Joel Z. Leibo

John P. Agapiou, Alexander Sasha Vezhnevets, Edgar A. Duéñez-Guzmán et al. · deepmind

Multi-agent artificial intelligence research promises a path to develop intelligent technologies that are more human-like and more human-compatible than those produced by "solipsistic" approaches, which do not consider interactions between agents. Melting Pot is a research tool developed to facilitate work on multi-agent artificial intelligence, and provides an evaluation protocol that measures generalization to novel social partners in a set of canonical test scenarios. Each scenario pairs a physical environment (a "substrate") with a reference set of co-players (a "background population"), to create a social situation with substantial interdependence between the individuals involved. For instance, some scenarios were inspired by institutional-economics-based accounts of natural resource management and public-good-provision dilemmas. Others were inspired by considerations from evolutionary biology, game theory, and artificial life. Melting Pot aims to cover a maximally diverse set of interdependencies and incentives. It includes the commonly-studied extreme cases of perfectly-competitive (zero-sum) motivations and perfectly-cooperative (shared-reward) motivations, but does not stop with them. As in real-life, a clear majority of scenarios in Melting Pot have mixed incentives. They are neither purely competitive nor purely cooperative and thus demand successful agents be able to navigate the resulting ambiguity. Here we describe Melting Pot 2.0, which revises and expands on Melting Pot. We also introduce support for scenarios with asymmetric roles, and explain how to integrate them into the evaluation protocol. This report also contains: (1) details of all substrates and scenarios; (2) a complete description of all baseline algorithms and results. Our intention is for it to serve as a reference for researchers using Melting Pot 2.0.

Michael Bradley Johanson, Edward Hughes, Finbarr Timbers et al. · deepmind

Advances in artificial intelligence often stem from the development of new environments that abstract real-world situations into a form where research can be done conveniently. This paper contributes such an environment based on ideas inspired by elementary Microeconomics. Agents learn to produce resources in a spatially complex world, trade them with one another, and consume those that they prefer. We show that the emergent production, consumption, and pricing behaviors respond to environmental conditions in the directions predicted by supply and demand shifts in Microeconomics. We also demonstrate settings where the agents' emergent prices for goods vary over space, reflecting the local abundance of goods. After the price disparities emerge, some agents then discover a niche of transporting goods between regions with different prevailing prices -- a profitable strategy because they can buy goods where they are cheap and sell them where they are expensive. Finally, in a series of ablation experiments, we investigate how choices in the environmental rewards, bartering actions, agent architecture, and ability to consume tradable goods can either aid or inhibit the emergence of this economic behavior. This work is part of the environment development branch of a research program that aims to build human-like artificial general intelligence through multi-agent interactions in simulated societies. By exploring which environment features are needed for the basic phenomena of elementary microeconomics to emerge automatically from learning, we arrive at an environment that differs from those studied in prior multi-agent reinforcement learning work along several dimensions. For example, the model incorporates heterogeneous tastes and physical abilities, and agents negotiate with one another as a grounded form of communication.

Peter Sunehag, Alexander Sasha Vezhnevets, Edgar Duéñez-Guzmán et al. · deepmind

Many environments contain numerous available niches of variable value, each associated with a different local optimum in the space of behaviors (policy space). In such situations it is often difficult to design a learning process capable of evading distraction by poor local optima long enough to stumble upon the best available niche. In this work we propose a generic reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm that performs better than baseline deep Q-learning algorithms in such environments with multiple variably-valued niches. The algorithm we propose consists of two parts: an agent architecture and a learning rule. The agent architecture contains multiple sub-policies. The learning rule is inspired by fitness sharing in evolutionary computation and applied in reinforcement learning using Value-Decomposition-Networks in a novel manner for a single-agent's internal population. It can concretely be understood as adding an extra loss term where one policy's experience is also used to update all the other policies in a manner that decreases their value estimates for the visited states. In particular, when one sub-policy visits a particular state frequently this decreases the value predicted for other sub-policies for going to that state. Further, we introduce an artificial chemistry inspired platform where it is easy to create tasks with multiple rewarding strategies utilizing different resources (i.e. multiple niches). We show that agents trained this way can escape poor-but-attractive local optima to instead converge to harder-to-discover higher value strategies in both the artificial chemistry environments and in simpler illustrative environments.

Aliya Amirova, Theodora Fteropoulli, Nafiso Ahmed et al.

Today, using Large-scale generative Language Models (LLMs) it is possible to simulate free responses to interview questions like those traditionally analyzed using qualitative research methods. Qualitative methodology encompasses a broad family of techniques involving manual analysis of open-ended interviews or conversations conducted freely in natural language. Here we consider whether artificial "silicon participants" generated by LLMs may be productively studied using qualitative methods aiming to produce insights that could generalize to real human populations. The key concept in our analysis is algorithmic fidelity, a term introduced by Argyle et al. (2023) capturing the degree to which LLM-generated outputs mirror human sub-populations' beliefs and attitudes. By definition, high algorithmic fidelity suggests latent beliefs elicited from LLMs may generalize to real humans, whereas low algorithmic fidelity renders such research invalid. Here we used an LLM to generate interviews with silicon participants matching specific demographic characteristics one-for-one with a set of human participants. Using framework-based qualitative analysis, we showed the key themes obtained from both human and silicon participants were strikingly similar. However, when we analyzed the structure and tone of the interviews we found even more striking differences. We also found evidence of the hyper-accuracy distortion described by Aher et al. (2023). We conclude that the LLM we tested (GPT-3.5) does not have sufficient algorithmic fidelity to expect research on it to generalize to human populations. However, the rapid pace of LLM research makes it plausible this could change in the future. Thus we stress the need to establish epistemic norms now around how to assess validity of LLM-based qualitative research, especially concerning the need to ensure representation of heterogeneous lived experiences.

Anil Yaman, Joel Z. Leibo, Giovanni Iacca et al.

