Nir Rosenfeld

Itay Itzhak, Gabriel Stanovsky, Nir Rosenfeld et al.

Recent studies show that instruction tuning (IT) and reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) improve the abilities of large language models (LMs) dramatically. While these tuning methods can help align models with human objectives and generate high-quality text, not much is known about their potential adverse effects. In this work, we investigate the effect of IT and RLHF on decision making and reasoning in LMs, focusing on three cognitive biases - the decoy effect, the certainty effect, and the belief bias - all of which are known to influence human decision-making and reasoning. Our findings highlight the presence of these biases in various models from the GPT-3, Mistral, and T5 families. Notably, we find a stronger presence of biases in models that have undergone instruction tuning, such as Flan-T5, Mistral-Instruct, GPT3.5, and GPT4. Our work constitutes a step toward comprehending cognitive biases in instruction-tuned LMs, which is crucial for the development of more reliable and unbiased language models.

Bana Sadi, Eden Saig, Nir Rosenfeld

Prediction algorithms are increasingly used to inform decisions about humans, but maximizing accuracy$\rule[0.25em]{1em}{0.4pt}$the standard learning objective$\rule[0.25em]{1em}{0.4pt}$does not necessarily maximize user benefits. Instead, we propose optimizing social welfare, defined as the average gain users receive from correct predictions. Welfare enables to express, and therefore account for, heterogeneity in how much users benefit from accuracy. But since these valuations are private and users can gain from overreporting them, learning must simultaneously elicit truthful values and optimize welfare with respect to them. To this end, we propose a novel learning algorithm that incorporates a truthful auction. We show how to compute allocations and prices efficiently, and bound the number of paying users$\rule[0.25em]{1em}{0.4pt}$ which surprisingly is independent of the sample size. We conclude with experiments on real and synthetic data that demonstrate our algorithm and explore the connections between welfare and accuracy.

Amir Feder, Guy Horowitz, Yoav Wald et al.

Accurately predicting the relevance of items to users is crucial to the success of many social platforms. Conventional approaches train models on logged historical data; but recommendation systems, media services, and online marketplaces all exhibit a constant influx of new content -- making relevancy a moving target, to which standard predictive models are not robust. In this paper, we propose a learning framework for relevance prediction that is robust to changes in the data distribution. Our key observation is that robustness can be obtained by accounting for how users causally perceive the environment. We model users as boundedly-rational decision makers whose causal beliefs are encoded by a causal graph, and show how minimal information regarding the graph can be used to contend with distributional changes. Experiments in multiple settings demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach.

Eden Saig, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Nir Rosenfeld

When machine learning is outsourced to a rational agent, conflicts of interest might arise and severely impact predictive performance. In this work, we propose a theoretical framework for incentive-aware delegation of machine learning tasks. We model delegation as a principal-agent game, in which accurate learning can be incentivized by the principal using performance-based contracts. Adapting the economic theory of contract design to this setting, we define budget-optimal contracts and prove they take a simple threshold form under reasonable assumptions. In the binary-action case, the optimality of such contracts is shown to be equivalent to the classic Neyman-Pearson lemma, establishing a formal connection between contract design and statistical hypothesis testing. Empirically, we demonstrate that budget-optimal contracts can be constructed using small-scale data, leveraging recent advances in the study of learning curves and scaling laws. Performance and economic outcomes are evaluated using synthetic and real-world classification tasks.

Guy Horowitz, Nir Rosenfeld

When users can benefit from certain predictive outcomes, they may be prone to act to achieve those outcome, e.g., by strategically modifying their features. The goal in strategic classification is therefore to train predictive models that are robust to such behavior. However, the conventional framework assumes that changing features does not change actual outcomes, which depicts users as "gaming" the system. Here we remove this assumption, and study learning in a causal strategic setting where true outcomes do change. Focusing on accuracy as our primary objective, we show how strategic behavior and causal effects underlie two complementing forms of distribution shift. We characterize these shifts, and propose a learning algorithm that balances between these two forces and over time, and permits end-to-end training. Experiments on synthetic and semi-synthetic data demonstrate the utility of our approach.

Antonio Gois, Sophia Gunluk, Nir Rosenfeld et al.

