Ekin Zorer

Magda Dubois, Ekin Zorer, Maia Hamin et al. · cambridge

AI systems produce large volumes of logs as they interact with tools and users. Analysing these logs can help understand model capabilities, propensities, and behaviours, or assess whether an evaluation worked as intended. Researchers have started developing methods for log analysis, but a standardised approach is still missing. Here we suggest a pipeline based on current best practices. We illustrate it with concrete code examples in the Inspect Scout library, provide detailed guidance on each step, and highlight common pitfalls. Our framework provides researchers with a foundation for rigorous and reproducible log analysis.

Linus Folkerts, Will Payne, Simon Inman et al.

We evaluate the autonomous cyber-attack capabilities of frontier AI models on two purpose-built cyber ranges-a 32-step corporate network attack and a 7-step industrial control system attack-that require chaining heterogeneous capabilities across extended action sequences. By comparing seven models released over an eighteen-month period (August 2024 to February 2026) at varying inference-time compute budgets, we observe two capability trends. First, model performance scales log-linearly with inference-time compute, with no observed plateau-increasing from 10M to 100M tokens yields gains of up to 59%, requiring no specific technical sophistication from the operator. Second, each successive model generation outperforms its predecessor at fixed token budgets: on the corporate network range, average steps completed at 10M tokens rose from 1.7 (GPT-4o, August 2024) to 9.8 (Opus 4.6, February 2026). The best single run completed 22 of 32 steps, corresponding to roughly 6 of the estimated 14 hours a human expert would need. On the industrial control system range, performance remains limited, though the most recent models are the first to reliably complete steps, averaging 1.2-1.4 of 7 (max 3).