Efthymios Karangelos

Efthymios Karangelos, Patrick Panciatici, Louis Wehenkel

This paper investigates the stakes of introducing probabilistic approaches for the management of power system's security. In real-time operation, the aim is to arbitrate in a rational way between preventive and corrective control, while taking into account i) the prior probabilities of contingencies, ii) the possible failure modes of corrective control actions, iii) the socio-economic consequences of service interruptions. This work is a first step towards the construction of a globally coherent decision making framework for security management from long-term system expansion, via mid-term asset management, towards short-term operation planning and real-time operation.

Kirill Kuroptev, Florian Steinke, Efthymios Karangelos

This paper examines defending the power grid against load-altering attacks using electric vehicle charging. It proposes to preventively segment the cyber infrastructure that charging station operators (CSOs) use to communicate with and control their charging stations, thereby limiting the impact of successful cyber-attacks. Using real German charging station data and a reconstructed transmission grid model, a threat analysis shows that without segmentation, the successful hack of just two CSOs can overload two transmission grid branches, exceeding the N-1 security margin and necessitating defense measures. A novel defense design problem is then formulated that minimizes the number of imposed segmentations while bounding the number of branch overloads under worst-case attacks. The resulting IP-MILP bi-level problem can be solved with an exact column and constraint generation algorithm and with heuristics for fast computation on large-scale instances. For the near-real-world Germany case, the applicability of the heuristics is demonstrated and validated under relevant load and dispatch scenarios. It is found that the simple scheme of segmenting CSOs evenly by their installed capacity leads to only 23% more segments compared to the heuristic optimization result, suggesting potential relevance as a regulatory measure.

Efthymios Karangelos, Louis Wehenkel

We model the risk posed by a malicious cyber-attacker seeking to induce grid insecurity by means of a load redistribution attack, while explicitly acknowledging that such an actor would plausibly base its decision strategy on imperfect information. More specifically, we introduce a novel formulation for the cyber-attacker's decision-making problem and analyze the distribution of decisions taken with randomly inaccurate data on the grid branch admittances or capacities, and the distribution of their respective impact. Our findings indicate that inaccurate admittance values most often lead to suboptimal cyber-attacks that still compromise the grid security, while inaccurate capacity values result in notably less effective attacks. We also find common attacked cyber-assets and common affected physical-assets between all (random) imperfect cyber-attacks, which could be exploited in a preventive and/or corrective sense for effective cyber-physical risk management.