In strategic classification, an institution (e.g., a bank) anticipates adaptation from users who change their features to increase utility in a classification task (e.g., loan repayment). Since a key challenge is the distribution shift induced by users, we turn to causal models, which have been shown to bound the worst-case out-of-distribution (OOD) risk, and establish several new results that link causality and strategic classification. First, we show that causal classification leads to optimal classification error after any sufficiently large adaptation, when the noise is bounded in a certain way. Second, when these assumptions do not hold, we show OOD cross-entropy risk of optimal classifiers decomposes into an OOD bias term and a term arising from not using all observable features, allowing us to understand when causal classifiers have an advantage. Finally, we show that the use of causal features can allow alignment of long-term incentives between institutions and users, contrasting with previous work that highlights social costs of such approaches. We validate our theory empirically on synthetic data, finding that our results predict behavior in practice.

Itay Eilat, Nir Rosenfeld

The primary goal in recommendation is to suggest relevant content to users, but optimizing for accuracy often results in recommendations that lack diversity. To remedy this, conventional approaches such as re-ranking improve diversity by presenting more diverse items. Here we argue that to promote inherent and prolonged diversity, the system must encourage its creation. Towards this, we harness the performative nature of recommendation, and show how learning can incentivize strategic content creators to create diverse content. Our approach relies on a novel form of regularization that anticipates strategic changes to content, and penalizes for content homogeneity. We provide analytic and empirical results that demonstrate when and how diversity can be incentivized, and experimentally demonstrate the utility of our approach on synthetic and semi-synthetic data.

Itay Eilat, Ben Finkelshtein, Chaim Baskin et al.

Strategic classification studies learning in settings where users can modify their features to obtain favorable predictions. Most current works focus on simple classifiers that trigger independent user responses. Here we examine the implications of learning with more elaborate models that break the independence assumption. Motivated by the idea that applications of strategic classification are often social in nature, we focus on \emph{graph neural networks}, which make use of social relations between users to improve predictions. Using a graph for learning introduces inter-user dependencies in prediction; our key point is that strategic users can exploit these to promote their goals. As we show through analysis and simulation, this can work either against the system -- or for it. Based on this, we propose a differentiable framework for strategically-robust learning of graph-based classifiers. Experiments on several real networked datasets demonstrate the utility of our approach.

Vineet Nair, Ganesh Ghalme, Inbal Talgam-Cohen et al.

Humans have come to rely on machines for reducing excessive information to manageable representations. But this reliance can be abused -- strategic machines might craft representations that manipulate their users. How can a user make good choices based on strategic representations? We formalize this as a learning problem, and pursue algorithms for decision-making that are robust to manipulation. In our main setting of interest, the system represents attributes of an item to the user, who then decides whether or not to consume. We model this interaction through the lens of strategic classification (Hardt et al. 2016), reversed: the user, who learns, plays first; and the system, which responds, plays second. The system must respond with representations that reveal `nothing but the truth' but need not reveal the entire truth. Thus, the user faces the problem of learning set functions under strategic subset selection, which presents distinct algorithmic and statistical challenges. Our main result is a learning algorithm that minimizes error despite strategic representations, and our theoretical analysis sheds light on the trade-off between learning effort and susceptibility to manipulation.

Elan Rosenfeld, Nir Rosenfeld

The goal of strategic classification is to learn decision rules which are robust to strategic input manipulation. Earlier works assume that these responses are known; while some recent works handle unknown responses, they exclusively study online settings with repeated model deployments. But there are many domains$\unicode{x2014}$particularly in public policy, a common motivating use case$\unicode{x2014}$where multiple deployments are infeasible, or where even one bad round is unacceptable. To address this gap, we initiate the formal study of one-shot strategic classification under unknown responses, which requires committing to a single classifier once. Focusing on uncertainty in the users' cost function, we begin by proving that for a broad class of costs, even a small mis-estimation of the true cost can entail trivial accuracy in the worst case. In light of this, we frame the task as a minimax problem, aiming to minimize worst-case risk over an uncertainty set of costs. We design efficient algorithms for both the full-batch and stochastic settings, which we prove converge (offline) to the minimax solution at the rate of $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{-\frac{1}{2}})$. Our analysis reveals important structure stemming from strategic responses, particularly the value of dual norm regularization with respect to the cost function.

