Gerardo Berbeglia

Luciano Costa, Gerardo Berbeglia, Claudio Contardo et al.

This paper studies the estimation of ranked-list discrete choice models with single and multiple purchases. In this setting, each consumer type is characterized by a ranking over a subset of products and a desired number of purchases, and the estimation task is to identify the set of consumer types and their probabilities that best explain the observed transactional data. This problem is computationally challenging due to the exponential number of possible consumer types and becomes more difficult when multiple purchases are allowed. We propose a column generation framework for this problem. Our main contribution is a dynamic programming algorithm for the column generation subproblem. This subproblem generalizes the linear ordering problem and incorporates acceleration techniques to improve computational efficiency. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first dynamic programming-based approach for generating consumer types in non-parametric models. The proposed framework supports multiple model variants with minor modifications. Computational experiments on synthetic and real data show substantial speedups over existing methods while maintaining high solution quality, and demonstrate effectiveness in both estimation and assortment optimization.

Andres Abeliuk, Haris Aziz, Gerardo Berbeglia et al.

We propose a model of interdependent scheduling games in which each player controls a set of services that they schedule independently. A player is free to schedule his own services at any time; however, each of these services only begins to accrue reward for the player when all predecessor services, which may or may not be controlled by the same player, have been activated. This model, where players have interdependent services, is motivated by the problems faced in planning and coordinating large-scale infrastructures, e.g., restoring electricity and gas to residents after a natural disaster or providing medical care in a crisis when different agencies are responsible for the delivery of staff, equipment, and medicine. We undertake a game-theoretic analysis of this setting and in particular consider the issues of welfare maximization, computing best responses, Nash dynamics, and existence and computation of Nash equilibria.