R. Spencer Hallyburton

AI
h-index4
4papers
95citations
Novelty56%
AI Score42

4 Papers

54.8IVJun 3
Scaling Datasets for Multi-Sensor, Multi-Agent, and Multi-Domain Learning in Autonomous Systems

R. Spencer Hallyburton, David Hunt, Miroslav Pajic

Existing datasets cannot support large-scale learning in multi-agent, multi-sensor, or multi-domain autonomy, where diversity and coordination are essential. We present a modular dataset generation pipeline that creates terabyte-scale, ground-truth-labeled data for ground, aerial, and infrastructure-based systems using the AVstack framework and CARLA simulator. Supporting single- and multi-agent configurations with flexible sensor suites, the pipeline enables controllable experimentation across challenging conditions. Representative perception and fusion studies show how generated data can support application-specific training and collaborative autonomy.

AIMay 27, 2025
Assured Autonomy with Neuro-Symbolic Perception

R. Spencer Hallyburton, Miroslav Pajic

Many state-of-the-art AI models deployed in cyber-physical systems (CPS), while highly accurate, are simply pattern-matchers.~With limited security guarantees, there are concerns for their reliability in safety-critical and contested domains. To advance assured AI, we advocate for a paradigm shift that imbues data-driven perception models with symbolic structure, inspired by a human's ability to reason over low-level features and high-level context. We propose a neuro-symbolic paradigm for perception (NeuSPaPer) and illustrate how joint object detection and scene graph generation (SGG) yields deep scene understanding.~Powered by foundation models for offline knowledge extraction and specialized SGG algorithms for real-time deployment, we design a framework leveraging structured relational graphs that ensures the integrity of situational awareness in autonomy. Using physics-based simulators and real-world datasets, we demonstrate how SGG bridges the gap between low-level sensor perception and high-level reasoning, establishing a foundation for resilient, context-aware AI and advancing trusted autonomy in CPS.

CVMar 10, 2025
Probabilistic Segmentation for Robust Field of View Estimation

R. Spencer Hallyburton, David Hunt, Yiwei He et al.

Attacks on sensing and perception threaten the safe deployment of autonomous vehicles (AVs). Security-aware sensor fusion helps mitigate threats but requires accurate field of view (FOV) estimation which has not been evaluated autonomy. To address this gap, we adapt classical computer graphics algorithms to develop the first autonomy-relevant FOV estimators and create the first datasets with ground truth FOV labels. Unfortunately, we find that these approaches are themselves highly vulnerable to attacks on sensing. To improve robustness of FOV estimation against attacks, we propose a learning-based segmentation model that captures FOV features, integrates Monte Carlo dropout (MCD) for uncertainty quantification, and performs anomaly detection on confidence maps. We illustrate through comprehensive evaluations attack resistance and strong generalization across environments. Architecture trade studies demonstrate the model is feasible for real-time deployment in multiple applications.

CRJun 13, 2021
Security Analysis of Camera-LiDAR Fusion Against Black-Box Attacks on Autonomous Vehicles

R. Spencer Hallyburton, Yupei Liu, Yulong Cao et al.

To enable safe and reliable decision-making, autonomous vehicles (AVs) feed sensor data to perception algorithms to understand the environment. Sensor fusion with multi-frame tracking is becoming increasingly popular for detecting 3D objects. Thus, in this work, we perform an analysis of camera-LiDAR fusion, in the AV context, under LiDAR spoofing attacks. Recently, LiDAR-only perception was shown vulnerable to LiDAR spoofing attacks; however, we demonstrate these attacks are not capable of disrupting camera-LiDAR fusion. We then define a novel, context-aware attack: frustum attack, and show that out of 8 widely used perception algorithms - across 3 architectures of LiDAR-only and 3 architectures of camera-LiDAR fusion - all are significantly vulnerable to the frustum attack. In addition, we demonstrate that the frustum attack is stealthy to existing defenses against LiDAR spoofing as it preserves consistencies between camera and LiDAR semantics. Finally, we show that the frustum attack can be exercised consistently over time to form stealthy longitudinal attack sequences, compromising the tracking module and creating adverse outcomes on end-to-end AV control.