aggregate and verify more than 2 million signatures within a single Ethereum slot.

Zeta Avarikioti, Georg Fuchsbauer, Pim Keer et al.

Blockchains rely on economic incentives to ensure secure and decentralised operation, making incentive compatibility a core design concern. However, protocols are rarely deployed in isolation. Applications interact with the underlying consensus and network layers, and multiple protocols may run concurrently on the same chain. These interactions give rise to complex incentive dynamics that traditional, isolated analyses often fail to capture. We propose the first compositional game-theoretic framework for blockchain protocols. Our model represents blockchain protocols as interacting games across the application, network, and consensus layers. It enables formal reasoning about incentive compatibility under composition by introducing two key abstractions: the cross-layer game, which models how strategies in one layer influence others, and cross-application composition, which captures how application protocols interact concurrently through shared infrastructure. We illustrate our framework through case studies on Hashed Timelock Contracts (HTLCs), Layer-2 protocols, and Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) showing how compositional analysis reveals new subtle incentive vulnerabilities and supports modular security proofs. Also, by introduction of a novel rational miner model, we derive new conditions for the robustness of timelocks to bribing attacks.

Pim Keer, Matteo Maffei, Marco Argentieri et al.

Bitcoin is the cryptocurrency with the largest market capitalisation, but its widespread adoption is fundamentally limited by the scalability constraints of its consensus algorithm, which requires every transaction to be confirmed onchain. To address this, several Layer-2 scalability solutions have been proposed to move payments offchain -- most notably, the Lightning Network. However, their deployment remains hindered by cumbersome setup requirements: users must lock funds onchain to participate and engage in complex auxiliary protocols (e.g., for channel rebalancing, top-ups, and routing). Other solutions, like payment pools, sidechains and rollups, cannot be implemented in a non-custodial way on Bitcoin due to its limited scripting capabilities, or require all protocol participants to update the offchain state. In this work, we present Ark, the first Bitcoin-compatible commit-chain. Ark enables offchain transactions of virtual UTXOs (VTXOs), through an untrusted operator who aggregates them into succinct onchain commitments. A distinctive feature of Ark is its ease of deployment: users can receive offchain payments without locking any funds beforehand and Ark state updates can be performed only requiring the users involved in that update. We formally define the Ark protocol and prove its security. During this process, we identified two attacks affecting the testnet implementation, which we responsibly disclosed and proposed fixes for, which have been now integrated into the mainnet implementation. Our experimental evaluation demonstrates that Ark can commit onchain to batches of arbitrarily many VTXOs with a constant-sized footprint of approximately 200 vB. Cooperative exits add one output per user, while unilateral exits require $\mathcal{O}(\log n)$ transactions of roughly 150 vB per VTXO for a batch of $n$ VTXOs.

Zeta Avarikioti, Krzysztof Pietrzak, Iosif Salem et al.

Payment channels effectively move the transaction load off-chain thereby successfully addressing the inherent scalability problem most cryptocurrencies face. A major drawback of payment channels is the need to ``top up'' funds on-chain when a channel is depleted. Rebalancing was proposed to alleviate this issue, where parties with depleting channels move their funds along a cycle to replenish their channels off-chain. Protocols for rebalancing so far either introduce local solutions or compromise privacy. In this work, we present an opt-in rebalancing protocol that is both private and globally optimal, meaning our protocol maximizes the total amount of rebalanced funds. We study rebalancing from the framework of linear programming. To obtain full privacy guarantees, we leverage multi-party computation in solving the linear program, which is executed by selected participants to maintain efficiency. Finally, we efficiently decompose the rebalancing solution into incentive-compatible cycles which conserve user balances when executed atomically. Keywords: Payment Channel Networks, Privacy and Rebalancing.