Eden Saig, Nir Rosenfeld

Optimizing user engagement is a key goal for modern recommendation systems, but blindly pushing users towards increased consumption risks burn-out, churn, or even addictive habits. To promote digital well-being, most platforms now offer a service that periodically prompts users to take breaks. These, however, must be set up manually, and so may be suboptimal for both users and the system. In this paper, we study the role of breaks in recommendation, and propose a framework for learning optimal breaking policies that promote and sustain long-term engagement. Based on the notion that recommendation dynamics are susceptible to both positive and negative feedback, we cast recommendation as a Lotka-Volterra dynamical system, where breaking reduces to a problem of optimal control. We then give an efficient learning algorithm, provide theoretical guarantees, and empirically demonstrate the utility of our approach on semi-synthetic data.

Omer Nahum, Gali Noti, David Parkes et al.

Congestion is a common failure mode of markets, where consumers compete inefficiently on the same subset of goods (e.g., chasing the same small set of properties on a vacation rental platform). The typical economic story is that prices decongest by balancing supply and demand. But in modern online marketplaces, prices are typically set in a decentralized way by sellers, and the information about items is inevitably partial. The power of a platform is limited to controlling representations -- the subset of information about items presented by default to users. This motivates the present study of decongestion by representation, where a platform seeks to learn representations that reduce congestion and thus improve social welfare. The technical challenge is twofold: relying only on revealed preferences from the choices of consumers, rather than true preferences; and the combinatorial problem associated with representations that determine the features to reveal in the default view. We tackle both challenges by proposing a differentiable proxy of welfare that can be trained end-to-end on consumer choice data. We develop sufficient conditions for when decongestion promotes welfare, and present the results of extensive experiments on both synthetic and real data that demonstrate the utility of our approach.

Yuval Filmus, Shay Moran, Elizaveta Nesterova et al.

Strategic classification studies learning settings in which individuals can modify their features, at a cost, in order to influence the classifier's decision. A central question is how the sample complexity of the induced (strategic) hypothesis class depends on the complexities of the underlying hypothesis class and the cost structure governing feasible manipulations. Prior work has shown that in several natural settings, such as linear classifiers with norm costs, the induced complexity can be controlled. We begin by showing that such guarantees fail in general - even in simple cases: there exist hypothesis classes of VC dimension $1$ on the real line such that, even under the simplest interval neighborhoods, the induced class has infinite VC dimension. Thus, strategic behavior can turn an easy learning problem into a non-learnable one. To overcome this, we introduce structure via a geometric definability assumption: both the hypothesis class and the cost-induced neighborhood relation can be defined by first-order formulas over $\mathbb{R}_{\mathtt{exp}}$. Intuitively, this means that hypotheses and costs can be described using arithmetic operations, exponentiation, logarithms, and comparisons. This captures a broad range of natural classes and cost functions, including $\ell_p$ distances, Wasserstein distance, and information-theoretic divergences. Under this assumption, we prove that learnability is preserved, with sample complexity controlled by the complexity of the defining formulas.

Guy Horowitz, Yonatan Sommer, Moran Koren et al.

When users stand to gain from certain predictions, they are prone to act strategically to obtain favorable predictive outcomes. Whereas most works on strategic classification consider user actions that manifest as feature modifications, we study a novel setting in which users decide -- in response to the learned classifier -- whether to at all participate (or not). For learning approaches of increasing strategic awareness, we study the effects of self-selection on learning, and the implications of learning on the composition of the self-selected population. We then propose a differentiable framework for learning under self-selective behavior, which can be optimized effectively. We conclude with experiments on real data and simulated behavior that both complement our analysis and demonstrate the utility of our approach.

Ohad Einav, Nir Rosenfeld

Machine learning models play a key role for service providers looking to gain market share in consumer markets. However, traditional learning approaches do not take into account the existence of additional providers, who compete with each other for consumers. Our work aims to study learning in this market setting, as it affects providers, consumers, and the market itself. We begin by analyzing such markets through the lens of the learning objective, and show that accuracy cannot be the only consideration. We then propose a method for classification under competition, so that a learner can maximize market share in the presence of competitors. We show that our approach benefits the providers as well as the consumers, and find that the timing of market entry and model updates can be crucial. We display the effectiveness of our approach across a range of domains, from simple distributions to noisy datasets, and show that the market as a whole remains stable by converging quickly to an equilibrium.

