Pierfrancesco La Mura

2papers

2 Papers

GTJan 23, 2013
Expected Utility Networks

Pierfrancesco La Mura, Yoav Shoham

We introduce a new class of graphical representations, expected utility networks (EUNs), and discuss some of its properties and potential applications to artificial intelligence and economic theory. In EUNs not only probabilities, but also utilities enjoy a modular representation. EUNs are undirected graphs with two types of arc, representing probability and utility dependencies respectively. The representation of utilities is based on a novel notion of conditional utility independence, which we introduce and discuss in the context of other existing proposals. Just as probabilistic inference involves the computation of conditional probabilities, strategic inference involves the computation of conditional expected utilities for alternative plans of action. We define a new notion of conditional expected utility (EU) independence, and show that in EUNs node separation with respect to the probability and utility subgraphs implies conditional EU independence.

GTJan 16, 2013
Game Networks

Pierfrancesco La Mura

We introduce Game networks (G nets), a novel representation for multi-agent decision problems. Compared to other game-theoretic representations, such as strategic or extensive forms, G nets are more structured and more compact; more fundamentally, G nets constitute a computationally advantageous framework for strategic inference, as both probability and utility independencies are captured in the structure of the network and can be exploited in order to simplify the inference process. An important aspect of multi-agent reasoning is the identification of some or all of the strategic equilibria in a game; we present original convergence methods for strategic equilibrium which can take advantage of strategic separabilities in the G net structure in order to simplify the computations. Specifically, we describe a method which identifies a unique equilibrium as a function of the game payoffs, and one which identifies all equilibria.