Dominique Unruh

Dominique Unruh, José Manuel Rodríguez Caballero

We present a formalization of bounded operators on complex vector spaces in Isabelle/HOL. Our formalization contains material on complex vector spaces (normed spaces, Banach spaces, Hilbert spaces) that complements and goes beyond the developments of real vectors spaces in the Isabelle/HOL standard library. We define the type of bounded operators between complex vector spaces (cblinfun) and develop the theory of unitaries, projectors, extension of bounded linear functions (BLT theorem), adjoints, Loewner order, closed subspaces and more. For the finite-dimensional case, we provide code generation support by identifying finite-dimensional operators with matrices as formalized in the Jordan_Normal_Form AFP entry.

Andris Ambainis, Ansis Rosmanis, Dominique Unruh

Quantum zero-knowledge proofs and quantum proofs of knowledge are inherently difficult to analyze because their security analysis uses rewinding. Certain cases of quantum rewinding are handled by the results by Watrous (SIAM J Comput, 2009) and Unruh (Eurocrypt 2012), yet in general the problem remains elusive. We show that this is not only due to a lack of proof techniques: relative to an oracle, we show that classically secure proofs and proofs of knowledge are insecure in the quantum setting. More specifically, sigma-protocols, the Fiat-Shamir construction, and Fischlin's proof system are quantum insecure under assumptions that are sufficient for classical security. Additionally, we show that for similar reasons, computationally binding commitments provide almost no security guarantees in a quantum setting. To show these results, we develop the "pick-one trick", a general technique that allows an adversary to find one value satisfying a given predicate, but not two.

Aharon Brodutch, Daniel Nagaj, Or Sattath et al.

Unlike classical money, which is hard to forge for practical reasons (e.g. producing paper with a certain property), quantum money is attractive because its security might be based on the no-cloning theorem. The first quantum money scheme was introduced by Wiesner circa 1970. Although more sophisticated quantum money schemes were proposed, Wiesner's scheme remained appealing because it is both conceptually clean and relatively easy to implement. We show efficient adaptive attacks on Wiesner's quantum money scheme [Wie83] (and its variant by Bennett et al. [BBBW83]), when valid money is accepted and passed on, while invalid money is destroyed. We propose two attacks, the first is inspired by the Elitzur-Vaidman bomb testing problem [EV93, KWH+95], while the second is based on the idea of protective measurements [AAV93]. It allows us to break Wiesner's scheme with 4 possible states per qubit, and generalizations which use more than 4 states per qubit.