Benyamin Trachtenberg, Nir Rosenfeld

In strategic classification, the standard supervised learning setting is extended to support the notion of strategic user behavior in the form of costly feature manipulations made in response to a classifier. While standard learning supports a broad range of model classes, the study of strategic classification has, so far, been dedicated mostly to linear classifiers. This work aims to expand the horizon by exploring how strategic behavior manifests under non-linear classifiers and what this implies for learning. We take a bottom-up approach showing how non-linearity affects decision boundary points, classifier expressivity, and model class complexity. Our results show how, unlike the linear case, strategic behavior may either increase or decrease effective class complexity, and that the complexity decrease may be arbitrarily large. Another key finding is that universal approximators (e.g., neural nets) are no longer universal once the environment is strategic. We demonstrate empirically how this can create performance gaps even on an unrestricted model class.

Nir Rosenfeld, Haifeng Xu

Decades of research in machine learning have given us powerful tools for making accurate predictions. This has made such tools appealing for use in social settings and on human inputs. Yet despite a lack of justification for why the generic approach of accuracy maximization can or should improve our collective well-being -- and mounting evidence of likely adverse outcomes -- it remains the widespread default. This position paper asserts that for machine learning to become socially beneficial, it must be embedded within a broader economic framework that explicitly aims to maximize social welfare. The field of welfare economics asks: how should we allocate limited resources among self-interested agents to maximize overall benefits? We contend that this perspective applies to many contemporary applications of machine learning in social contexts, and advocate for its adoption. Rather than disposing of prediction, we propose to leverage this forte of machine learning towards welfare maximization. We demonstrate this idea by portraying a conceptual framework that gradually transitions from accuracy maximization (with awareness to welfare) to welfare maximization (via accurate prediction). We detail applications and use-cases for which this framework can be effective, identify technical challenges and practical opportunities, and highlight future avenues worth pursuing.

Eden Saig, Nir Rosenfeld

When a prediction algorithm serves a collection of users, disparities in prediction quality are likely to emerge. If users respond to accurate predictions by increasing engagement, inviting friends, or adopting trends, repeated learning creates a feedback loop that shapes both the model and the population of its users. In this work, we introduce evolutionary prediction games, a framework grounded in evolutionary game theory which models such feedback loops as natural-selection processes among groups of users. Our theoretical analysis reveals a gap between idealized and real-world learning settings: In idealized settings with unlimited data and computational power, repeated learning creates competition and promotes competitive exclusion across a broad class of behavioral dynamics. However, under realistic constraints such as finite data, limited compute, or risk of overfitting, we show that stable coexistence and mutualistic symbiosis between groups becomes possible. We analyze these possibilities in terms of their stability and feasibility, present mechanisms that can sustain their existence, and empirically demonstrate our findings.

Yonatan Sommer, Ivri Hikri, Lotan Amit et al.

When learning is used to inform decisions about humans, such as for loans, hiring, or admissions, this can incentivize users to strategically modify their features, at a cost, to obtain positive predictions. The common assumption is that the function governing costs is exogenous, fixed, and predetermined. We challenge this assumption, and assert that costs can emerge as a result of deploying a classifier. Our idea is simple: when users seek positive predictions, this creates demand for important features; and if features are available for purchase, then a market will form, and competition will give rise to prices. We extend the strategic classification framework to support this notion, and study learning in a setting where a classifier can induce a market for features. We present an analysis of the learning task, devise an algorithm for computing market prices, propose a differentiable learning framework, and conduct experiments to explore our novel setting and approach.

Maayan Ehrenberg, Roy Ganz, Nir Rosenfeld

Adversarial training aims to defend against adversaries: malicious opponents whose sole aim is to harm predictive performance in any way possible. This presents a rather harsh perspective, which we assert results in unnecessarily conservative training. As an alternative, we propose to model opponents as simply pursuing their own goals--rather than working directly against the classifier. Employing tools from strategic modeling, our approach enables knowledge or beliefs regarding the opponent's possible incentives to be used as inductive bias for learning. Accordingly, our method of strategic training is designed to defend against all opponents within an 'incentive uncertainty set'. This resorts to adversarial learning when the set is maximal, but offers potential gains when the set can be appropriately reduced. We conduct a series of experiments that show how even mild knowledge regarding the opponent's incentives can be useful, and that the degree of potential gains depends on how these incentives relate to the structure of the learning task.

