Karissa Huang

Urmisha Chatterjee, Karissa Huang, Ritabrata Karmakar et al.

We study a generalization of the classical hidden clique problem to graphs with real-valued edge weights. Formally, we define a hypothesis testing problem. Under the null hypothesis, edges of a complete graph on $n$ vertices are associated with independent and identically distributed edge weights from a distribution $P$. Under the alternate hypothesis, $k$ vertices are chosen at random and the edge weights between them are drawn from a distribution $Q$, while the remaining are sampled from $P$. The goal is to decide, upon observing the edge weights, which of the two hypotheses they were generated from. We investigate the problem under two different scenarios: (1) when $P$ and $Q$ are completely known, and (2) when there is only partial information of $P$ and $Q$. In the first scenario, we obtain statistical limits on $k$ when the two hypotheses are distinguishable, and when they are not. Additionally, in each of the scenarios, we provide bounds on the minimal risk of the hypothesis testing problem when $Q$ is not absolutely continuous with respect to $P$. We also provide computationally efficient spectral tests that can distinguish the two hypotheses as long as $k=Ω(\sqrt{n})$ in both the scenarios.

Yeganeh Alimohammadi, Karissa Huang, Christian Borgs et al.

Online social platforms increasingly rely on crowd-sourced systems to label misleading content at scale, but these systems must both aggregate users' evaluations and decide whose evaluations to trust. To address the latter, many platforms audit users by rewarding agreement with the final aggregate outcome, a design we term consensus-based auditing. We analyze the consequences of this design in X's Community Notes, which in September 2022 adopted consensus-based auditing that ties users' eligibility for participation to agreement with the eventual platform outcome. We find evidence of strategic conformity: minority contributors' evaluations drift toward the majority and their participation share falls on controversial topics, where independent signals matter most. We formalize this mechanism in a behavioral model in which contributors trade off private beliefs against anticipated penalties for disagreement. Motivated by these findings, we propose a two-stage auditing and aggregation algorithm that weights contributors by the stability of their past residuals rather than by agreement with the majority. The method first accounts for differences across content and contributors, and then measures how predictable each contributor's evaluations are relative to the latent-factor model. Contributors whose evaluations are consistently informative receive greater influence in aggregation, even when they disagree with the prevailing consensus. In the Community Notes data, this approach improves out-of-sample predictive performance while avoiding penalization of disagreement.