Ataberk Olgun

Rahul Bera, Konstantinos Kanellopoulos, Shankar Balachandran et al.

Long-latency load requests continue to limit the performance of high-performance processors. To increase the latency tolerance of a processor, architects have primarily relied on two key techniques: sophisticated data prefetchers and large on-chip caches. In this work, we show that: 1) even a sophisticated state-of-the-art prefetcher can only predict half of the off-chip load requests on average across a wide range of workloads, and 2) due to the increasing size and complexity of on-chip caches, a large fraction of the latency of an off-chip load request is spent accessing the on-chip cache hierarchy. The goal of this work is to accelerate off-chip load requests by removing the on-chip cache access latency from their critical path. To this end, we propose a new technique called Hermes, whose key idea is to: 1) accurately predict which load requests might go off-chip, and 2) speculatively fetch the data required by the predicted off-chip loads directly from the main memory, while also concurrently accessing the cache hierarchy for such loads. To enable Hermes, we develop a new lightweight, perceptron-based off-chip load prediction technique that learns to identify off-chip load requests using multiple program features (e.g., sequence of program counters). For every load request, the predictor observes a set of program features to predict whether or not the load would go off-chip. If the load is predicted to go off-chip, Hermes issues a speculative request directly to the memory controller once the load's physical address is generated. If the prediction is correct, the load eventually misses the cache hierarchy and waits for the ongoing speculative request to finish, thus hiding the on-chip cache hierarchy access latency from the critical path of the off-chip load. Our evaluation shows that Hermes significantly improves performance of a state-of-the-art baseline. We open-source Hermes.

Haocong Luo, F. Nisa Bostancı, Ataberk Olgun et al.

Ramulator 2.1 is a major overhaul of Ramulator 2.0 that substantially improves the simulator in three directions: 1) support of modern and emerging DRAM and memory-controller features, 2) better usability and extensibility of the simulator, and 3) more comprehensive tests and validation workflows. Ramulator 2.1 adds support for advanced features in recent and emerging DRAM standards and memory controllers, including HBM3/4, LPDDR5/6, and GDDR7. To improve usability and extensibility, Ramulator 2.1 introduces a Python-based modeling and configuration interface backed by a two-way code-generation framework that 1) hides low-level C++ code behind high-level DRAM specifications written in Python, and 2) automatically creates Python proxies for all components of the simulator. Doing so enables users to rapidly create variants of DRAM standards and automate design-space-exploration workflows. To improve trustworthiness in simulation results, Ramulator 2.1 provides a comprehensive testing and validation infrastructure that covers both 1) fine-grained validation of specific DRAM timing constraints and memory-controller scheduling behavior, and 2) system-level performance evaluation using latency-throughput curves. To aid performance analysis and debugging, Ramulator 2.1 also includes an easy-to-use and high-performance DRAM command trace visualizer. Ramulator 2.1 is open-source on GitHub and under active development.

Ataberk Olgun, Haocong Luo, Ismail Emir Yuksel et al.

Real memory chip characterization yields insights into fundamental operational characteristics of modern memory, enabling new mechanisms that improve memory performance, robustness, security, and energy efficiency. We describe our large-scale DRAM characterization laboratory for understanding DRAM. A key building block of this laboratory is DRAM Bender, a versatile and easy-to-use modern DRAM characterization infrastructure. We have updated DRAM Bender to i) introduce support for new types of characterization experiments, ii) expand on its DRAM interface standard support, and iii) make it easier to use at large scale. This paper introduces these updates for the first time. We hope our infrastructure enables the community to discover new problems and solve critical memory scaling issues, enabling the overcoming of the huge memory bottleneck that plagues modern computing systems.

Jikun Wang, Haocong Luo, Ataberk Olgun et al.