Human ecological success relies on our characteristic ability to flexibly self-organize into cooperative social groups, the most successful of which employ substantial specialization and division of labor. Unlike most other animals, humans learn by trial and error during their lives what role to take on. However, when some critical roles are more attractive than others, and individuals are self-interested, then there is a social dilemma: each individual would prefer others take on the critical but unremunerative roles so they may remain free to take one that pays better. But disaster occurs if all act thusly and a critical role goes unfilled. In such situations learning an optimum role distribution may not be possible. Consequently, a fundamental question is: how can division of labor emerge in groups of self-interested lifetime-learning individuals? Here we show that by introducing a model of social norms, which we regard as emergent patterns of decentralized social sanctioning, it becomes possible for groups of self-interested individuals to learn a productive division of labor involving all critical roles. Such social norms work by redistributing rewards within the population to disincentivize antisocial roles while incentivizing prosocial roles that do not intrinsically pay as well as others.

Chandler Smith, Marwa Abdulhai, Manfred Diaz et al.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents have demonstrated impressive capabilities for social interaction and are increasingly being deployed in situations where they might engage with both human and artificial agents. These interactions represent a critical frontier for LLM-based agents, yet existing evaluation methods fail to measure how well these capabilities generalize to novel social situations. In this paper, we introduce a method for evaluating the ability of LLM-based agents to cooperate in zero-shot, mixed-motive environments using Concordia, a natural language multi-agent simulation environment. Our method measures general cooperative intelligence by testing an agent's ability to identify and exploit opportunities for mutual gain across diverse partners and contexts. We present empirical results from the NeurIPS 2024 Concordia Contest, where agents were evaluated on their ability to achieve mutual gains across a suite of diverse scenarios ranging from negotiation to collective action problems. Our findings reveal significant gaps between current agent capabilities and the robust generalization required for reliable cooperation, particularly in scenarios demanding persuasion and norm enforcement.

Davide Paglieri, Logan Cross, William A. Cunningham et al.

Evaluating AI systems that interact with humans requires understanding their behavior across diverse user populations, but collecting representative human data is often expensive or infeasible, particularly for novel technologies or hypothetical future scenarios. Recent work in Generative Agent-Based Modeling has shown that large language models can simulate human-like synthetic personas with high fidelity, accurately reproducing the beliefs and behaviors of specific individuals. However, most approaches require detailed data about target populations and often prioritize density matching (replicating what is most probable) rather than support coverage (spanning what is possible), leaving long-tail behaviors underexplored. We introduce Persona Generators, functions that can produce diverse synthetic populations tailored to arbitrary contexts. We apply an iterative improvement loop based on AlphaEvolve, using large language models as mutation operators to refine our Persona Generator code over hundreds of iterations. The optimization process produces lightweight Persona Generators that can automatically expand small descriptions into populations of diverse synthetic personas that maximize coverage of opinions and preferences along relevant diversity axes. We demonstrate that evolved generators substantially outperform existing baselines across six diversity metrics on held-out contexts, producing populations that span rare trait combinations difficult to achieve in standard LLM outputs.

Xiaoxuan Hou, Jiayi Yuan, Joel Z. Leibo et al.

InvestESG is a novel multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) benchmark designed to study the impact of Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) disclosure mandates on corporate climate investments. The benchmark models an intertemporal social dilemma where companies balance short-term profit losses from climate mitigation efforts and long-term benefits from reducing climate risk, while ESG-conscious investors attempt to influence corporate behavior through their investment decisions. Companies allocate capital across mitigation, greenwashing, and resilience, with varying strategies influencing climate outcomes and investor preferences. We are releasing open-source versions of InvestESG in both PyTorch and JAX, which enable scalable and hardware-accelerated simulations for investigating competing incentives in mitigate climate change. Our experiments show that without ESG-conscious investors with sufficient capital, corporate mitigation efforts remain limited under the disclosure mandate. However, when a critical mass of investors prioritizes ESG, corporate cooperation increases, which in turn reduces climate risks and enhances long-term financial stability. Additionally, providing more information about global climate risks encourages companies to invest more in mitigation, even without investor involvement. Our findings align with empirical research using real-world data, highlighting MARL's potential to inform policy by providing insights into large-scale socio-economic challenges through efficient testing of alternative policy and market designs.

Alexander Sasha Vezhnevets, John P. Agapiou, Avia Aharon et al.

Agent-based modeling has been around for decades, and applied widely across the social and natural sciences. The scope of this research method is now poised to grow dramatically as it absorbs the new affordances provided by Large Language Models (LLM)s. Generative Agent-Based Models (GABM) are not just classic Agent-Based Models (ABM)s where the agents talk to one another. Rather, GABMs are constructed using an LLM to apply common sense to situations, act "reasonably", recall common semantic knowledge, produce API calls to control digital technologies like apps, and communicate both within the simulation and to researchers viewing it from the outside. Here we present Concordia, a library to facilitate constructing and working with GABMs. Concordia makes it easy to construct language-mediated simulations of physically- or digitally-grounded environments. Concordia agents produce their behavior using a flexible component system which mediates between two fundamental operations: LLM calls and associative memory retrieval. A special agent called the Game Master (GM), which was inspired by tabletop role-playing games, is responsible for simulating the environment where the agents interact. Agents take actions by describing what they want to do in natural language. The GM then translates their actions into appropriate implementations. In a simulated physical world, the GM checks the physical plausibility of agent actions and describes their effects. In digital environments simulating technologies such as apps and services, the GM may handle API calls to integrate with external tools such as general AI assistants (e.g., Bard, ChatGPT), and digital apps (e.g., Calendar, Email, Search, etc.). Concordia was designed to support a wide array of applications both in scientific research and for evaluating performance of real digital services by simulating users and/or generating synthetic data.

Lewis Hammond, Alan Chan, Jesse Clifton et al. · stanford

The rapid development of advanced AI agents and the imminent deployment of many instances of these agents will give rise to multi-agent systems of unprecedented complexity. These systems pose novel and under-explored risks. In this report, we provide a structured taxonomy of these risks by identifying three key failure modes (miscoordination, conflict, and collusion) based on agents' incentives, as well as seven key risk factors (information asymmetries, network effects, selection pressures, destabilising dynamics, commitment problems, emergent agency, and multi-agent security) that can underpin them. We highlight several important instances of each risk, as well as promising directions to help mitigate them. By anchoring our analysis in a range of real-world examples and experimental evidence, we illustrate the distinct challenges posed by multi-agent systems and their implications for the safety, governance, and ethics of advanced AI.

Yali Du, Joel Z. Leibo, Usman Islam et al.

