Ramij Rahaman

Ramij Rahaman

We present a device independently secure quantum scheme for p-threshold all-or-nothing oblivious transfer. Novelty of the scheme is that, its security does not depend -- unlike the usual case -- on any quantum bit commitment protocol, rather it depends on Hardy's argument for two-qubit system. This scheme is shown to be unconditionally secure against any strategy allowed by quantum mechanics. By providing a secure scheme for all-or-nothing quantum oblivious transfer, we have answered a long standing open problem, other than the quantum key distribution, whether there is any two-party quantum cryptographic protocol, which is unconditionally secure.

Ramij Rahaman, Guruprasad Kar

Anonymous Veto (AV) and Dining cryptographers (DC) are two basic primitives for the cryptographic problems where the main aim is to hide the identity of the senders of the messages. These can be achieved by classical methods where the security is based either on computational hardness or on shared private keys. In this regard, we present a secure quantum protocol for both DC and AV by exploiting the GHZ correlations. We first solve a generalized version of the DC problem with the help of multiparty GHZ state. This allow us to provide a secure quantum protocol for the AV. Securities for both the protocols rely on some novel and fundamental features of GHZ correlations related to quantum nonlocality.

Ramij Rahaman, Marcin Wieśniak, Marek Żukowski

We present a device-independent quantum scheme for the {\em Byzantine Generals} problem. The protocol is for three parties. Party $C$ is to send two identical one bit messages to parties $A$ and $B$. The receivers $A$ and $B$ may exchange two one bit messages informing the other party on the message received from $C$. A bit flipping error in one of the transmissions, does not allow the receiving parties to establish what was the message of $C$. Our quantum scheme has the feature that if the messages of the Byzantine protocol are readable (that is give an unambiguous bit value for any of the receivers), then any error by $C$ (cheating by one of the commanding general) is impossible. $A$ and $B$ do not have to exchange protocol messages to be sure of this.

Ramij Rahaman, Matthew G. Parker

In this paper we analyze the (im)possibility of the exact distinguishability of orthogonal multipartite entangled states under {\em restricted local operation and classical communication}. Based on this local distinguishability analysis we propose a new scheme for quantum secret sharing (QSS). Our QSS scheme is quite general and cost efficient compared to other schemes. In our scheme no joint quantum operation is needed to reconstruct the secret. We also present an interesting $(2,n)$-threshold QSS scheme, where any two cooperating players, one from each of two disjoint groups of players, can always reconstruct the secret. This QSS scheme is quite uncommon, as most $(k,n)$-threshold schemes have the restriction $k\geq\lceil\frac{n}{2}\rceil$.

Ramij Rahaman, Matthew G. Parker, Piotr Mironowicz et al.

We provide an analysis of a new family of device independent quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols with several novel features: (a) The bits used for the secret key do not come from the results of the measurements on an entangled state but from the choices of settings; (b) Instead of a single security parameter (a violation of some Bell inequality) a set of them is used to estimate the level of trust in the secrecy of the key. The main advantage of these protocols is a smaller vulnerability to imperfect random number generators made possible by feature (a). We prove the security and the robustness of such protocols. We show that using our method it is possible to construct a QKD protocol which retains its security even if the source of randomness used by communicating parties is strongly biased. As a proof of principle, an explicit example of a protocol based on the Hardy's paradox is presented. Moreover, in the noiseless case, the protocol is secure in a natural way against any type of memory attack, and thus allows to reuse the device in subsequent rounds. We also analyse the robustness of the protocol using semi-definite programming methods. Finally, we present a post-processing method, and observe a paradoxical property that rejecting some random part of the private data can increase the key rate of the protocol.