Baoxiang Wang

GT
h-index29
3papers
13citations
Novelty70%
AI Score31

3 Papers

8.8LGNov 14, 2023
Learning Adversarial Low-rank Markov Decision Processes with Unknown Transition and Full-information Feedback

Canzhe Zhao, Ruofeng Yang, Baoxiang Wang et al.

In this work, we study the low-rank MDPs with adversarially changed losses in the full-information feedback setting. In particular, the unknown transition probability kernel admits a low-rank matrix decomposition \citep{REPUCB22}, and the loss functions may change adversarially but are revealed to the learner at the end of each episode. We propose a policy optimization-based algorithm POLO, and we prove that it attains the $\widetilde{O}(K^{\frac{5}{6}}A^{\frac{1}{2}}d\ln(1+M)/(1-γ)^2)$ regret guarantee, where $d$ is rank of the transition kernel (and hence the dimension of the unknown representations), $A$ is the cardinality of the action space, $M$ is the cardinality of the model class, and $γ$ is the discounted factor. Notably, our algorithm is oracle-efficient and has a regret guarantee with no dependence on the size of potentially arbitrarily large state space. Furthermore, we also prove an $Ω(\frac{γ^2}{1-γ} \sqrt{d A K})$ regret lower bound for this problem, showing that low-rank MDPs are statistically more difficult to learn than linear MDPs in the regret minimization setting. To the best of our knowledge, we present the first algorithm that interleaves representation learning, exploration, and exploitation to achieve the sublinear regret guarantee for RL with nonlinear function approximation and adversarial losses.

5.9MANov 3, 2024
Learning to Communicate Through Implicit Communication Channels

Han Wang, Binbin Chen, Tieying Zhang et al.

Effective communication is an essential component in collaborative multi-agent systems. Situations where explicit messaging is not feasible have been common in human society throughout history, which motivate the study of implicit communication. Previous works on learning implicit communication mostly rely on theory of mind (ToM), where agents infer the mental states and intentions of others by interpreting their actions. However, ToM-based methods become less effective in making accurate inferences in complex tasks. In this work, we propose the Implicit Channel Protocol (ICP) framework, which allows agents to communicate through implicit communication channels similar to the explicit ones. ICP leverages a subset of actions, denoted as the scouting actions, and a mapping between information and these scouting actions that encodes and decodes the messages. We propose training algorithms for agents to message and act, including learning with a randomly initialized information map and with a delayed information map. The efficacy of ICP has been tested on the tasks of Guessing Numbers, Revealing Goals, and Hanabi, where ICP significantly outperforms baseline methods through more efficient information transmission.

1.2GTNov 6, 2024
On the Decomposition of Differential Game

Nanxiang Zhou, Jing Dong, Yutian Li et al.

To understand the complexity of the dynamic of learning in differential games, we decompose the game into components where the dynamic is well understood. One of the possible tools is Helmholtz's theorem, which can decompose a vector field into a potential and a harmonic component. This has been shown to be effective in finite and normal-form games. However, applying Helmholtz's theorem by connecting it with the Hodge theorem on $\mathbb{R}^n$ (which is the strategy space of differential game) is non-trivial due to the non-compactness of $\mathbb{R}^n$. Bridging the dynamic-strategic disconnect through Hodge/Helmoltz's theorem in differential games is then left as an open problem \cite{letcher2019differentiable}. In this work, we provide two decompositions of differential games to answer this question: the first as an exact scalar potential part, a near vector potential part, and a non-strategic part; the second as a near scalar potential part, an exact vector potential part, and a non-strategic part. We show that scalar potential games coincide with potential games proposed by \cite{monderer1996potential}, where the gradient descent dynamic can successfully find the Nash equilibrium. For the vector potential game, we show that the individual gradient field is divergence-free, in which case the gradient descent dynamic may either be divergent or recurrent.