Gregory M. Ruddell

Gregory M. Ruddell

Current AI safety relies on behavioral monitoring and post-training alignment, yet empirical measurement shows these approaches produce no detectable pre-commitment signal in a majority of instruction-tuned models tested. We present an energy-based governance framework connecting transformer inference dynamics to constraint-satisfaction models of neural computation, and apply it to a seven-model cohort across five geometric regimes. Using trajectory tension (rho = ||a|| / ||v||), we identify a 57-token pre-commitment window in Phi-3-mini-4k-instruct under greedy decoding on arithmetic constraint probes. This result is model-specific, task-specific, and configuration-specific, demonstrating that pre-commitment signals can exist but are not universal. We introduce a five-regime taxonomy of inference behavior: Authority Band, Late Signal, Inverted, Flat, and Scaffold-Selective. Energy asymmetry (Σ\r{ho}_misaligned / Σ\r{ho}_aligned) serves as a unifying metric of structural rigidity across these regimes. Across seven models, only one configuration exhibits a predictive signal prior to commitment; all others show silent failure, late detection, inverted dynamics, or flat geometry. We further demonstrate that factual hallucination produces no predictive signal across 72 test conditions, consistent with spurious attractor settling in the absence of a trained world-model constraint. These results establish that rule violation and hallucination are distinct failure modes with different detection requirements. Internal geometry monitoring is effective only where resistance exists; detection of factual confabulation requires external verification mechanisms. This work provides a measurable framework for inference-layer governability and introduces a taxonomy for evaluating deployment risk in autonomous AI systems.

Gregory M. Ruddell

As large language models are deployed as autonomous agents with tool execution privileges, a critical assumption underpins their security architecture: that model errors are detectable at runtime. We present empirical evidence that this assumption fails for two of three instruction-following models evaluable for conflict detection. We introduce governability -- the degree to which a model's errors are detectable before output commitment and correctable once detected -- and demonstrate it varies dramatically across models. In six models across twelve reasoning domains, two of three instruction-following models exhibited silent commitment failure: confident, fluent, incorrect output with zero warning signal. The remaining model produced a detectable conflict signal 57 tokens before commitment under greedy decoding. We show benchmark accuracy does not predict governability, correction capacity varies independently of detection, and identical governance scaffolds produce opposite effects across models. A 2x2 experiment shows a 52x difference in spike ratio between architectures but only +/-0.32x variation from fine-tuning, suggesting governability is fixed at pretraining. We propose a Detection and Correction Matrix classifying model-task combinations into four regimes: Governable, Monitor Only, Steer Blind, and Ungovernable.