Bryce McLaughlin

Bryce McLaughlin, Jann Spiess

When an algorithm provides risk assessments, we typically think of them as helpful inputs to human decisions, such as when risk scores are presented to judges or doctors. However, a decision-maker may react not only to the information provided by the algorithm. The decision-maker may also view the algorithmic recommendation as a default action, making it costly for them to deviate, such as when a judge is reluctant to overrule a high-risk assessment for a defendant or a doctor fears the consequences of deviating from recommended procedures. To address such unintended consequences of algorithmic assistance, we propose a model of joint human-machine decision-making. Within this model, we consider the effect and design of algorithmic recommendations when they affect choices not just by shifting beliefs, but also by altering preferences. We motivate this assumption from institutional factors, such as a desire to avoid audits, as well as from well-established models in behavioral science that predict loss aversion relative to a reference point. We show that recommendation-dependent preferences create inefficiencies where the decision-maker is overly responsive to the recommendation. As a remedy, we discuss algorithms that strategically withhold recommendations and show how they can improve the quality of final decisions. Concretely, we prove that an intuitive algorithm achieves minimax optimality by sending recommendations only when it is confident that their implementation would improve over an unassisted baseline decision.

Bryce McLaughlin, Jann Spiess

Algorithms frequently assist, rather than replace, human decision-makers. However, the design and analysis of algorithms often focus on predicting outcomes and do not explicitly model their effect on human decisions. This discrepancy between the design and role of algorithmic assistants becomes particularly concerning in light of empirical evidence that suggests that algorithmic assistants again and again fail to improve human decisions. In this article, we formalize the design of recommendation algorithms that assist human decision-makers without making restrictive ex-ante assumptions about how recommendations affect decisions. We formulate an algorithmic-design problem that leverages the potential-outcomes framework from causal inference to model the effect of recommendations on a human decision-maker's binary treatment choice. Within this model, we introduce a monotonicity assumption that leads to an intuitive classification of human responses to the algorithm. Under this assumption, we can express the human's response to algorithmic recommendations in terms of their compliance with the algorithm and the active decision they would take if the algorithm sends no recommendation. We showcase the utility of our framework using an online experiment that simulates a hiring task. We argue that our approach can make sense of the relative performance of different recommendation algorithms in the experiment and can help design solutions that realize human-AI complementarity. Finally, we leverage our approach to derive minimax optimal recommendation algorithms that can be implemented with machine learning using limited training data.

Talia Gillis, Bryce McLaughlin, Jann Spiess

When machine-learning algorithms are used in high-stakes decisions, we want to ensure that their deployment leads to fair and equitable outcomes. This concern has motivated a fast-growing literature that focuses on diagnosing and addressing disparities in machine predictions. However, many machine predictions are deployed to assist in decisions where a human decision-maker retains the ultimate decision authority. In this article, we therefore consider in a formal model and in a lab experiment how properties of machine predictions affect the resulting human decisions. In our formal model of statistical decision-making, we show that the inclusion of a biased human decision-maker can revert common relationships between the structure of the algorithm and the qualities of resulting decisions. Specifically, we document that excluding information about protected groups from the prediction may fail to reduce, and may even increase, ultimate disparities. In the lab experiment, we demonstrate how predictions informed by gender-specific information can reduce average gender disparities in decisions. While our concrete theoretical results rely on specific assumptions about the data, algorithm, and decision-maker, and the experiment focuses on a particular prediction task, our findings show more broadly that any study of critical properties of complex decision systems, such as the fairness of machine-assisted human decisions, should go beyond focusing on the underlying algorithmic predictions in isolation.