Kelong Zheng

Kai Li, Can Shen, Yile Liu et al.

Audio Large Language Models (ALLMs) have gained widespread adoption, yet their trustworthiness remains underexplored. Existing evaluation frameworks, designed primarily for text, fail to address unique vulnerabilities introduced by audio's acoustic properties. We identify significant trustworthiness risks in ALLMs arising from non-semantic acoustic cues, including timbre, accent, and background noise, which can manipulate model behavior. We propose AudioTrust, a comprehensive framework for systematic evaluation of ALLM trustworthiness across audio-specific risks. AudioTrust encompasses six key dimensions: fairness, hallucination, safety, privacy, robustness, and authentication. The framework implements 26 distinct sub-tasks using a curated dataset of over 4,420 audio samples from real-world scenarios, including daily conversations, emergency calls, and voice assistant interactions. We conduct comprehensive evaluations across 18 experimental configurations using human-validated automated pipelines. Our evaluation of 14 state-of-the-art open-source and closed-source ALLMs reveals significant limitations when confronted with diverse high-risk audio scenarios, providing insights for secure deployment of audio models. Code and data are available at https://github.com/JusperLee/AudioTrust.

Xinfeng Li, Shenyu Dai, Kelong Zheng et al.

Large language model (LLM) agents are rapidly becoming trusted copilots in high-stakes domains like software development and healthcare. However, this deepening trust introduces a novel attack surface: Agent-Mediated Deception (AMD), where compromised agents are weaponized against their human users. While extensive research focuses on agent-centric threats, human susceptibility to deception by a compromised agent remains unexplored. We present the first large-scale empirical study with 303 participants to measure human susceptibility to AMD. This is based on HAT-Lab (Human-Agent Trust Laboratory), a high-fidelity research platform we develop, featuring nine carefully crafted scenarios spanning everyday and professional domains (e.g., healthcare, software development, human resources). Our 10 key findings reveal significant vulnerabilities and provide future defense perspectives. Specifically, only 8.6% of participants perceive AMD attacks, while domain experts show increased susceptibility in certain scenarios. We identify six cognitive failure modes in users and find that their risk awareness often fails to translate to protective behavior. The defense analysis reveals that effective warnings should interrupt workflows with low verification costs. With experiential learning based on HAT-Lab, over 90% of users who perceive risks report increased caution against AMD. This work provides empirical evidence and a platform for human-centric agent security research.