Cooperation in multi-agent learning (MAL) is a topic at the intersection of numerous disciplines, including game theory, economics, social sciences, and evolutionary biology. Research in this area aims to understand both how agents can coordinate effectively when goals are aligned and how they may cooperate in settings where gains from working together are possible but possibilities for conflict abound. In this paper we provide an overview of the fundamental concepts, problem settings and algorithms of multi-agent learning. This encompasses reinforcement learning, multi-agent sequential decision-making, challenges associated with multi-agent cooperation, and a comprehensive review of recent progress, along with an evaluation of relevant metrics. Finally we discuss open challenges in the field with the aim of inspiring new avenues for research.

Edgar A. Duéñez-Guzmán, Suzanne Sadedin, Jane X. Wang et al. · deepmind

Traditionally, cognitive and computer scientists have viewed intelligence solipsistically, as a property of unitary agents devoid of social context. Given the success of contemporary learning algorithms, we argue that the bottleneck in artificial intelligence (AI) progress is shifting from data assimilation to novel data generation. We bring together evidence showing that natural intelligence emerges at multiple scales in networks of interacting agents via collective living, social relationships and major evolutionary transitions, which contribute to novel data generation through mechanisms such as population pressures, arms races, Machiavellian selection, social learning and cumulative culture. Many breakthroughs in AI exploit some of these processes, from multi-agent structures enabling algorithms to master complex games like Capture-The-Flag and StarCraft II, to strategic communication in Diplomacy and the shaping of AI data streams by other AIs. Moving beyond a solipsistic view of agency to integrate these mechanisms suggests a path to human-like compounding innovation through ongoing novel data generation.

Joel Z. Leibo, Alexander Sasha Vezhnevets, Manfred Diaz et al.

What is appropriateness? Humans navigate a multi-scale mosaic of interlocking notions of what is appropriate for different situations. We act one way with our friends, another with our family, and yet another in the office. Likewise for AI, appropriate behavior for a comedy-writing assistant is not the same as appropriate behavior for a customer-service representative. What determines which actions are appropriate in which contexts? And what causes these standards to change over time? Since all judgments of AI appropriateness are ultimately made by humans, we need to understand how appropriateness guides human decision making in order to properly evaluate AI decision making and improve it. This paper presents a theory of appropriateness: how it functions in human society, how it may be implemented in the brain, and what it means for responsible deployment of generative AI technology.

Siqi Liu, Luke Marris, Marc Lanctot et al.

We study computationally efficient methods for finding equilibria in n-player general-sum games, specifically ones that afford complex visuomotor skills. We show how existing methods would struggle in this setting, either computationally or in theory. We then introduce NeuPL-JPSRO, a neural population learning algorithm that benefits from transfer learning of skills and converges to a Coarse Correlated Equilibrium (CCE) of the game. We show empirical convergence in a suite of OpenSpiel games, validated rigorously by exact game solvers. We then deploy NeuPL-JPSRO to complex domains, where our approach enables adaptive coordination in a MuJoCo control domain and skill transfer in capture-the-flag. Our work shows that equilibrium convergent population learning can be implemented at scale and in generality, paving the way towards solving real-world games between heterogeneous players with mixed motives.

Cody Kommers, Drew Hemment, Maria Antoniak et al.

This position paper argues that large language models (LLMs) can make cultural context, and therefore human meaning, legible at an unprecedented scale in AI-based sociotechnical systems. We argue that such systems have previously been unable to represent human meaning because they rely on thin descriptions: numerical representations that enforce standardization and therefore strip human activity of the cultural context that gives it meaning. By contrast, scholars in the humanities and qualitative social sciences have developed frameworks for representing meaning through thick description: verbal representations that accommodate heterogeneity and retain contextual information needed to represent human meaning. While these methods can effectively codify meaning, they are difficult to deploy at scale. However, the verbal capabilities of LLMs now provide a means of (at least partially) automating the generation and processing of thick descriptions, potentially overcoming this bottleneck. We argue that the problem of rendering human meaning legible is not just about selecting better metrics, but about developing new representational formats (based on thick description). We frame this as a crucial direction for the application of generative AI and identify five key challenges: preserving context, maintaining interpretive pluralism, integrating perspectives based on lived experience and critical distance, distinguishing qualitative content from quantitative magnitude, and acknowledging meaning as dynamic rather than static. Furthermore, we suggest that thick description has the potential to serve as a unifying framework to address a number of emerging concerns about the difficulties of representing culture in (or using) LLMs.

Zihao Guo, Shuqing Shi, Richard Willis et al.

Sequential social dilemmas pose a significant challenge in the field of multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), requiring environments that accurately reflect the tension between individual and collective interests. Previous benchmarks and environments, such as Melting Pot, provide an evaluation protocol that measures generalization to new social partners in various test scenarios. However, running reinforcement learning algorithms in traditional environments requires substantial computational resources. In this paper, we introduce SocialJax, a suite of sequential social dilemma environments and algorithms implemented in JAX. JAX is a high-performance numerical computing library for Python that enables significant improvements in operational efficiency. Our experiments demonstrate that the SocialJax training pipeline achieves at least 50\texttimes{} speed-up in real-time performance compared to Melting Pot RLlib baselines. Additionally, we validate the effectiveness of baseline algorithms within SocialJax environments. Finally, we use Schelling diagrams to verify the social dilemma properties of these environments, ensuring that they accurately capture the dynamics of social dilemmas.

Nenad Tomasev, Matija Franklin, Joel Z. Leibo et al.

The rapid adoption of autonomous AI agents is giving rise to a new economic layer where agents transact and coordinate at scales and speeds beyond direct human oversight. We propose the "sandbox economy" as a framework for analyzing this emergent system, characterizing it along two key dimensions: its origins (emergent vs. intentional) and its degree of separateness from the established human economy (permeable vs. impermeable). Our current trajectory points toward a spontaneous emergence of a vast and highly permeable AI agent economy, presenting us with opportunities for an unprecedented degree of coordination as well as significant challenges, including systemic economic risk and exacerbated inequality. Here we discuss a number of possible design choices that may lead to safely steerable AI agent markets. In particular, we consider auction mechanisms for fair resource allocation and preference resolution, the design of AI "mission economies" to coordinate around achieving collective goals, and socio-technical infrastructure needed to ensure trust, safety, and accountability. By doing this, we argue for the proactive design of steerable agent markets to ensure the coming technological shift aligns with humanity's long-term collective flourishing.

