Burkhard C. Schipper

Burkhard C. Schipper

Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2013) introduced dynamic game with unawareness consisting of a partially ordered set of games in extensive form. Here, we study the normal form of dynamic games with unawareness. The generalized normal form associated with a dynamic game with unawareness consists of a partially ordered set of games in norm form. We use the generalized normal form to characterize extensive-form rationalizability (resp., prudent rationalizability) in dynamic games with unawareness by iterated conditional strict (resp., weak) dominance in the associated generalized normal form. We also show that the analogue to iterated admissibility for dynamic games with unawareness depends on extensive-form structure. This is because under unawareness, a player's information set not only determines which nodes she considers possible but also of which game tree(s) she is aware of.

Burkhard C. Schipper

It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games that a player has an incentive to adopt, that would be evolutionary stable or that could "learn itself". Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach such a learning opponent in order secure at least the Stackelberg leader payoff. The impossibility result remains intact when restricted to the classes of generic games, two-player games, potential games, games with strategic complements or 2x2 games, in which learning is known to be "nice". More generally, it also applies to uncoupled learning heuristics leading to correlated equilibria, rationalizable outcomes, iterated admissible outcomes, or minimal curb sets. A possibility result restricted to "strategically trivial" games fails if some generic games outside this class are considered as well.

Burkhard C. Schipper

Morris (1996, 1997) introduced preference-based definitions of knowledge and belief in standard state-space structures. This paper extends this preference-based approach to unawareness structures (Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper, 2006, 2008). By defining unawareness and knowledge in terms of preferences over acts in unawareness structures and showing their equivalence to the epistemic notions of unawareness and knowledge, we try to build a bridge between decision theory and epistemic logic. Unawareness of an event is characterized behaviorally as the event being null and its negation being null.