Giuseppe D'Alconzo

CC
3papers
Novelty45%
AI Score33

3 Papers

33.8AGMar 10
Linear Code Equivalence via Plücker Coordinates

Gessica Alecci, Giuseppe D'Alconzo

The assumed hardness of the Linear Code Equivalence problem (LCE) lies at the core of the security of the LESS signature scheme and other signature schemes with advanced functionalities. The LCE problem asks to determine whether two linear codes are equivalent. This equivalence is represented by a monomial matrix $ Q$, i.e. the product of a diagonal matrix $D$ and a permutation matrix $P$. The recovery of $Q= DP$ is known to be reduced to the recovery of the permutation matrix $ P$ alone. Exploiting this fact, we construct an algebraic model for LCE involving only the matrix $P$. To this end, we study the action of monomial matrices on linear codes using tools from algebraic geometry, including Plücker coordinates and fields of invariant rational functions. In particular, we analyse the action of diagonal matrices on linear codes, which can be interpreted as diagonal scaling of the coordinates of elements of the Grassmannian. We propose a method to determine algebraically independent generators of the field of rational functions invariant under this action, without relying on Reynolds operators or Gröbner basis computations. Furthermore, given two equivalent codes, we apply our results to explicitly construct, for each invariant function, a polynomial having $P$ as a root. However, the resulting polynomials are not of practical use: their degrees are high for cryptographically relevant parameters, and the number of monomials grows exponentially, making them infeasible to manipulate. Despite this limitation, our results are of theoretical interest, as they constitute the first application of these tools to the cryptanalysis of LCE and provide insight into how algebraic geometry and invariant theory can be employed in Cryptography.

CCFeb 28, 2022
A Note on the Hardness of Problems from Cryptographic Group Actions

Giuseppe D'Alconzo

Given a cryptographic group action, we show that the Group Action Inverse Problem (GAIP) and other related problems cannot be NP-hard unless the Polynomial Hierarchy collapses. We show this via random self-reductions and the design of interactive proofs. Since cryptographic group actions are the building block of many security protocols, this result serves both as an upper bound on the worst-case complexity of some cryptographic assumptions and as proof that the hardness in the worst and in the average case coincide. We also point out the link with Graph Isomorphism and other related NP intermediate problems.

CRDec 1, 2021
Security issues of CFS-like digital signature algorithms

Giuseppe D'Alconzo, Alessio Meneghetti, Paolo Piasenti

We analyse the security of some variants of the CFS code-based digital signature scheme. We show how the adoption of some code-based hash-functions to improve the efficiency of CFS leads to the ability of an attacker to produce a forgery compatible to the rightful user's public key.