Norman C. Dalkey

Norman C. Dalkey

The form and justification of inductive inference rules depend strongly on the representation of uncertainty. This paper examines one generic representation, namely, incomplete information. The notion can be formalized by presuming that the relevant probabilities in a decision problem are known only to the extent that they belong to a class K of probability distributions. The concept is a generalization of a frequent suggestion that uncertainty be represented by intervals or ranges on probabilities. To make the representation useful for decision making, an inductive rule can be formulated which determines, in a well-defined manner, a best approximation to the unknown probability, given the set K. In addition, the knowledge set notion entails a natural procedure for updating -- modifying the set K given new evidence. Several non-intuitive consequences of updating emphasize the differences between inference with complete and inference with incomplete information.

Norman C. Dalkey

Two different approaches to dealing with probabilistic knowledge are examined -models and inductive inference. Examples of the first are: influence diagrams [1], Bayesian networks [2], log-linear models [3, 4]. Examples of the second are: games-against nature [5, 6] varieties of maximum-entropy methods [7, 8, 9], and the author's min-score induction [10]. In the modeling approach, the basic issue is manageability, with respect to data elicitation and computation. Thus, it is assumed that the pertinent set of users in some sense knows the relevant probabilities, and the problem is to format that knowledge in a way that is convenient to input and store and that allows computation of the answers to current questions in an expeditious fashion. The basic issue for the inductive approach appears at first sight to be very different. In this approach it is presumed that the relevant probabilities are only partially known, and the problem is to extend that incomplete information in a reasonable way to answer current questions. Clearly, this approach requires that some form of induction be invoked. Of course, manageability is an important additional concern. Despite their seeming differences, the two approaches have a fair amount in common, especially with respect to the structural framework they employ. Roughly speaking, this framework involves identifying clusters of variables which strongly interact, establishing marginal probability distributions on the clusters, and extending the subdistributions to a more complete distribution, usually via a product formalism. The product extension is justified on the modeling approach in terms of assumed conditional independence; in the inductive approach the product form arises from an inductive rule.

Norman C. Dalkey

An inductive logic can be formulated in which the elements are not propositions or probability distributions, but information systems. The logic is complete for information systems with binary hypotheses, i.e., it applies to all such systems. It is not complete for information systems with more than two hypotheses, but applies to a subset of such systems. The logic is inductive in that conclusions are more informative than premises. Inferences using the formalism have a strong justification in terms of the expected value of the derived information system.

Norman C. Dalkey

The product expansion of conditional probabilities for belief nets is not maximum entropy. This appears to deny a desirable kind of assurance for the model. However, a kind of guarantee that is almost as strong as maximum entropy can be derived. Surprisingly, a variant model also exhibits the guarantee, and for many cases obtains a higher performance score than the product expansion.