Joel Z. Leibo, Alexander Sasha Vezhnevets, William A. Cunningham et al.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly placed in positions where their decisions have real consequences, e.g., moderating online spaces, conducting research, and advising on policy. Ensuring they operate in a safe and ethically acceptable fashion is thus critical. However, most solutions have been a form of one-size-fits-all "alignment". We are worried that such systems, which overlook enduring moral diversity, will spark resistance, erode trust, and destabilize our institutions. This paper traces the underlying problem to an often-unstated Axiom of Rational Convergence: the idea that under ideal conditions, rational agents will converge in the limit of conversation on a single ethics. Treating that premise as both optional and doubtful, we propose what we call the appropriateness framework: an alternative approach grounded in conflict theory, cultural evolution, multi-agent systems, and institutional economics. The appropriateness framework treats persistent disagreement as the normal case and designs for it by applying four principles: (1) contextual grounding, (2) community customization, (3) continual adaptation, and (4) polycentric governance. We argue here that adopting these design principles is a good way to shift the main alignment metaphor from moral unification to a more productive metaphor of conflict management, and that taking this step is both desirable and urgent.

Peter Sunehag, Joel Z. Leibo

We introduce Simulation Streams, a programming paradigm designed to efficiently control and leverage Large Language Models (LLMs) for complex, dynamic simulations and agentic workflows. Our primary goal is to create a minimally interfering framework that harnesses the agentic abilities of LLMs while addressing their limitations in maintaining consistency, selectively ignoring/including information, and enforcing strict world rules. Simulation Streams achieves this through a state-based approach where variables are modified in sequential steps by "operators," producing output on a recurring format and adhering to consistent rules for state variables. This approach focus the LLMs on defined tasks, while aiming to have the context stream remain "in-distribution". The approach incorporates an Entity-Component-System (ECS) architecture to write programs in a more intuitive manner, facilitating reuse of workflows across different components and entities. This ECS approach enhances the modularity of the output stream, allowing for complex, multi-entity simulations while maintaining format consistency, information control, and rule enforcement. It is supported by a custom editor that aids in creating, running, and analyzing simulations. We demonstrate the versatility of simulation streams through an illustrative example of an ongoing market economy simulation, a social simulation of three characters playing a game of catch in a park and a suite of classical reinforcement learning benchmark tasks. These examples showcase Simulation Streams' ability to handle complex, evolving scenarios over 100s-1000s of iterations, facilitate comparisons between different agent workflows and models, and maintain consistency and continued interesting developments in LLM-driven simulations.

Marko Tesic, Yue Zhao, Joel Z. Leibo et al.

The development and evaluation of social capabilities in AI agents require complex environments where competitive and cooperative behaviours naturally emerge. While game-theoretic properties can explain why certain teams or agent populations outperform others, more abstract behaviours, such as convention following, are harder to control in training and evaluation settings. The Melting Pot contest is a social AI evaluation suite designed to assess the cooperation capabilities of AI systems. In this paper, we apply a Bayesian approach known as Measurement Layouts to infer the capability profiles of multi-agent systems in the Melting Pot contest. We show that these capability profiles not only predict future performance within the Melting Pot suite but also reveal the underlying prosocial abilities of agents. Our analysis indicates that while higher prosocial capabilities sometimes correlate with better performance, this is not a universal trend-some lower-scoring agents exhibit stronger cooperation abilities. Furthermore, we find that top-performing contest submissions are more likely to achieve high scores in scenarios where prosocial capabilities are not required. These findings, together with reports that the contest winner used a hard-coded solution tailored to specific environments, suggest that at least one top-performing team may have optimised for conditions where cooperation was not necessary, potentially exploiting limitations in the evaluation framework. We provide recommendations for improving the annotation of cooperation demands and propose future research directions to account for biases introduced by different testing environments. Our results demonstrate that Measurement Layouts offer both strong predictive accuracy and actionable insights, contributing to a more transparent and generalisable approach to evaluating AI systems in complex social settings.

Jonathan Cook, Chris Lu, Edward Hughes et al.

Cultural accumulation drives the open-ended and diverse progress in capabilities spanning human history. It builds an expanding body of knowledge and skills by combining individual exploration with inter-generational information transmission. Despite its widespread success among humans, the capacity for artificial learning agents to accumulate culture remains under-explored. In particular, approaches to reinforcement learning typically strive for improvements over only a single lifetime. Generational algorithms that do exist fail to capture the open-ended, emergent nature of cultural accumulation, which allows individuals to trade-off innovation and imitation. Building on the previously demonstrated ability for reinforcement learning agents to perform social learning, we find that training setups which balance this with independent learning give rise to cultural accumulation. These accumulating agents outperform those trained for a single lifetime with the same cumulative experience. We explore this accumulation by constructing two models under two distinct notions of a generation: episodic generations, in which accumulation occurs via in-context learning and train-time generations, in which accumulation occurs via in-weights learning. In-context and in-weights cultural accumulation can be interpreted as analogous to knowledge and skill accumulation, respectively. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to present general models that achieve emergent cultural accumulation in reinforcement learning, opening up new avenues towards more open-ended learning systems, as well as presenting new opportunities for modelling human culture.

Yiran Mao, Madeline G. Reinecke, Markus Kunesch et al.

Is it possible to evaluate the moral cognition of complex artificial agents? In this work, we take a look at one aspect of morality: `doing the right thing for the right reasons.' We propose a behavior-based analysis of artificial moral cognition which could also be applied to humans to facilitate like-for-like comparison. Morally-motivated behavior should persist despite mounting cost; by measuring an agent's sensitivity to this cost, we gain deeper insight into underlying motivations. We apply this evaluation to a particular set of deep reinforcement learning agents, trained by memory-based meta-reinforcement learning. Our results indicate that agents trained with a reward function that includes other-regarding preferences perform helping behavior in a way that is less sensitive to increasing cost than agents trained with more self-interested preferences.

Kavya Kopparapu, Edgar A. Duéñez-Guzmán, Jayd Matyas et al.