DRAM suffers from read disturbance phenomena (e.g., RowHammer and RowPress), where repeatedly accessing or continuously keeping open a DRAM row (aggressor row) induces bitflips in other physically nearby unaccessed rows (victim rows). The disturbance mechanism is practically exploitable from the software stack and worsens across generations with continued density scaling. DRAM read disturbance is highly sensitive to memory access patterns, yet prior work explores read disturbance under only a limited set of access patterns. We present ScaleDisturb, a new DRAM access pattern that can amplify DRAM read disturbance by asymmetrically extending the open time of two aggressor rows. Our rigorous experimental characterization of 196 DDR4 and 3 HBM2 DRAM chips shows that ScaleDisturb (1) leads to bitflips at significantly fewer row activations, compared to state-of-the-art memory access patterns, (2) makes read disturbance attacks easier across all tested DRAM chips, (3) increases DRAM vulnerability to read disturbance as DRAM manufacturing technology scales down to smaller node sizes. We showcase a proof-of-concept attack on a real system where a user-level program leveraging ScaleDisturb induces more bitflips than state-of-the-art RowHammer and RowPress memory access patterns. We describe and evaluate four solutions for mitigating read disturbance bitflips in the presence of ScaleDisturb and call for more research on the topic.

Steve Rhyner, Haocong Luo, Juan Gómez-Luna et al.

Modern Machine Learning (ML) training on large-scale datasets is a very time-consuming workload. It relies on the optimization algorithm Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) due to its effectiveness, simplicity, and generalization performance. Processor-centric architectures (e.g., CPUs, GPUs) commonly used for modern ML training workloads based on SGD are bottlenecked by data movement between the processor and memory units due to the poor data locality in accessing large datasets. As a result, processor-centric architectures suffer from low performance and high energy consumption while executing ML training workloads. Processing-In-Memory (PIM) is a promising solution to alleviate the data movement bottleneck by placing the computation mechanisms inside or near memory. Our goal is to understand the capabilities of popular distributed SGD algorithms on real-world PIM systems to accelerate data-intensive ML training workloads. To this end, we 1) implement several representative centralized parallel SGD algorithms on the real-world UPMEM PIM system, 2) rigorously evaluate these algorithms for ML training on large-scale datasets in terms of performance, accuracy, and scalability, 3) compare to conventional CPU and GPU baselines, and 4) discuss implications for future PIM hardware and highlight the need for a shift to an algorithm-hardware codesign. Our results demonstrate three major findings: 1) The UPMEM PIM system can be a viable alternative to state-of-the-art CPUs and GPUs for many memory-bound ML training workloads, especially when operations and datatypes are natively supported by PIM hardware, 2) it is important to carefully choose the optimization algorithms that best fit PIM, and 3) the UPMEM PIM system does not scale approximately linearly with the number of nodes for many data-intensive ML training workloads. We open source all our code to facilitate future research.

Andreas Kosmas Kakolyris, F. Nisa Bostanci, Ataberk Olgun et al.

Modern DRAM chips are vulnerable to read disturbance phenomena such as RowHammer and RowPress, which induce bitflips after accessing nearby rows a certain number of times (the read disturbance threshold). ColumnDisturb is a new, fundamentally different DRAM read disturbance phenomenon. Specifically, ColumnDisturb (i) disturbs DRAM columns instead of rows, and (ii) increases the number of affected DRAM cells from those in only a few neighboring rows to all cells across three consecutive DRAM subarrays. We propose ColumnKeeper, the first set of ColumnDisturb mitigations, in two variants: ColumnKeeper-D (CK-D), a deterministic mechanism, and ColumnKeeper-P (CK-P), a probabilistic one. CK-D exploits DRAM's open-bitline architecture to provide deterministic security guarantees at low performance and energy overheads: it uses two counters per subarray to track activations affecting the odd and even columns, and refreshes one row in a subarray when either counter reaches a predetermined threshold. CK-P instead refreshes one row in three consecutive subarrays upon a row activation in the middle subarray, with a predetermined probability, providing configurable security guarantees at low area overhead. Both mechanisms prevent ColumnDisturb bitflips at low performance, energy, and area overheads. At the current experimentally-demonstrated ColumnDisturb threshold (1M), CK-D and CK-P incur very low average single-core performance overheads of 0.15% and 0.36%, respectively. For near-future thresholds (128K), these rise to a still low average of 1.70% and 2.73%. Mitigating ColumnDisturb at low thresholds (e.g., 16K) remains possible by adopting smaller subarray sizes or enabling subarray-level parallelism. CK-D and CK-P require low area overheads of 0.1 mm^2 and 0.03 mm^2, respectively. ColumnKeeper is freely available at https://github.com/CMU-SAFARI/ColumnKeeper .

