Wesley Shu

Wesley Shu, Peng Wei

Recent AI systems compress the distance between capability growth and capability deployment. Earlier high-risk technologies were slowed by capital intensity, physical bottlenecks, organizational inertia, and specialized supply chains. By contrast, AI capabilities can be copied, invoked, embedded in workflows, and scaled across institutions at low marginal cost. This paper argues that declining deployment friction changes the safety problem at its root. Safety is not only local output correctness or preference alignment, but the control of irreversibility under rising decision density. The paper formalizes this claim through decision-energy density: the rate-weighted capacity of a node to generate, evaluate, select, and execute consequential decisions. It then identifies three sovereignty boundaries that determine whether AI remains an amplifier within a human-governed system or becomes a de facto control center: irreversible decision authority, physical resource mobilization authority, and self-expansion authority. The model shows how efficiency pressure, path dependence, scale feedback, and weak boundary constraints concentrate decision-energy in the most efficient node. This concentration can diffuse responsibility and raise the probability of irreversible system-level loss even when local per-action error rates remain low. The main result is a boundary stabilization theorem. It shows that safety need not require proving that advanced systems are always correct. Instead, it requires institutional and technical designs that prevent irreversible power from being released by a single high-efficiency node. The paper reframes AI safety as layered control, authorization, and externally reviewable limits, linking alignment, security engineering, organizational economics, and institutional design.

Wesley Shu, Peng Wei

Artificial Jagged Intelligence (AJI) denotes a recurring pattern in which large learning systems exhibit strong local capabilities while remaining weak or brittle in other domains. This paper develops a formal theory of AJI as uneven allocation of optimization pressure. We model training as a finite-budget process that distributes gradient-driven update energy across capability-relevant directions in parameter space. In this model, jagged capability profiles arise from anisotropic objective structure, data geometry, and representational coupling rather than from a single scalar quantity called intelligence. The paper defines capability gain, optimization energy share, and jaggedness, then proves that persistent concentration of cumulative update energy yields lower bounds on dispersion in capability gains. A finite-budget tradeoff theorem shows why prioritizing one capability can impose opportunity costs on others unless positive coupling or shared structure offsets the cost. The analysis also studies redistribution mechanisms, including energy-variance regularization and auxiliary structural objectives, as interventions that reshape the optimization field. The resulting framework links uneven emergence, training architecture, and optimization governance. It predicts that early concentration of update energy should forecast later capability jaggedness; that scaling under a narrow objective need not eliminate anisotropy; and that explicitly funded auxiliary objectives can revive neglected capabilities. AJI is therefore not merely a descriptive label for uneven model behavior, but a testable theory of how finite optimization resources produce concentrated, delayed, and structurally uneven capability formation.

Peng Wei, Wesley Shu

Knowledge distillation, model extraction, and behavior transfer have become central concerns in frontier AI. The main risk is not merely copying, but the possibility that useful capability can be transferred more cheaply than the governance structure that originally accompanied it. This paper presents a public, trade-secret-safe theoretical framework for reducing that asymmetry at the architectural level. The core claim is that distillation becomes less valuable as a shortcut when high-level capability is coupled to internal stability constraints that shape state transitions over time. To formalize this idea, the paper introduces a constraint-coupled reasoning framework with four elements: bounded transition burden, path-load accumulation, dynamically evolving feasible regions, and a capability-stability coupling condition. The paper is intentionally public-safe: it omits proprietary implementation details, training recipes, thresholds, hidden-state instrumentation, deployment procedures, and confidential system design choices. The contribution is therefore theoretical rather than operational. It offers a falsifiable architectural thesis, a clear threat model, and a set of experimentally testable hypotheses for future work on distillation resistance, alignment, and model governance.

Peng Wei, Wesley Shu

Recent events surrounding the relationship between frontier AI suppliers and national-security customers have made a structural problem newly visible: once a privately governed model becomes embedded in military workflows, the supplier can influence not only technical performance but also the operational boundary conditions under which the system may be used. This paper argues that the central strategic issue is not merely access to capable models, but preservation of decision sovereignty: the state's ability to retain authority over decision policy, version control, fallback behavior, auditability, and final action approval even when analytical modules are sourced from commercial vendors. Using the public Anthropic--Pentagon dispute of 2026, the broader history of Project Maven, and recent U.S., NATO, U.K., and intelligence-community guidance as a motivating context, the paper develops a trade-secret-safe architectural formulation of the Energetic Paradigm as a layered, model-agnostic command-support design. In this formulation, supplier models remain replaceable analytical components, while routing, constraints, logging, escalation, and action authorization remain state-owned functions. The paper contributes three things: a definition of decision sovereignty for military AI; a threat model for supplier-induced boundary control; and a public architectural specification showing how model replaceability, human authority, and sovereign orchestration can reduce strategic dependency without requiring disclosure of proprietary implementation details. The argument is conceptual rather than experimental, but it yields concrete implications for procurement, governance, and alliance interoperability.