A key challenge in the study of multiagent cooperation is the need for individual agents not only to cooperate effectively, but to decide with whom to cooperate. This is particularly critical in situations when other agents have hidden, possibly misaligned motivations and goals. Social deduction games offer an avenue to study how individuals might learn to synthesize potentially unreliable information about others, and elucidate their true motivations. In this work, we present Hidden Agenda, a two-team social deduction game that provides a 2D environment for studying learning agents in scenarios of unknown team alignment. The environment admits a rich set of strategies for both teams. Reinforcement learning agents trained in Hidden Agenda show that agents can learn a variety of behaviors, including partnering and voting without need for communication in natural language.

Edgar A. Duéñez-Guzmán, Kevin R. McKee, Yiran Mao et al.

Undesired bias afflicts both human and algorithmic decision making, and may be especially prevalent when information processing trade-offs incentivize the use of heuristics. One primary example is \textit{statistical discrimination} -- selecting social partners based not on their underlying attributes, but on readily perceptible characteristics that covary with their suitability for the task at hand. We present a theoretical model to examine how information processing influences statistical discrimination and test its predictions using multi-agent reinforcement learning with various agent architectures in a partner choice-based social dilemma. As predicted, statistical discrimination emerges in agent policies as a function of both the bias in the training population and of agent architecture. All agents showed substantial statistical discrimination, defaulting to using the readily available correlates instead of the outcome relevant features. We show that less discrimination emerges with agents that use recurrent neural networks, and when their training environment has less bias. However, all agent algorithms we tried still exhibited substantial bias after learning in biased training populations.

Joel Z. Leibo, Edgar Duéñez-Guzmán, Alexander Sasha Vezhnevets et al.

Existing evaluation suites for multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) do not assess generalization to novel situations as their primary objective (unlike supervised-learning benchmarks). Our contribution, Melting Pot, is a MARL evaluation suite that fills this gap, and uses reinforcement learning to reduce the human labor required to create novel test scenarios. This works because one agent's behavior constitutes (part of) another agent's environment. To demonstrate scalability, we have created over 80 unique test scenarios covering a broad range of research topics such as social dilemmas, reciprocity, resource sharing, and task partitioning. We apply these test scenarios to standard MARL training algorithms, and demonstrate how Melting Pot reveals weaknesses not apparent from training performance alone.

Anil Yaman, Nicolas Bredeche, Onur Çaylak et al.

Social learning, copying other's behavior without actual experience, offers a cost-effective means of knowledge acquisition. However, it raises the fundamental question of which individuals have reliable information: successful individuals versus the majority. The former and the latter are known respectively as success-based and conformist social learning strategies. We show here that while the success-based strategy fully exploits the benign environment of low uncertainly, it fails in uncertain environments. On the other hand, the conformist strategy can effectively mitigate this adverse effect. Based on these findings, we hypothesized that meta-control of individual and social learning strategies provides effective and sample-efficient learning in volatile and uncertain environments. Simulations on a set of environments with various levels of volatility and uncertainty confirmed our hypothesis. The results imply that meta-control of social learning affords agents the leverage to resolve environmental uncertainty with minimal exploration cost, by exploiting others' learning as an external knowledge base.

Kevin R. McKee, Edward Hughes, Tina O. Zhu et al.

Collective action demands that individuals efficiently coordinate how much, where, and when to cooperate. Laboratory experiments have extensively explored the first part of this process, demonstrating that a variety of social-cognitive mechanisms influence how much individuals choose to invest in group efforts. However, experimental research has been unable to shed light on how social cognitive mechanisms contribute to the where and when of collective action. We build and test a computational model of human behavior in Clean Up, a social dilemma task popular in multi-agent reinforcement learning research. We show that human groups effectively cooperate in Clean Up when they can identify group members and track reputations over time, but fail to organize under conditions of anonymity. A multi-agent reinforcement learning model of reputation demonstrates the same difference in cooperation under conditions of identifiability and anonymity. In addition, the model accurately predicts spatial and temporal patterns of group behavior: in this public goods dilemma, the intrinsic motivation for reputation catalyzes the development of a non-territorial, turn-taking strategy to coordinate collective action.

Kevin R. McKee, Joel Z. Leibo, Charlie Beattie et al.

Generalization is a major challenge for multi-agent reinforcement learning. How well does an agent perform when placed in novel environments and in interactions with new co-players? In this paper, we investigate and quantify the relationship between generalization and diversity in the multi-agent domain. Across the range of multi-agent environments considered here, procedurally generating training levels significantly improves agent performance on held-out levels. However, agent performance on the specific levels used in training sometimes declines as a result. To better understand the effects of co-player variation, our experiments introduce a new environment-agnostic measure of behavioral diversity. Results demonstrate that population size and intrinsic motivation are both effective methods of generating greater population diversity. In turn, training with a diverse set of co-players strengthens agent performance in some (but not all) cases.

Michiel A. Bakker, Richard Everett, Laura Weidinger et al.

The real world is awash with multi-agent problems that require collective action by self-interested agents, from the routing of packets across a computer network to the management of irrigation systems. Such systems have local incentives for individuals, whose behavior has an impact on the global outcome for the group. Given appropriate mechanisms describing agent interaction, groups may achieve socially beneficial outcomes, even in the face of short-term selfish incentives. In many cases, collective action problems possess an underlying graph structure, whose topology crucially determines the relationship between local decisions and emergent global effects. Such scenarios have received great attention through the lens of network games. However, this abstraction typically collapses important dimensions, such as geometry and time, relevant to the design of mechanisms promoting cooperation. In parallel work, multi-agent deep reinforcement learning has shown great promise in modelling the emergence of self-organized cooperation in complex gridworld domains. Here we apply this paradigm in graph-structured collective action problems. Using multi-agent deep reinforcement learning, we simulate an agent society for a variety of plausible mechanisms, finding clear transitions between different equilibria over time. We define analytic tools inspired by related literatures to measure the social outcomes, and use these to draw conclusions about the efficacy of different environmental interventions. Our methods have implications for mechanism design in both human and artificial agent systems.

Allan Dafoe, Edward Hughes, Yoram Bachrach et al.