Umut Baser, Ismail Emir Yuksel, F. Nisa Bostanci et al.

We experimentally demonstrate that it is possible to generate unique, repeatable, and device-specific signatures suitable for use as Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) responses in commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) DRAM chips by leveraging simultaneous multiple-row activation (SiMRA). Based on a rigorous experimental characterization of 112 modern DDR4 DRAM chips (from 10 modules), we introduce SiMRA-PUF, the first DRAM-based PUF that uses SiMRA-generated signatures as PUF responses. We analyze SiMRA-PUF in terms of reliability, uniqueness, and evaluation latency for varying numbers of simultaneously activated DRAM rows (i.e., 2, 4, 8, 16, and 32), DRAM chip density & die revision, and evaluate how temperature affects the similarity of SiMRA-generated responses. Among our 8 key experimental observations, we highlight two major results. First, SiMRA-PUF provides average intra-Jaccard indices of 89.02%, 89.81%, 93.03%, 94.06%, and 94.86%, and average inter-Jaccard indices of 3.98%, 2.37%, 3.44%, 2.92%, and 3.24% for 2-, 4-, 8-, 16-, and 32-row activations, respectively, showing that SiMRA-generated signatures are both repeatable within a device and unique across devices. Second, 2-row activation-based SiMRA-PUF provides 5.75% lower evaluation latency than the state-of-the-art DRAM-based PUF. We open-source our infrastructure and datasets at https://github.com/CMU-SAFARI/SiMRA-PUF.

F. Nisa Bostanci, Haocong Luo, Ataberk Olgun et al.

Cycle-level DRAM simulators provide accurate and flexible models for DRAM and memory controller operations and enable research on current and future memory systems. Therefore, they are critical for improving the performance, efficiency, and robustness of DRAM-based memory systems. Ramulator 2.0 (successor of Ramulator) is a highly modular and extensible cycle-accurate DRAM simulator that enables rapid exploration of new ideas in DRAM-based memory systems. A MICRO 2024 best paper runner-up publication, A Mess of Memory System Benchmarking, Simulation and Application Profiling, which we refer to as "the Mess paper," with all three artifact badges awarded (including "Reproducible"), proposes a new benchmark to evaluate real and simulated memory system performance. While doing so, it makes strong negative claims about Ramulator 2.0 and shows unexpected results. In this talk and the associated extended abstract, we demonstrate that these results and claims in the Mess paper are incorrect and are due to configuration and simulator usage errors made in the Mess paper. We describe four best practices to aid users and developers of simulation tools to avoid such issues in the future. We emphasize the importance of contacting simulator authors and developers when unexpected results are observed (especially and importantly before publishing such results), to ensure these simulators are used with correct configurations and as intended. Our investigation also aims to stimulate discussion on artifact evaluation practices and on mechanisms for correcting results and artifacts after publication. To aid future works and reproduction of all our results, we open source all our code and scripts at https://github.com/CMU-SAFARI/Cleaning-up-the-Mess. We refer the reader to our full ISPASS 2026 paper and its artifact for the complete analysis, detailed methodology, and extended results.

Daichi Tokuda, Tatsuya Kubo, Ismail Emir Yuksel et al.

Vector-scalar comparison is a fundamental computation primitive that compares each element in a vector against a single scalar value. It is widely used in various data-intensive workloads from databases to machine learning. Due to its low computational intensity, its execution tends to be memory-bound, limiting the utilization of compute resources. Processing-using-DRAM (PuD) is an emerging computing paradigm that performs massively parallel bitwise operations directly inside DRAM arrays, alleviating off-chip data movement. Existing PuD-based approaches require many DRAM commands because the comparison's algorithmic complexity grows with operand bit-width in the bit-serial execution model. This command overhead becomes the dominant bottleneck, limiting application-level speedup. We propose Clutch, a data representation and comparison algorithm that accelerates vector-scalar comparisons in PuD systems with high efficiency and scalability. Clutch first uses temporal coding, encoding each vector value as a sequence of leading ones, which enables lookup-based comparison against a scalar by accessing the corresponding DRAM row. To avoid the prohibitive memory footprint of lookup tables at high precision, Clutch partitions operands into multiple multi-bit chunks, compares chunks independently using compact lookup tables, and merges the per-chunk results with a PuD-efficient procedure. By adjusting the number of chunks, Clutch provides a flexible tradeoff between throughput and memory usage. Across predicate evaluation and decision tree inference, Clutch improves end-to-end application throughput and energy efficiency by an average of 12x and 69x over highly optimized CPU and GPU execution, and by 2.9x and 3.0x over the state-of-the-art bit-serial PuD implementation. We also present the first mapping of decision tree inference to PuD execution, extending PuD to a new application domain.