Sagi Levanon, Nir Rosenfeld

Strategic classification studies learning in settings where self-interested users can strategically modify their features to obtain favorable predictive outcomes. A key working assumption, however, is that "favorable" always means "positive"; this may be appropriate in some applications (e.g., loan approval), but reduces to a fairly narrow view of what user interests can be. In this work we argue for a broader perspective on what accounts for strategic user behavior, and propose and study a flexible model of generalized strategic classification. Our generalized model subsumes most current models but includes other novel settings; among these, we identify and target one intriguing sub-class of problems in which the interests of users and the system are aligned. This setting reveals a surprising fact: that standard max-margin losses are ill-suited for strategic inputs. Returning to our fully generalized model, we propose a novel max-margin framework for strategic learning that is practical and effective, and which we analyze theoretically. We conclude with a set of experiments that empirically demonstrate the utility of our approach.

Sagi Levanon, Nir Rosenfeld

Strategic classification regards the problem of learning in settings where users can strategically modify their features to improve outcomes. This setting applies broadly and has received much recent attention. But despite its practical significance, work in this space has so far been predominantly theoretical. In this paper we present a learning framework for strategic classification that is practical. Our approach directly minimizes the "strategic" empirical risk, achieved by differentiating through the strategic response of users. This provides flexibility that allows us to extend beyond the original problem formulation and towards more realistic learning scenarios. A series of experiments demonstrates the effectiveness of our approach on various learning settings.

Ganesh Ghalme, Vineet Nair, Itay Eilat et al.

Strategic classification studies the interaction between a classification rule and the strategic agents it governs. Under the assumption that the classifier is known, rational agents respond to it by manipulating their features. However, in many real-life scenarios of high-stake classification (e.g., credit scoring), the classifier is not revealed to the agents, which leads agents to attempt to learn the classifier and game it too. In this paper we generalize the strategic classification model to such scenarios. We define the price of opacity as the difference in prediction error between opaque and transparent strategy-robust classifiers, characterize it, and give a sufficient condition for this price to be strictly positive, in which case transparency is the recommended policy. Our experiments show how Hardt et al.'s robust classifier is affected by keeping agents in the dark.

Nir Rosenfeld, Sophie Hilgard, Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath et al.

Machine learning is a powerful tool for predicting human-related outcomes, from credit scores to heart attack risks. But when deployed, learned models also affect how users act in order to improve outcomes, whether predicted or real. The standard approach to learning is agnostic to induced user actions and provides no guarantees as to the effect of actions. We provide a framework for learning predictors that are both accurate and promote good actions. For this, we introduce look-ahead regularization which, by anticipating user actions, encourages predictive models to also induce actions that improve outcomes. This regularization carefully tailors the uncertainty estimates governing confidence in this improvement to the distribution of model-induced actions. We report the results of experiments on real and synthetic data that show the effectiveness of this approach.

Nir Rosenfeld, Aron Szanto, David C. Parkes

Recent work in the domain of misinformation detection has leveraged rich signals in the text and user identities associated with content on social media. But text can be strategically manipulated and accounts reopened under different aliases, suggesting that these approaches are inherently brittle. In this work, we investigate an alternative modality that is naturally robust: the pattern in which information propagates. Can the veracity of an unverified rumor spreading online be discerned solely on the basis of its pattern of diffusion through the social network? Using graph kernels to extract complex topological information from Twitter cascade structures, we train accurate predictive models that are blind to language, user identities, and time, demonstrating for the first time that such "sanitized" diffusion patterns are highly informative of veracity. Our results indicate that, with proper aggregation, the collective sharing pattern of the crowd may reveal powerful signals of rumor truth or falsehood, even in the early stages of propagation.

