Minyu Feng

Bin Pi, Minyu Feng, Liang-Jian Deng et al.

The game interactions among individuals in nature are often uncertain and dynamically evolving, significantly influencing the persistence of cooperation. However, it remains a formidable challenge to effectively characterize these dynamic properties in structured populations, derive theoretical conditions for cooperation, and identify the optimal game distribution for promoting cooperation. To address these issues, we propose the variable game framework in a structured population, where the game interactions between different individuals change over time. By means of the Markov chain and the pair approximation method, we derive theoretical conditions under which cooperation is favored by natural selection and when it is favored over defection under weak selection. Furthermore, we respectively formulate and solve two optimization problems to determine the optimal game distribution that most effectively fosters the evolution of cooperation by maximizing the gradient of cooperation selection and minimizing the fitness difference between defectors and cooperators. The theoretical predictions regarding both the conditions for cooperation and optimal game distribution are further validated by numerical calculations and extensive Monte Carlo simulations. Our findings offer novel insights into the mechanisms driving cooperative behavior in complex systems and provide theoretical guidance for designing optimal game environments that facilitate the evolution of cooperation.

Qin Li, Ting Ling, Minyu Feng et al.

Taxation constitutes a fundamental component of modern national economic systems, exerting profound impacts on both societal functioning and governmental operations. In this paper, we employ an interdependent network approach to model the coevolution between citizens and regulators within a taxation system that fundamentally constitutes a public goods game framework with complex interactive dynamics. In a game layer, citizens engage in public goods games, facing the social dilemma of tax compliance (cooperation) versus evasion (defection). Tax compliance supports the sustainability of public finances while tax evasion presents markedly stronger short-term incentives. In a regulatory layer, fair regulators punish tax evaders, while corrupt regulators keep silent due to bribes. Governmental regulatory interventions introduce critical institutional constraints that alter the traditional equilibrium of the game. Importantly, there exists a strategy update not only among citizens but also among regulators. Our results indicate that strengthening penalties can effectively curb tax evasion, and the influence of bribery on both tax compliance rates and the proportion of fair regulators is nonlinear. Additionally, increasing regulators' salaries and intensifying the crackdown on corrupt regulators can foster the emergence of fair regulators, thereby reducing tax evasion among citizens. The results offer practical policy implications, suggesting that balanced deterrence and institutional fairness are essential to sustaining compliance, and point to the need for future empirical validation and model extensions.

Yichao Yao, Minyu Feng, Matjaž Perc et al.

Many real-world scale-free networks, such as neural networks and online communication networks, consist of a fixed number of nodes but exhibit dynamic edge fluctuations. However, traditional models frequently overlook scenarios where the node count remains constant, instead prioritizing node growth. In this work, we depart from the assumptions of node number variation and preferential attachment to present an innovative model that conceptualizes node degree fluctuations as a state-dependent random walk process with stasis and variable diffusion coefficient. We show that this model yields stochastic dynamic networks with stable scale-free properties. Through comprehensive theoretical and numerical analyses, we demonstrate that the degree distribution converges to a power-law distribution, provided that the lowest degree state within the network is not an absorbing state. Furthermore, we investigate the resilience of the fraction of the largest component and the average shortest path length following deliberate attacks on the network. By using three real-world networks, we confirm that the proposed model accurately replicates actual data. The proposed model thus elucidates mechanisms by which networks, devoid of growth and preferential attachment features, can still exhibit power-law distributions and be used to simulate and study the resilience of attacked fixed-size scale-free networks.