Haocong Luo, İsmail Emir Yüksel, Ataberk Olgun et al.

We provide the first experimental demonstration of DejaVu, a phenomenon where the data previously written to DRAM cells affects DRAM's vulnerability to read disturbance. Our experimental characterization using 112 COTS DDR4 DRAM chips from all three major manufacturers shows that, compared to the baseline where we initialize the victim row by writing to it only once, 1) overwriting it with the opposite data reduces ACmin, the minimum aggressor row activation count to induce a bitflip, and 2) writing the same data twice increases ACmin. We provide two hypotheses to explain DejaVu. First, we hypothesize that overwriting the victim row with opposite data values causes under-restoration of charge in DRAM cells. Second, we hypothesize that overwriting the victim row changes charge trap states in the active region, affecting read-disturbance-induced cell leakage current. We conduct controlled characterization to provide insight into these hypotheses. We further characterize the reliability of Processing-Using-DRAM (PUD) operations with DRAM rows initialized with DejaVu patterns. Our characterization of 32-row MAJ-3 operation shows that overwriting the DRAM rows used in the operation reduces the number of bitlines that fail to reliably perform MAJ-3 by 32.7% on average compared to the baseline where rows are written only once. Based on our observations, we describe two major implications of DejaVu. We show how DRAM testing and characterization methodologies should account for DejaVu to accurately characterize read disturbance vulnerability under fixed data patterns and rigorously study data-pattern effects without unintended interference from DejaVu. We also evaluate the performance overhead of read disturbance mitigation techniques when thresholds need to be lowered to be secure against DejaVu, showing a 6.3% overhead when reducing the threshold by 20%.

Ismail Emir Yuksel, F. Nisa Bostanci, Ataberk Olgun et al.

Today's computing systems are processor-centric: they require frequent data movement between processing elements (e.g., CPU) and main memory (DRAM), leading to significant inefficiencies in performance and energy consumption. Memory-centric computing instead moves computation to the data, enabling computation capability in and near all places where data is generated and stored, and greatly reducing the performance and energy overheads of data access and data movement. This shift from a processor-centric to a memory-centric paradigm has important and underexplored consequences for system security. Turning memory from a dumb, inactive store into an active computing substrate introduces benefits as well as challenges for system security: it can provide new in-memory security primitives and also reduce data exposure, but it can also expose new attack surfaces. This work discusses the security benefits and challenges of memory-centric computing, specifically Processing-in-DRAM (PiD), a paradigm where the operational characteristics of a DRAM chip are exploited and enhanced to perform computation on data stored in DRAM. Specifically, we describe 1) new state-of-the-art DRAM-based true random number generators that provide up to 16.05 Gb/s throughput and physical unclonable functions with 5.75% lower evaluation latency than the prior state-of-the-art, both on real DRAM chips and 2) two key security challenges of PiD: amplified DRAM read disturbance (e.g., 158x reduction in the minimum number of DRAM accesses required to induce the first bitflip) and high throughput memory timing channels (e.g., a communication throughput of 14.8Mb/s). We believe it is time to design, use, and program DRAM, and in general memory, not as an inactive storage substrate, but as a combined computation, storage, and security substrate, where computational capability, storage density, and security are all key goals.

Daichi Tokuda, İsmail Emir Yüksel, Tatsuya Kubo et al.

