Yudong Chen

Young Wu, Jeremy McMahan, Yiding Chen et al.

We study the game modification problem, where a benevolent game designer or a malevolent adversary modifies the reward function of a zero-sum Markov game so that a target deterministic or stochastic policy profile becomes the unique Markov perfect Nash equilibrium and has a value within a target range, in a way that minimizes the modification cost. We characterize the set of policy profiles that can be installed as the unique equilibrium of a game and establish sufficient and necessary conditions for successful installation. We propose an efficient algorithm that solves a convex optimization problem with linear constraints and then performs random perturbation to obtain a modification plan with a near-optimal cost. The code for our algorithm is available at https://github.com/YoungWu559/game-modification .

Jeremy McMahan, Young Wu, Yudong Chen et al.

Many real-world games suffer from information asymmetry: one player is only aware of their own payoffs while the other player has the full game information. Examples include the critical domain of security games and adversarial multi-agent reinforcement learning. Information asymmetry renders traditional solution concepts such as Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium (SSE) and Robust-Optimization Equilibrium (ROE) inoperative. We propose a novel solution concept called VISER (Victim Is Secure, Exploiter best-Responds). VISER enables an external observer to predict the outcome of such games. In particular, for security applications, VISER allows the victim to better defend itself while characterizing the most damaging attacks available to the attacker. We show that each player's VISER strategy can be computed independently in polynomial time using linear programming (LP). We also extend VISER to its Markov-perfect counterpart for Markov games, which can be solved efficiently using a series of LPs.

Yige Hong, Qiaomin Xie, Yudong Chen et al.

We consider the infinite-horizon, average-reward restless bandit problem in discrete time. We propose a new class of policies that are designed to drive a progressively larger subset of arms toward the optimal distribution. We show that our policies are asymptotically optimal with an $O(1/\sqrt{N})$ optimality gap for an $N$-armed problem, assuming only a unichain and aperiodicity assumption. Our approach departs from most existing work that focuses on index or priority policies, which rely on the Global Attractor Property (GAP) to guarantee convergence to the optimum, or a recently developed simulation-based policy, which requires a Synchronization Assumption (SA).

Jeremy McMahan, Young Wu, Yudong Chen et al.

In this work, we develop a reward design framework for installing a desired behavior as a strict equilibrium across standard solution concepts: dominant strategy equilibrium, Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, and coarse correlated equilibrium. We also extend our framework to capture the Markov-perfect equivalents of each solution concept. Central to our framework is a comprehensive mathematical characterization of strictly installable, based on the desired solution concept and the behavior's structure. These characterizations lead to efficient iterative algorithms, which we generalize to handle optimization objectives through linear programming. Finally, we explore how our results generalize to bounded rational agents.

Jeremy McMahan, Young Wu, Yudong Chen et al.

We study security threats to Markov games due to information asymmetry and misinformation. We consider an attacker player who can spread misinformation about its reward function to influence the robust victim player's behavior. Given a fixed fake reward function, we derive the victim's policy under worst-case rationality and present polynomial-time algorithms to compute the attacker's optimal worst-case policy based on linear programming and backward induction. Then, we provide an efficient inception ("planting an idea in someone's mind") attack algorithm to find the optimal fake reward function within a restricted set of reward functions with dominant strategies. Importantly, our methods exploit the universal assumption of rationality to compute attacks efficiently. Thus, our work exposes a security vulnerability arising from standard game assumptions under misinformation.

Yige Hong, Qiaomin Xie, Yudong Chen et al.

We study the infinite-horizon restless bandit problem with the average reward criterion, in both discrete-time and continuous-time settings. A fundamental goal is to efficiently compute policies that achieve a diminishing optimality gap as the number of arms, $N$, grows large. Existing results on asymptotic optimality all rely on the uniform global attractor property (UGAP), a complex and challenging-to-verify assumption. In this paper, we propose a general, simulation-based framework, Follow-the-Virtual-Advice, that converts any single-armed policy into a policy for the original $N$-armed problem. This is done by simulating the single-armed policy on each arm and carefully steering the real state towards the simulated state. Our framework can be instantiated to produce a policy with an $O(1/\sqrt{N})$ optimality gap. In the discrete-time setting, our result holds under a simpler synchronization assumption, which covers some problem instances that violate UGAP. More notably, in the continuous-time setting, we do not require \emph{any} additional assumptions beyond the standard unichain condition. In both settings, our work is the first asymptotic optimality result that does not require UGAP.