Aslan Askarov

2papers

2 Papers

3.7PLApr 17
The downgrading semantics of memory safety (Extended version)

René Rydhof Hansen, Andreas Stenbæk Larsen, Aslan Askarov

Memory safety is traditionally characterized in terms of bad things that cannot happen. This approach is currently embraced in the literature on formal methods for memory safety. However, a general semantic principle for memory safety, that implies the negative items, remains elusive. This paper focuses on the allocator-specific aspects of memory safety, such as null-pointer dereference, use after free, double free, and heap overflow. To that extent, we propose a notion of gradual allocator independence that accurately captures the allocator-dependent aspects of memory safety. Our approach is inspired by the previously suggested connection between memory safety and noninterference, but extends that connection in a fundamentally important direction towards downgrading. We consider a low-level language with access to an allocator that provides malloc and free primitives in a flat memory model. Pointers are just integers, and as such it is trivial to write memory-unsafe programs. The basic intuition of gradual allocator independence is that of noninterference, namely that allocators must not influence program execution. This intuition is refined in two important ways that account for the allocators running out-of-memory and for programs to have pointer-to-integer casts. The key insight of the definition is to treat these extensions as forms of downgrading and give them satisfactory technical treatment using the state-of-the-art information flow machinery.

CRFeb 4, 2022
With a Little Help from My Friends: Transport Deniability for Instant Messaging

Boel Nelson, Aslan Askarov

Traffic analysis for instant messaging (IM) applications continues to pose an important privacy challenge. In particular, transport-level data can leak unintentional information about IM -- such as who communicates with whom. Existing tools for metadata privacy have adoption obstacles, including the risks of being scrutinized for having a particular app installed, and performance overheads incompatible with mobile devices. We posit that resilience to traffic analysis must be directly supported by major IM services themselves, and must be done in a low-cost manner without breaking existing features. As a first step in this direction, we propose a hybrid messaging model that combines regular and deniable messages. We present a novel protocol for deniable instant messaging, which we call DenIM. DenIM is built on the principle that deniable messages can be made indistinguishable from regular messages with a little help from a user's friends. Deniable messages' network traffic can then be explained by a plausible cover story. DenIM achieves overhead proportional to the messages sent, as opposed to scaling with time or number of users. To show the effectiveness of DenIM, we implement a trace simulator, and show that DenIM's deniability guarantees hold against strong adversaries such as internet service providers.