Problems of cooperation--in which agents seek ways to jointly improve their welfare--are ubiquitous and important. They can be found at scales ranging from our daily routines--such as driving on highways, scheduling meetings, and working collaboratively--to our global challenges--such as peace, commerce, and pandemic preparedness. Arguably, the success of the human species is rooted in our ability to cooperate. Since machines powered by artificial intelligence are playing an ever greater role in our lives, it will be important to equip them with the capabilities necessary to cooperate and to foster cooperation. We see an opportunity for the field of artificial intelligence to explicitly focus effort on this class of problems, which we term Cooperative AI. The objective of this research would be to study the many aspects of the problems of cooperation and to innovate in AI to contribute to solving these problems. Central goals include building machine agents with the capabilities needed for cooperation, building tools to foster cooperation in populations of (machine and/or human) agents, and otherwise conducting AI research for insight relevant to problems of cooperation. This research integrates ongoing work on multi-agent systems, game theory and social choice, human-machine interaction and alignment, natural-language processing, and the construction of social tools and platforms. However, Cooperative AI is not the union of these existing areas, but rather an independent bet about the productivity of specific kinds of conversations that involve these and other areas. We see opportunity to more explicitly focus on the problem of cooperation, to construct unified theory and vocabulary, and to build bridges with adjacent communities working on cooperation, including in the natural, social, and behavioural sciences.

Charles Beattie, Thomas Köppe, Edgar A. Duéñez-Guzmán et al.

We present DeepMind Lab2D, a scalable environment simulator for artificial intelligence research that facilitates researcher-led experimentation with environment design. DeepMind Lab2D was built with the specific needs of multi-agent deep reinforcement learning researchers in mind, but it may also be useful beyond that particular subfield.

Yoram Bachrach, Richard Everett, Edward Hughes et al.

When autonomous agents interact in the same environment, they must often cooperate to achieve their goals. One way for agents to cooperate effectively is to form a team, make a binding agreement on a joint plan, and execute it. However, when agents are self-interested, the gains from team formation must be allocated appropriately to incentivize agreement. Various approaches for multi-agent negotiation have been proposed, but typically only work for particular negotiation protocols. More general methods usually require human input or domain-specific data, and so do not scale. To address this, we propose a framework for training agents to negotiate and form teams using deep reinforcement learning. Importantly, our method makes no assumptions about the specific negotiation protocol, and is instead completely experience driven. We evaluate our approach on both non-spatial and spatially extended team-formation negotiation environments, demonstrating that our agents beat hand-crafted bots and reach negotiation outcomes consistent with fair solutions predicted by cooperative game theory. Additionally, we investigate how the physical location of agents influences negotiation outcomes.

Edward Hughes, Thomas W. Anthony, Tom Eccles et al.

Zero-sum games have long guided artificial intelligence research, since they possess both a rich strategy space of best-responses and a clear evaluation metric. What's more, competition is a vital mechanism in many real-world multi-agent systems capable of generating intelligent innovations: Darwinian evolution, the market economy and the AlphaZero algorithm, to name a few. In two-player zero-sum games, the challenge is usually viewed as finding Nash equilibrium strategies, safeguarding against exploitation regardless of the opponent. While this captures the intricacies of chess or Go, it avoids the notion of cooperation with co-players, a hallmark of the major transitions leading from unicellular organisms to human civilization. Beyond two players, alliance formation often confers an advantage; however this requires trust, namely the promise of mutual cooperation in the face of incentives to defect. Successful play therefore requires adaptation to co-players rather than the pursuit of non-exploitability. Here we argue that a systematic study of many-player zero-sum games is a crucial element of artificial intelligence research. Using symmetric zero-sum matrix games, we demonstrate formally that alliance formation may be seen as a social dilemma, and empirically that naïve multi-agent reinforcement learning therefore fails to form alliances. We introduce a toy model of economic competition, and show how reinforcement learning may be augmented with a peer-to-peer contract mechanism to discover and enforce alliances. Finally, we generalize our agent model to incorporate temporally-extended contracts, presenting opportunities for further work.

Kevin R. McKee, Ian Gemp, Brian McWilliams et al.

Recent research on reinforcement learning in pure-conflict and pure-common interest games has emphasized the importance of population heterogeneity. In contrast, studies of reinforcement learning in mixed-motive games have primarily leveraged homogeneous approaches. Given the defining characteristic of mixed-motive games--the imperfect correlation of incentives between group members--we study the effect of population heterogeneity on mixed-motive reinforcement learning. We draw on interdependence theory from social psychology and imbue reinforcement learning agents with Social Value Orientation (SVO), a flexible formalization of preferences over group outcome distributions. We subsequently explore the effects of diversity in SVO on populations of reinforcement learning agents in two mixed-motive Markov games. We demonstrate that heterogeneity in SVO generates meaningful and complex behavioral variation among agents similar to that suggested by interdependence theory. Empirical results in these mixed-motive dilemmas suggest agents trained in heterogeneous populations develop particularly generalized, high-performing policies relative to those trained in homogeneous populations.

Raphael Köster, Dylan Hadfield-Menell, Gillian K. Hadfield et al.

How can societies learn to enforce and comply with social norms? Here we investigate the learning dynamics and emergence of compliance and enforcement of social norms in a foraging game, implemented in a multi-agent reinforcement learning setting. In this spatiotemporally extended game, individuals are incentivized to implement complex berry-foraging policies and punish transgressions against social taboos covering specific berry types. We show that agents benefit when eating poisonous berries is taboo, meaning the behavior is punished by other agents, as this helps overcome a credit-assignment problem in discovering delayed health effects. Critically, however, we also show that introducing an additional taboo, which results in punishment for eating a harmless berry, improves the rate and stability with which agents learn to punish taboo violations and comply with taboos. Counterintuitively, our results show that an arbitrary taboo (a "silly rule") can enhance social learning dynamics and achieve better outcomes in the middle stages of learning. We discuss the results in the context of studying normativity as a group-level emergent phenomenon.

David Balduzzi, Wojciech M Czarnecki, Thomas W Anthony et al.

With the success of modern machine learning, it is becoming increasingly important to understand and control how learning algorithms interact. Unfortunately, negative results from game theory show there is little hope of understanding or controlling general n-player games. We therefore introduce smooth markets (SM-games), a class of n-player games with pairwise zero sum interactions. SM-games codify a common design pattern in machine learning that includes (some) GANs, adversarial training, and other recent algorithms. We show that SM-games are amenable to analysis and optimization using first-order methods.

