Liang Cai

CR
h-index1
3papers
64citations
Novelty57%
AI Score31

3 Papers

SEJun 2, 2023
SourceP: Detecting Ponzi Schemes on Ethereum with Source Code

Pengcheng Lu, Liang Cai, Keting Yin

As blockchain technology becomes more and more popular, a typical financial scam, the Ponzi scheme, has also emerged in the blockchain platform Ethereum. This Ponzi scheme deployed through smart contracts, also known as the smart Ponzi scheme, has caused a lot of economic losses and negative impacts. Existing methods for detecting smart Ponzi schemes on Ethereum mainly rely on bytecode features, opcode features, account features, and transaction behavior features of smart contracts, which are unable to truly characterize the behavioral features of Ponzi schemes, and thus generally perform poorly in terms of detection accuracy and false alarm rates. In this paper, we propose SourceP, a method to detect smart Ponzi schemes on the Ethereum platform using pre-trained models and data flow, which only requires using the source code of smart contracts as features. SourceP reduces the difficulty of data acquisition and feature extraction of existing detection methods. Specifically, we first convert the source code of a smart contract into a data flow graph and then introduce a pre-trained model based on learning code representations to build a classification model to identify Ponzi schemes in smart contracts. The experimental results show that SourceP achieves 87.2% recall and 90.7% F-score for detecting smart Ponzi schemes within Ethereum's smart contract dataset, outperforming state-of-the-art methods in terms of performance and sustainability. We also demonstrate through additional experiments that pre-trained models and data flow play an important contribution to SourceP, as well as proving that SourceP has a good generalization ability.

CVMay 22, 2025
AnchorFormer: Differentiable Anchor Attention for Efficient Vision Transformer

Jiquan Shan, Junxiao Wang, Lifeng Zhao et al.

Recently, vision transformers (ViTs) have achieved excellent performance on vision tasks by measuring the global self-attention among the image patches. Given $n$ patches, they will have quadratic complexity such as $\mathcal{O}(n^2)$ and the time cost is high when splitting the input image with a small granularity. Meanwhile, the pivotal information is often randomly gathered in a few regions of an input image, some tokens may not be helpful for the downstream tasks. To handle this problem, we introduce an anchor-based efficient vision transformer (AnchorFormer), which employs the anchor tokens to learn the pivotal information and accelerate the inference. Firstly, by estimating the bipartite attention between the anchors and tokens, the complexity will be reduced from $\mathcal{O}(n^2)$ to $\mathcal{O}(mn)$, where $m$ is an anchor number and $m < n$. Notably, by representing the anchors with the neurons in a neural layer, we can differentiably learn these anchors and approximate global self-attention through the Markov process. It avoids the burden caused by non-differentiable operations and further speeds up the approximate attention. Moreover, we extend the proposed model to three downstream tasks including classification, detection, and segmentation. Extensive experiments show the effectiveness of our AnchorFormer, e.g., achieving up to a 9.0% higher accuracy or 46.7% FLOPs reduction on ImageNet classification, 81.3% higher mAP on COCO detection under comparable FLOPs, as compared to the current baselines.

CRDec 15, 2017
Mining Sandboxes for Linux Containers

Zhiyuan Wan, David Lo, Xin Xia et al.

A container is a group of processes isolated from other groups via distinct kernel namespaces and resource allocation quota. Attacks against containers often leverage kernel exploits through system call interface. In this paper, we present an approach that mines sandboxes for containers. We first explore the behaviors of a container by leveraging automatic testing, and extract the set of system calls accessed during testing. The set of system calls then results as a sandbox of the container. The mined sandbox restricts the container's access to system calls which are not seen during testing and thus reduces the attack surface. In the experiment, our approach requires less than eleven minutes to mine sandbox for each of the containers. The enforcement of mined sandboxes does not impact the regular functionality of a container and incurs low performance overhead.