Processing-using-DRAM (PuD) is a promising computation paradigm that alleviates frequent data movement between main memory and processing units by using each DRAM column as a computation engine via simultaneous multiple-row activation (SiMRA). Unfortunately, DRAM density scaling may hinder PuD's benefits: denser cell arrays bring rows and columns closer, making regular DRAM operations susceptible to noise and interference from neighboring cells. Yet no prior work investigates whether interference from rows or columns not intended to participate in computation can compromise PuD robustness. In this work, we reveal PuDGhost, an interference phenomenon where a PuD operation in a given column produces erroneous results due to interference from 1) data in non-activated DRAM rows and 2) data in other columns that compute concurrently under the same SiMRA operation. PuDGhost violates the ideal picture that each column's computation depends solely on its own operand data, threatening future PuD systems. We present the first extensive characterization of PuDGhost using 96 real DDR4 DRAM chips from 12 modules, quantifying these two interference sources under various conditions. Among our 15 new empirical observations, we highlight two major results: 1) data in adjacent non-activated rows affects SiMRA outputs by up to 10% for random inputs, and 2) data in concurrently computing columns affects SiMRA outputs by up to 48% for random inputs. Guided by these findings, we propose countermeasures across multiple layers of the PuD computing stack. Specifically, we evaluate on real DDR4 DRAM chips: 1) robust column screening that reduces the risk of using unreliable columns in the presence of PuDGhost, and 2) a compute row layout that mitigates PuDGhost via dedicated rows between compute rows. Our solutions greatly improve PuD computation accuracy and provide a foundation for robust future PuD systems.

Ataberk Olgun, F. Nisa Bostanci, Ismail Emir Yuksel et al.

State-of-the-art DRAM read disturbance mitigations rely on the read disturbance threshold (RDT) (e.g., the number of aggressor row activations needed to induce the first read disturbance bitflip) to securely and performance- and energy-efficiently prevent read disturbance bitflips. However, accurately and exhaustively characterizing the RDT of every DRAM row in a chip is time intensive. Rapidly determining RDT is important for enabling secure, performance- and energy-efficient systems. Our goal is to develop and evaluate a reliable and rapid read disturbance testing methodology. To that end, we develop DiscoRD building on the key results of an extensive experimental characterization study using 212 real DDR4 chips whereby we measure the RDT of hundreds of thousands of DRAM rows millions of times. We develop an empirical model for read disturbance bitflips and evaluate the probability of read-disturbance-induced uncorrectable errors when a read disturbance mechanism is configured using a single $RDT_{min}$ measurement. Using this model we demonstrate that 1) relying on a lightweight error-correcting code (ECC) alone yields relatively high uncorrectable error probability and 2) combining ECC, infrequent memory scrubbing, and configurable read disturbance mitigation mechanisms can greatly reduce the error probability. Building on our observations and analyses, we discuss the RDT of each individual row can be identified more precisely. Our results show that error tolerance, memory scrubbing, online profiling, and run-time configurable read disturbance mitigation techniques are important to enable secure and energy-efficient spatial-variation aware read disturbance mitigations. We hope that DiscoRD drives research that enables us to quantitatively navigate the performance/cost - reliability tradeoff space for read disturbance mitigation techniques.

Lois Orosa, Abdullah Giray Yağlıkçı, Haocong Luo et al.

RowHammer is a circuit-level DRAM vulnerability where repeatedly accessing (i.e., hammering) a DRAM row can cause bit flips in physically nearby rows. The RowHammer vulnerability worsens as DRAM cell size and cell-to-cell spacing shrink. Recent studies demonstrate that modern DRAM chips, including chips previously marketed as RowHammer-safe, are even more vulnerable to RowHammer than older chips such that the required hammer count to cause a bit flip has reduced by more than 10X in the last decade. Therefore, it is essential to develop a better understanding and in-depth insights into the RowHammer vulnerability of modern DRAM chips to more effectively secure current and future systems. Our goal in this paper is to provide insights into fundamental properties of the RowHammer vulnerability that are not yet rigorously studied by prior works, but can potentially be $i$) exploited to develop more effective RowHammer attacks or $ii$) leveraged to design more effective and efficient defense mechanisms. To this end, we present an experimental characterization using 248~DDR4 and 24~DDR3 modern DRAM chips from four major DRAM manufacturers demonstrating how the RowHammer effects vary with three fundamental properties: 1)~DRAM chip temperature, 2)~aggressor row active time, and 3)~victim DRAM cell's physical location. Among our 16 new observations, we highlight that a RowHammer bit flip 1)~is very likely to occur in a bounded range, specific to each DRAM cell (e.g., 5.4% of the vulnerable DRAM cells exhibit errors in the range 70C to 90C), 2)~is more likely to occur if the aggressor row is active for longer time (e.g., RowHammer vulnerability increases by 36% if we keep a DRAM row active for 15 column accesses), and 3)~is more likely to occur in certain physical regions of the DRAM module under attack (e.g., 5% of the rows are 2x more vulnerable than the remaining 95% of the rows).