Meire Fortunato, Melissa Tan, Ryan Faulkner et al.

Memory is an important aspect of intelligence and plays a role in many deep reinforcement learning models. However, little progress has been made in understanding when specific memory systems help more than others and how well they generalize. The field also has yet to see a prevalent consistent and rigorous approach for evaluating agent performance on holdout data. In this paper, we aim to develop a comprehensive methodology to test different kinds of memory in an agent and assess how well the agent can apply what it learns in training to a holdout set that differs from the training set along dimensions that we suggest are relevant for evaluating memory-specific generalization. To that end, we first construct a diverse set of memory tasks that allow us to evaluate test-time generalization across multiple dimensions. Second, we develop and perform multiple ablations on an agent architecture that combines multiple memory systems, observe its baseline models, and investigate its performance against the task suite.

Alexander Sasha Vezhnevets, Yuhuai Wu, Remi Leblond et al.

This paper investigates generalisation in multi-agent games, where the generality of the agent can be evaluated by playing against opponents it hasn't seen during training. We propose two new games with concealed information and complex, non-transitive reward structure (think rock/paper/scissors). It turns out that most current deep reinforcement learning methods fail to efficiently explore the strategy space, thus learning policies that generalise poorly to unseen opponents. We then propose a novel hierarchical agent architecture, where the hierarchy is grounded in the game-theoretic structure of the game -- the top level chooses strategic responses to opponents, while the low level implements them into policy over primitive actions. This grounding facilitates credit assignment across the levels of hierarchy. Our experiments show that the proposed hierarchical agent is capable of generalisation to unseen opponents, while conventional baselines fail to generalise whatsoever.

Ben Deverett, Ryan Faulkner, Meire Fortunato et al.

The measurement of time is central to intelligent behavior. We know that both animals and artificial agents can successfully use temporal dependencies to select actions. In artificial agents, little work has directly addressed (1) which architectural components are necessary for successful development of this ability, (2) how this timing ability comes to be represented in the units and actions of the agent, and (3) whether the resulting behavior of the system converges on solutions similar to those of biology. Here we studied interval timing abilities in deep reinforcement learning agents trained end-to-end on an interval reproduction paradigm inspired by experimental literature on mechanisms of timing. We characterize the strategies developed by recurrent and feedforward agents, which both succeed at temporal reproduction using distinct mechanisms, some of which bear specific and intriguing similarities to biological systems. These findings advance our understanding of how agents come to represent time, and they highlight the value of experimentally inspired approaches to characterizing agent abilities.

Tom Eccles, Edward Hughes, János Kramár et al.

Reciprocity is an important feature of human social interaction and underpins our cooperative nature. What is more, simple forms of reciprocity have proved remarkably resilient in matrix game social dilemmas. Most famously, the tit-for-tat strategy performs very well in tournaments of Prisoner's Dilemma. Unfortunately this strategy is not readily applicable to the real world, in which options to cooperate or defect are temporally and spatially extended. Here, we present a general online reinforcement learning algorithm that displays reciprocal behavior towards its co-players. We show that it can induce pro-social outcomes for the wider group when learning alongside selfish agents, both in a $2$-player Markov game, and in $5$-player intertemporal social dilemmas. We analyse the resulting policies to show that the reciprocating agents are strongly influenced by their co-players' behavior.

Joel Z. Leibo, Edward Hughes, Marc Lanctot et al.

Evolution has produced a multi-scale mosaic of interacting adaptive units. Innovations arise when perturbations push parts of the system away from stable equilibria into new regimes where previously well-adapted solutions no longer work. Here we explore the hypothesis that multi-agent systems sometimes display intrinsic dynamics arising from competition and cooperation that provide a naturally emergent curriculum, which we term an autocurriculum. The solution of one social task often begets new social tasks, continually generating novel challenges, and thereby promoting innovation. Under certain conditions these challenges may become increasingly complex over time, demanding that agents accumulate ever more innovations.

Joel Z. Leibo, Julien Perolat, Edward Hughes et al.

Here we explore a new algorithmic framework for multi-agent reinforcement learning, called Malthusian reinforcement learning, which extends self-play to include fitness-linked population size dynamics that drive ongoing innovation. In Malthusian RL, increases in a subpopulation's average return drive subsequent increases in its size, just as Thomas Malthus argued in 1798 was the relationship between preindustrial income levels and population growth. Malthusian reinforcement learning harnesses the competitive pressures arising from growing and shrinking population size to drive agents to explore regions of state and policy spaces that they could not otherwise reach. Furthermore, in environments where there are potential gains from specialization and division of labor, we show that Malthusian reinforcement learning is better positioned to take advantage of such synergies than algorithms based on self-play.

Natasha Jaques, Angeliki Lazaridou, Edward Hughes et al.

We propose a unified mechanism for achieving coordination and communication in Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL), through rewarding agents for having causal influence over other agents' actions. Causal influence is assessed using counterfactual reasoning. At each timestep, an agent simulates alternate actions that it could have taken, and computes their effect on the behavior of other agents. Actions that lead to bigger changes in other agents' behavior are considered influential and are rewarded. We show that this is equivalent to rewarding agents for having high mutual information between their actions. Empirical results demonstrate that influence leads to enhanced coordination and communication in challenging social dilemma environments, dramatically increasing the learning curves of the deep RL agents, and leading to more meaningful learned communication protocols. The influence rewards for all agents can be computed in a decentralized way by enabling agents to learn a model of other agents using deep neural networks. In contrast, key previous works on emergent communication in the MARL setting were unable to learn diverse policies in a decentralized manner and had to resort to centralized training. Consequently, the influence reward opens up a window of new opportunities for research in this area.

Max Jaderberg, Wojciech M. Czarnecki, Iain Dunning et al.

