Rafael Uetz

Luis Alberto Benthin Sanguino, Rafael Uetz

In this paper, we analyze the Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) dictionary and the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) feeds. These repositories are widely used in Vulnerability Management Systems (VMSs) to check for known vulnerabilities in software products. The analysis shows, among other issues, a lack of synchronization between both datasets that can lead to incorrect results output by VMSs relying on those datasets. To deal with these problems, we developed a method that recommends to a user a prioritized list of CPE identifiers for a given software product. The user can then assign (and, if necessary, adapt) the most suitable CPE identifier to the software so that regular (e.g., daily) checks can find known vulnerabilities for this software in the CVE feeds. Our evaluation of this method shows that this interaction is indeed necessary because a fully automated CPE assignment is prone to errors due to the CPE and CVE shortcomings. We implemented an open-source VMS that employs the proposed method and published it on GitHub.

Rafael Uetz, Christian Hemminghaus, Louis Hackländer et al.

Artifacts such as log data and network traffic are fundamental for cybersecurity research, e.g., in the area of intrusion detection. Yet, most research is based on artifacts that are not available to others or cannot be adapted to own purposes, thus making it difficult to reproduce and build on existing work. In this paper, we identify the challenges of artifact generation with the goal of conducting sound experiments that are valid, controlled, and reproducible. We argue that testbeds for artifact generation have to be designed specifically with reproducibility and adaptability in mind. To achieve this goal, we present SOCBED, our proof-of-concept implementation and the first testbed with a focus on generating realistic log data for cybersecurity experiments in a reproducible and adaptable manner. SOCBED enables researchers to reproduce testbed instances on commodity computers, adapt them according to own requirements, and verify their correct functionality. We evaluate SOCBED with an exemplary, practical experiment on detecting a multi-step intrusion of an enterprise network and show that the resulting experiment is indeed valid, controlled, and reproducible. Both SOCBED and the log dataset underlying our evaluation are freely available.