Alexander Schneider

Christian Meter, Alexander Schneider, Philipp Hagemeister et al.

Current electronic voting systems require an anonymous channel during the voting phase to prevent coercion. Typically, low-latency anonymization-networks like Tor are used for this purpose. In this paper we devise a monitoring attack that allows an attacker to monitor whether participants of an election voted, despite the use of a low-latency network during the voting phase, thereby breaking an important part of coercion-freeness. We implement a simulation carrying out our attack and measure its success rates.

Alexander Schneider, Christian Meter, Philipp Hagemeister

Electronic and remote voting has become a large field of research and brought forth a multiplicity of schemes, systems, cryptographic primitives as well as formal definitions and requirements for electronic elections. In this survey we try to give a brief and precise overview and summary of the current situation.