Benjamin von Berg

Benjamin von Berg, Bernhard K. Aichernig

AALpy is a well-established open-source automata learning library written in Python with a focus on active learning of systems with IO behavior. It provides a wide range of state-of-the-art algorithms for different automaton types ranging from fully deterministic to probabilistic automata. In this work, we present the recent addition of a generalized implementation of an important method from the domain of passive automata learning: state-merging in the red-blue framework. Using a common internal representation for different automaton types allows for a general and highly configurable implementation of the red-blue framework. We describe how to define and execute state-merging algorithms using AALpy, which reduces the implementation effort for state-merging algorithms mainly to the definition of compatibility criteria and scoring. This aids the implementation of both existing and novel algorithms. In particular, defining some existing state-merging algorithms from the literature with AALpy only takes a few lines of code.

Claudio Canella, Jo Van Bulck, Michael Schwarz et al.

Research on transient execution attacks including Spectre and Meltdown showed that exception or branch misprediction events might leave secret-dependent traces in the CPU's microarchitectural state. This observation led to a proliferation of new Spectre and Meltdown attack variants and even more ad-hoc defenses (e.g., microcode and software patches). Both the industry and academia are now focusing on finding effective defenses for known issues. However, we only have limited insight on residual attack surface and the completeness of the proposed defenses. In this paper, we present a systematization of transient execution attacks. Our systematization uncovers 6 (new) transient execution attacks that have been overlooked and not been investigated so far: 2 new exploitable Meltdown effects: Meltdown-PK (Protection Key Bypass) on Intel, and Meltdown-BND (Bounds Check Bypass) on Intel and AMD; and 4 new Spectre mistraining strategies. We evaluate the attacks in our classification tree through proof-of-concept implementations on 3 major CPU vendors (Intel, AMD, ARM). Our systematization yields a more complete picture of the attack surface and allows for a more systematic evaluation of defenses. Through this systematic evaluation, we discover that most defenses, including deployed ones, cannot fully mitigate all attack variants.