Antonio García Castañeda

Kevin R. McKee, Edward Hughes, Tina O. Zhu et al.

Collective action demands that individuals efficiently coordinate how much, where, and when to cooperate. Laboratory experiments have extensively explored the first part of this process, demonstrating that a variety of social-cognitive mechanisms influence how much individuals choose to invest in group efforts. However, experimental research has been unable to shed light on how social cognitive mechanisms contribute to the where and when of collective action. We build and test a computational model of human behavior in Clean Up, a social dilemma task popular in multi-agent reinforcement learning research. We show that human groups effectively cooperate in Clean Up when they can identify group members and track reputations over time, but fail to organize under conditions of anonymity. A multi-agent reinforcement learning model of reputation demonstrates the same difference in cooperation under conditions of identifiability and anonymity. In addition, the model accurately predicts spatial and temporal patterns of group behavior: in this public goods dilemma, the intrinsic motivation for reputation catalyzes the development of a non-territorial, turn-taking strategy to coordinate collective action.

Max Jaderberg, Wojciech M. Czarnecki, Iain Dunning et al.

Recent progress in artificial intelligence through reinforcement learning (RL) has shown great success on increasingly complex single-agent environments and two-player turn-based games. However, the real-world contains multiple agents, each learning and acting independently to cooperate and compete with other agents, and environments reflecting this degree of complexity remain an open challenge. In this work, we demonstrate for the first time that an agent can achieve human-level in a popular 3D multiplayer first-person video game, Quake III Arena Capture the Flag, using only pixels and game points as input. These results were achieved by a novel two-tier optimisation process in which a population of independent RL agents are trained concurrently from thousands of parallel matches with agents playing in teams together and against each other on randomly generated environments. Each agent in the population learns its own internal reward signal to complement the sparse delayed reward from winning, and selects actions using a novel temporally hierarchical representation that enables the agent to reason at multiple timescales. During game-play, these agents display human-like behaviours such as navigating, following, and defending based on a rich learned representation that is shown to encode high-level game knowledge. In an extensive tournament-style evaluation the trained agents exceeded the win-rate of strong human players both as teammates and opponents, and proved far stronger than existing state-of-the-art agents. These results demonstrate a significant jump in the capabilities of artificial agents, bringing us closer to the goal of human-level intelligence.

Edward Hughes, Joel Z. Leibo, Matthew G. Phillips et al.

Groups of humans are often able to find ways to cooperate with one another in complex, temporally extended social dilemmas. Models based on behavioral economics are only able to explain this phenomenon for unrealistic stateless matrix games. Recently, multi-agent reinforcement learning has been applied to generalize social dilemma problems to temporally and spatially extended Markov games. However, this has not yet generated an agent that learns to cooperate in social dilemmas as humans do. A key insight is that many, but not all, human individuals have inequity averse social preferences. This promotes a particular resolution of the matrix game social dilemma wherein inequity-averse individuals are personally pro-social and punish defectors. Here we extend this idea to Markov games and show that it promotes cooperation in several types of sequential social dilemma, via a profitable interaction with policy learnability. In particular, we find that inequity aversion improves temporal credit assignment for the important class of intertemporal social dilemmas. These results help explain how large-scale cooperation may emerge and persist.

Joel Z. Leibo, Cyprien de Masson d'Autume, Daniel Zoran et al.

Psychlab is a simulated psychology laboratory inside the first-person 3D game world of DeepMind Lab (Beattie et al. 2016). Psychlab enables implementations of classical laboratory psychological experiments so that they work with both human and artificial agents. Psychlab has a simple and flexible API that enables users to easily create their own tasks. As examples, we are releasing Psychlab implementations of several classical experimental paradigms including visual search, change detection, random dot motion discrimination, and multiple object tracking. We also contribute a study of the visual psychophysics of a specific state-of-the-art deep reinforcement learning agent: UNREAL (Jaderberg et al. 2016). This study leads to the surprising conclusion that UNREAL learns more quickly about larger target stimuli than it does about smaller stimuli. In turn, this insight motivates a specific improvement in the form of a simple model of foveal vision that turns out to significantly boost UNREAL's performance, both on Psychlab tasks, and on standard DeepMind Lab tasks. By open-sourcing Psychlab we hope to facilitate a range of future such studies that simultaneously advance deep reinforcement learning and improve its links with cognitive science.