Jacob Steeves

Joel Lidin, Amir Sarfi, Evangelos Pappas et al.

We describe an incentive system for distributed deep learning of foundational models where peers are rewarded for contributions. The incentive system, \textit{Gauntlet}, has been deployed on the bittensor blockchain and used to train a 1.2B LLM with completely permissionless contributions of pseudo-gradients: no control over the users that can register or their hardware. \textit{Gauntlet} can be applied to any synchronous distributed training scheme that relies on aggregating updates or pseudo-gradients. We rely on a two-stage mechanism for fast filtering of peer uptime, reliability, and synchronization, combined with the core component that estimates the loss before and after individual pseudo-gradient contributions. We utilized an OpenSkill rating system to track competitiveness of pseudo-gradient scores across time. Finally, we introduce a novel mechanism to ensure peers on the network perform unique computations. Our live 1.2B run, which has paid out real-valued tokens to participants based on the value of their contributions, yielded a competitive (on a per-iteration basis) 1.2B model that demonstrates the utility of our incentive system.

Yuma Rao, Jacob Steeves, Ala Shaabana et al.

As with other commodities, markets could help us efficiently produce machine intelligence. We propose a market where intelligence is priced by other intelligence systems peer-to-peer across the internet. Peers rank each other by training neural networks which learn the value of their neighbors. Scores accumulate on a digital ledger where high ranking peers are monetarily rewarded with additional weight in the network. However, this form of peer-ranking is not resistant to collusion, which could disrupt the accuracy of the mechanism. The solution is a connectivity-based regularization which exponentially rewards trusted peers, making the system resistant to collusion of up to 50 percent of the network weight. The result is a collectively run intelligence market which continual produces newly trained models and pays contributors who create information theoretic value.