Demosthenis Teneketzis

Ashutosh Nayyar, Tamer Basar, Demosthenis Teneketzis et al.

We consider a remote estimation problem with an energy harvesting sensor and a remote estimator. The sensor observes the state of a discrete-time source which may be a finite state Markov chain or a multi-dimensional linear Gaussian system. It harvests energy from its environment (say, for example, through a solar cell) and uses this energy for the purpose of communicating with the estimator. Due to the randomness of energy available for communication, the sensor may not be able to communicate all the time. The sensor may also want to save its energy for future communications. The estimator relies on messages communicated by the sensor to produce real-time estimates of the source state. We consider the problem of finding a communication scheduling strategy for the sensor and an estimation strategy for the estimator that jointly minimize an expected sum of communication and distortion costs over a finite time horizon. Our goal of joint optimization leads to a decentralized decision-making problem. By viewing the problem from the estimator's perspective, we obtain a dynamic programming characterization for the decentralized decision-making problem that involves optimization over functions. Under some symmetry assumptions on the source statistics and the distortion metric, we show that an optimal communication strategy is described by easily computable thresholds and that the optimal estimate is a simple function of the most recently received sensor observation.

Ashutosh Nayyar, Aditya Mahajan, Demosthenis Teneketzis

A general model of decentralized stochastic control called partial history sharing information structure is presented. In this model, at each step the controllers share part of their observation and control history with each other. This general model subsumes several existing models of information sharing as special cases. Based on the information commonly known to all the controllers, the decentralized problem is reformulated as an equivalent centralized problem from the perspective of a coordinator. The coordinator knows the common information and select prescriptions that map each controller's local information to its control actions. The optimal control problem at the coordinator is shown to be a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) which is solved using techniques from Markov decision theory. This approach provides (a) structural results for optimal strategies, and (b) a dynamic program for obtaining optimal strategies for all controllers in the original decentralized problem. Thus, this approach unifies the various ad-hoc approaches taken in the literature. In addition, the structural results on optimal control strategies obtained by the proposed approach cannot be obtained by the existing generic approach (the person-by-person approach) for obtaining structural results in decentralized problems; and the dynamic program obtained by the proposed approach is simpler than that obtained by the existing generic approach (the designer's approach) for obtaining dynamic programs in decentralized problems.

Yi Ouyang, Demosthenis Teneketzis

A discrete-time decentralized routing problem in a service system consisting of two service stations and two controllers is investigated. Each controller is affiliated with one station. Each station has an infinite size buffer. Exogenous customer arrivals at each station occur with rate $λ$. Service times at each station have rate $μ$. At any time, a controller can route one of the customers waiting in its own station to the other station. Each controller knows perfectly the queue length in its own station and observes the exogenous arrivals to its own station as well as the arrivals of customers sent from the other station. At the beginning, each controller has a probability mass function (PMF) on the number of customers in the other station. These PMFs are common knowledge between the two controllers. At each time a holding cost is incurred at each station due to the customers waiting at that station. The objective is to determine routing policies for the two controllers that minimize either the total expected holding cost over a finite horizon or the average cost per unit time over an infinite horizon. In this problem there is implicit communication between the two controllers; whenever a controller decides to send or not to send a customer from its own station to the other station it communicates information about its queue length to the other station. This implicit communication through control actions is referred to as signaling in decentralized control. Signaling results in complex communication and decision problems. In spite of the complexity of signaling involved, it is shown that an optimal signaling strategy is described by a threshold policy which depends on the common information between the two controllers; this threshold policy is explicitly determined.

Erik Miehling, Demosthenis Teneketzis

With the increased level of distributed generation and demand response comes the need for associated mechanisms that can perform well in the face of increasingly complex deregulated energy market structures. Using Lagrangian duality theory, we develop a decentralized market mechanism that ensures that, under the guidance of a market operator, self-interested market participants: generation companies (GenCos), distribution companies (DistCos), and transmission companies (TransCos), reach a competitive equilibrium. We show that even in the presence of informational asymmetries and nonlinearities (such as power losses and transmission constraints), the resulting competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient.

Yi Ouyang, Hamidreza Tavafoghi, Demosthenis Teneketzis

We formulate and analyze a general class of stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information arising in dynamic systems. In such games, multiple strategic agents control the system dynamics and have different information about the system over time. Because of the presence of asymmetric information, each agent needs to form beliefs about other agents' private information. Therefore, the specification of the agents' beliefs along with their strategies is necessary to study the dynamic game. We use Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) as our solution concept. A PBE consists of a pair of strategy profile and belief system. In a PBE, every agent's strategy should be a best response under the belief system, and the belief system depends on agents' strategy profile when there is signaling among agents. Therefore, the circular dependence between strategy profile and belief system makes it difficult to compute PBE. Using the common information among agents, we introduce a subclass of PBE called common information based perfect Bayesian equilibria (CIB-PBE), and provide a sequential decomposition of the dynamic game. Such decomposition leads to a backward induction algorithm to compute CIB-PBE. We illustrate the sequential decomposition with an example of a multiple access broadcast game. We prove the existence of CIB-PBE for a subclass of dynamic games.

Yi Ouyang, Demosthenis Teneketzis

We consider a multiple access communication system where multiple users share a common collision channel. Each user observes its local traffic and the feedback from the channel. At each time instant the feedback from the channel is one of three messages: no transmission, successful transmission, collision. The objective is to design a transmission protocol that coordinates the users' transmissions and achieves high throughput and low delay. We present a decentralized Common Information-Based Multiple Access (CIMA) protocol that has the following features: (i) it achieves the full throughput region of the collision channel; (ii) it results in a delay that is linear in the number of users, and is significantly lower than that of CSMA protocols; (iii) it avoids collisions without channel sensing.

Mohammad Rasouli, Erik Miehling, Demosthenis Teneketzis

An analytical approach for a dynamic cyber-security problem that captures progressive attacks to a computer network is presented. We formulate the dynamic security problem from the defender's point of view as a supervisory control problem with imperfect information, modeling the computer network's operation by a discrete event system. We consider a min-max performance criterion and use dynamic programming to determine, within a restricted set of policies, an optimal policy for the defender. We study and interpret the behavior of this optimal policy as we vary certain parameters of the supervisory control problem.