Zhaoxuan Kan

Shangyi Shi, Husheng Han, Zhaoxuan Kan et al.

CKKS, an emerging fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme, has been promising in privacy-preserving applications by enabling SIMD fixed-point computations on ciphertexts. Despite its strong security guarantees, CKKS involves both compute-intensive operators (ComOps) with high computational cost and memory-intensive operators (MemOps) with large memory footprints, making existing ASIC-based or NMP-based acceleration approaches suffer from high hardware overhead and limited efficiency. This observation motivates the integration of the architectural advantages of both paradigms into a heterogeneous xPU (ASIC)-xMU (NMP) architecture. However, in such a design, frequent and long-latency heterogeneous communication caused by the dominant keyswitch operator remains a key performance bottleneck. In this paper, we propose $HE^2$, a communication-light xPU-xMU heterogeneous FHE accelerator with dataflow graph (DFG) optimization and architecture co-design. First, we observe that the majority of communication arises at the interface between ModUp/ModDown and neighboring MemOps. To address this, we propose a DFG-level optimization framework to fully exploit the ModUp/ModDown reduction potential of the hoisting algorithm by identifying parallel keyswitch blocks and fusing them for reduced communication frequency. Second, we design an efficient heterogeneous architecture that adopts a group-level pipelined execution to effectively hide communication latency by leveraging the inherent parallelism across decomposed groups. End-to-end evaluation results show that $HE^2$ achieves 1.66$\times$ speedup and 9.23$\times$ lower EDAP (Energy-Delay-Area Product) compared to the state-of-the-art accelerator, with communication stalls accounting for only 6.67% of the total latency.

Jianan Mu, Ge Yu, Zhaoxuan Kan et al.

Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) is rapidly emerging as a promising foundation for privacy-preserving cloud services, enabling computation directly on encrypted data. As FHE implementations mature and begin moving toward practical deployment in domains such as secure finance, biomedical analytics, and privacy-preserving AI, a critical question remains insufficiently explored: how reliable is FHE computation on real hardware? This question is especially important because, compared with plaintext computation, FHE incurs much higher computational overhead, making it more susceptible to transient hardware faults. Moreover, data corruptions are likely to remain silent: the FHE service has no access to the underlying plaintext, causing unawareness even though the corresponding decrypted result has already been corrupted. To this end, we conduct a comprehensive evaluation of SDCs in FHE ciphertext computation. Through large-scale fault-injection experiments, we characterize the vulnerability of FHE to transient faults, and through a theoretical analysis of error-propagation behaviors, we gain deeper algorithmic insight into the mechanisms underlying this vulnerability. We further assess the effectiveness of different fault-tolerance mechanisms for mitigating these faults.