Recent progress in artificial intelligence through reinforcement learning (RL) has shown great success on increasingly complex single-agent environments and two-player turn-based games. However, the real-world contains multiple agents, each learning and acting independently to cooperate and compete with other agents, and environments reflecting this degree of complexity remain an open challenge. In this work, we demonstrate for the first time that an agent can achieve human-level in a popular 3D multiplayer first-person video game, Quake III Arena Capture the Flag, using only pixels and game points as input. These results were achieved by a novel two-tier optimisation process in which a population of independent RL agents are trained concurrently from thousands of parallel matches with agents playing in teams together and against each other on randomly generated environments. Each agent in the population learns its own internal reward signal to complement the sparse delayed reward from winning, and selects actions using a novel temporally hierarchical representation that enables the agent to reason at multiple timescales. During game-play, these agents display human-like behaviours such as navigating, following, and defending based on a rich learned representation that is shown to encode high-level game knowledge. In an extensive tournament-style evaluation the trained agents exceeded the win-rate of strong human players both as teammates and opponents, and proved far stronger than existing state-of-the-art agents. These results demonstrate a significant jump in the capabilities of artificial agents, bringing us closer to the goal of human-level intelligence.

Kris Cao, Angeliki Lazaridou, Marc Lanctot et al.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning offers a way to study how communication could emerge in communities of agents needing to solve specific problems. In this paper, we study the emergence of communication in the negotiation environment, a semi-cooperative model of agent interaction. We introduce two communication protocols -- one grounded in the semantics of the game, and one which is \textit{a priori} ungrounded and is a form of cheap talk. We show that self-interested agents can use the pre-grounded communication channel to negotiate fairly, but are unable to effectively use the ungrounded channel. However, prosocial agents do learn to use cheap talk to find an optimal negotiating strategy, suggesting that cooperation is necessary for language to emerge. We also study communication behaviour in a setting where one agent interacts with agents in a community with different levels of prosociality and show how agent identifiability can aid negotiation.

Greg Wayne, Chia-Chun Hung, David Amos et al.

Animals execute goal-directed behaviours despite the limited range and scope of their sensors. To cope, they explore environments and store memories maintaining estimates of important information that is not presently available. Recently, progress has been made with artificial intelligence (AI) agents that learn to perform tasks from sensory input, even at a human level, by merging reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms with deep neural networks, and the excitement surrounding these results has led to the pursuit of related ideas as explanations of non-human animal learning. However, we demonstrate that contemporary RL algorithms struggle to solve simple tasks when enough information is concealed from the sensors of the agent, a property called "partial observability". An obvious requirement for handling partially observed tasks is access to extensive memory, but we show memory is not enough; it is critical that the right information be stored in the right format. We develop a model, the Memory, RL, and Inference Network (MERLIN), in which memory formation is guided by a process of predictive modeling. MERLIN facilitates the solution of tasks in 3D virtual reality environments for which partial observability is severe and memories must be maintained over long durations. Our model demonstrates a single learning agent architecture that can solve canonical behavioural tasks in psychology and neurobiology without strong simplifying assumptions about the dimensionality of sensory input or the duration of experiences.

Edward Hughes, Joel Z. Leibo, Matthew G. Phillips et al.

Groups of humans are often able to find ways to cooperate with one another in complex, temporally extended social dilemmas. Models based on behavioral economics are only able to explain this phenomenon for unrealistic stateless matrix games. Recently, multi-agent reinforcement learning has been applied to generalize social dilemma problems to temporally and spatially extended Markov games. However, this has not yet generated an agent that learns to cooperate in social dilemmas as humans do. A key insight is that many, but not all, human individuals have inequity averse social preferences. This promotes a particular resolution of the matrix game social dilemma wherein inequity-averse individuals are personally pro-social and punish defectors. Here we extend this idea to Markov games and show that it promotes cooperation in several types of sequential social dilemma, via a profitable interaction with policy learnability. In particular, we find that inequity aversion improves temporal credit assignment for the important class of intertemporal social dilemmas. These results help explain how large-scale cooperation may emerge and persist.

Simon Schmitt, Jonathan J. Hudson, Augustin Zidek et al.

We present a method for using previously-trained 'teacher' agents to kickstart the training of a new 'student' agent. To this end, we leverage ideas from policy distillation and population based training. Our method places no constraints on the architecture of the teacher or student agents, and it regulates itself to allow the students to surpass their teachers in performance. We show that, on a challenging and computationally-intensive multi-task benchmark (DMLab-30), kickstarted training improves the data efficiency of new agents, making it significantly easier to iterate on their design. We also show that the same kickstarting pipeline can allow a single student agent to leverage multiple 'expert' teachers which specialize on individual tasks. In this setting kickstarting yields surprisingly large gains, with the kickstarted agent matching the performance of an agent trained from scratch in almost 10x fewer steps, and surpassing its final performance by 42 percent. Kickstarting is conceptually simple and can easily be incorporated into reinforcement learning experiments.

Joel Z. Leibo, Cyprien de Masson d'Autume, Daniel Zoran et al.

Psychlab is a simulated psychology laboratory inside the first-person 3D game world of DeepMind Lab (Beattie et al. 2016). Psychlab enables implementations of classical laboratory psychological experiments so that they work with both human and artificial agents. Psychlab has a simple and flexible API that enables users to easily create their own tasks. As examples, we are releasing Psychlab implementations of several classical experimental paradigms including visual search, change detection, random dot motion discrimination, and multiple object tracking. We also contribute a study of the visual psychophysics of a specific state-of-the-art deep reinforcement learning agent: UNREAL (Jaderberg et al. 2016). This study leads to the surprising conclusion that UNREAL learns more quickly about larger target stimuli than it does about smaller stimuli. In turn, this insight motivates a specific improvement in the form of a simple model of foveal vision that turns out to significantly boost UNREAL's performance, both on Psychlab tasks, and on standard DeepMind Lab tasks. By open-sourcing Psychlab we hope to facilitate a range of future such studies that simultaneously advance deep reinforcement learning and improve its links with cognitive science.

M. Botvinick, D. G. T. Barrett, P. Battaglia et al.

We agree with Lake and colleagues on their list of key ingredients for building humanlike intelligence, including the idea that model-based reasoning is essential. However, we favor an approach that centers on one additional ingredient: autonomy. In particular, we aim toward agents that can both build and exploit their own internal models, with minimal human hand-engineering. We believe an approach centered on autonomous learning has the greatest chance of success as we scale toward real-world complexity, tackling domains for which ready-made formal models are not available. Here we survey several important examples of the progress that has been made toward building autonomous agents with humanlike abilities, and highlight some outstanding challenges.