Nir Rosenfeld, Kojin Oshiba, Yaron Singer

Providing users with alternatives to choose from is an essential component in many online platforms, making the accurate prediction of choice vital to their success. A renewed interest in learning choice models has led to significant progress in modeling power, but most current methods are either limited in the types of choice behavior they capture, cannot be applied to large-scale data, or both. Here we propose a learning framework for predicting choice that is accurate, versatile, theoretically grounded, and scales well. Our key modeling point is that to account for how humans choose, predictive models must capture certain set-related invariances. Building on recent results in economics, we derive a class of models that can express any behavioral choice pattern, enjoy favorable sample complexity guarantees, and can be efficiently trained end-to-end. Experiments on three large choice datasets demonstrate the utility of our approach.

Sophie Hilgard, Nir Rosenfeld, Mahzarin R. Banaji et al.

When machine predictors can achieve higher performance than the human decision-makers they support, improving the performance of human decision-makers is often conflated with improving machine accuracy. Here we propose a framework to directly support human decision-making, in which the role of machines is to reframe problems rather than to prescribe actions through prediction. Inspired by the success of representation learning in improving performance of machine predictors, our framework learns human-facing representations optimized for human performance. This "Mind Composed with Machine" framework incorporates a human decision-making model directly into the representation learning paradigm and is trained with a novel human-in-the-loop training procedure. We empirically demonstrate the successful application of the framework to various tasks and representational forms.

Nir Rosenfeld, Yishay Mansour, Elad Yom-Tov

In this work we consider the task of constructing prediction intervals in an inductive batch setting. We present a discriminative learning framework which optimizes the expected error rate under a budget constraint on the interval sizes. Most current methods for constructing prediction intervals offer guarantees for a single new test point. Applying these methods to multiple test points can result in a high computational overhead and degraded statistical guarantees. By focusing on expected errors, our method allows for variability in the per-example conditional error rates. As we demonstrate both analytically and empirically, this flexibility can increase the overall accuracy, or alternatively, reduce the average interval size. While the problem we consider is of a regressive flavor, the loss we use is combinatorial. This allows us to provide PAC-style, finite-sample guarantees. Computationally, we show that our original objective is NP-hard, and suggest a tractable convex surrogate. We conclude with a series of experimental evaluations.

Nir Rosenfeld, Amir Globerson

The goal in semi-supervised learning is to effectively combine labeled and unlabeled data. One way to do this is by encouraging smoothness across edges in a graph whose nodes correspond to input examples. In many graph-based methods, labels can be thought of as propagating over the graph, where the underlying propagation mechanism is based on random walks or on averaging dynamics. While theoretically elegant, these dynamics suffer from several drawbacks which can hurt predictive performance. Our goal in this work is to explore alternative mechanisms for propagating labels. In particular, we propose a method based on dynamic infection processes, where unlabeled nodes can be "infected" with the label of their already infected neighbors. Our algorithm is efficient and scalable, and an analysis of the underlying optimization objective reveals a surprising relation to other Laplacian approaches. We conclude with a thorough set of experiments across multiple benchmarks and various learning settings.

Nir Rosenfeld, Yishay Mansour, Elad Yom-Tov

When a new treatment is considered for use, whether a pharmaceutical drug or a search engine ranking algorithm, a typical question that arises is, will its performance exceed that of the current treatment? The conventional way to answer this counterfactual question is to estimate the effect of the new treatment in comparison to that of the conventional treatment by running a controlled, randomized experiment. While this approach theoretically ensures an unbiased estimator, it suffers from several drawbacks, including the difficulty in finding representative experimental populations as well as the cost of running such trials. Moreover, such trials neglect the huge quantities of available control-condition data which are often completely ignored. In this paper we propose a discriminative framework for estimating the performance of a new treatment given a large dataset of the control condition and data from a small (and possibly unrepresentative) randomized trial comparing new and old treatments. Our objective, which requires minimal assumptions on the treatments, models the relation between the outcomes of the different conditions. This allows us to not only estimate mean effects but also to generate individual predictions for examples outside the randomized sample. We demonstrate the utility of our approach through experiments in three areas: Search engine operation, treatments to diabetes patients, and market value estimation for houses. Our results demonstrate that our approach can reduce the number and size of the currently performed randomized controlled experiments, thus saving significant time, money and effort on the part of practitioners.