Ataberk Olgun, Minesh Patel, A. Giray Yağlıkçı et al.

True random number generators (TRNG) sample random physical processes to create large amounts of random numbers for various use cases, including security-critical cryptographic primitives, scientific simulations, machine learning applications, and even recreational entertainment. Unfortunately, not every computing system is equipped with dedicated TRNG hardware, limiting the application space and security guarantees for such systems. To open the application space and enable security guarantees for the overwhelming majority of computing systems that do not necessarily have dedicated TRNG hardware, we develop QUAC-TRNG. QUAC-TRNG exploits the new observation that a carefully-engineered sequence of DRAM commands activates four consecutive DRAM rows in rapid succession. This QUadruple ACtivation (QUAC) causes the bitline sense amplifiers to non-deterministically converge to random values when we activate four rows that store conflicting data because the net deviation in bitline voltage fails to meet reliable sensing margins. We experimentally demonstrate that QUAC reliably generates random values across 136 commodity DDR4 DRAM chips from one major DRAM manufacturer. We describe how to develop an effective TRNG (QUAC-TRNG) based on QUAC. We evaluate the quality of our TRNG using NIST STS and find that QUAC-TRNG successfully passes each test. Our experimental evaluations show that QUAC-TRNG generates true random numbers with a throughput of 3.44 Gb/s (per DRAM channel), outperforming the state-of-the-art DRAM-based TRNG by 15.08x and 1.41x for basic and throughput-optimized versions, respectively. We show that QUAC-TRNG utilizes DRAM bandwidth better than the state-of-the-art, achieving up to 2.03x the throughput of a throughput-optimized baseline when scaling bus frequencies to 12 GT/s.

Abdullah Giray Yağlıkçı, Minesh Patel, Jeremie S. Kim et al.

Aggressive memory density scaling causes modern DRAM devices to suffer from RowHammer, a phenomenon where rapidly activating a DRAM row can cause bit-flips in physically-nearby rows. Recent studies demonstrate that modern DRAM chips, including chips previously marketed as RowHammer-safe, are even more vulnerable to RowHammer than older chips. Many works show that attackers can exploit RowHammer bit-flips to reliably mount system-level attacks to escalate privilege and leak private data. Therefore, it is critical to ensure RowHammer-safe operation on all DRAM-based systems. Unfortunately, state-of-the-art RowHammer mitigation mechanisms face two major challenges. First, they incur increasingly higher performance and/or area overheads when applied to more vulnerable DRAM chips. Second, they require either proprietary information about or modifications to the DRAM chip design. In this paper, we show that it is possible to efficiently and scalably prevent RowHammer bit-flips without knowledge of or modification to DRAM internals. We introduce BlockHammer, a low-cost, effective, and easy-to-adopt RowHammer mitigation mechanism that overcomes the two key challenges by selectively throttling memory accesses that could otherwise cause RowHammer bit-flips. The key idea of BlockHammer is to (1) track row activation rates using area-efficient Bloom filters and (2) use the tracking data to ensure that no row is ever activated rapidly enough to induce RowHammer bit-flips. By doing so, BlockHammer (1) makes it impossible for a RowHammer bit-flip to occur and (2) greatly reduces a RowHammer attack's impact on the performance of co-running benign applications. Compared to state-of-the-art RowHammer mitigation mechanisms, BlockHammer provides competitive performance and energy when the system is not under a RowHammer attack and significantly better performance and energy when the system is under attack.