Wen Shen

Wen Shen, Zhihua Wei, Shikun Huang et al.

In this paper, we diagnose deep neural networks for 3D point cloud processing to explore utilities of different intermediate-layer network architectures. We propose a number of hypotheses on the effects of specific intermediate-layer network architectures on the representation capacity of DNNs. In order to prove the hypotheses, we design five metrics to diagnose various types of DNNs from the following perspectives, information discarding, information concentration, rotation robustness, adversarial robustness, and neighborhood inconsistency. We conduct comparative studies based on such metrics to verify the hypotheses. We further use the verified hypotheses to revise intermediate-layer architectures of existing DNNs and improve their utilities. Experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our method.

Wen Shen, Jacob W. Crandall, Ke Yan et al.

Crowdfunding has emerged as a prominent way for entrepreneurs to secure funding without sophisticated intermediation. In crowdfunding, an entrepreneur often has to decide how to disclose the campaign status in order to collect as many contributions as possible. Such decisions are difficult to make primarily due to incomplete information. We propose information design as a tool to help the entrepreneur to improve revenue by influencing backers' beliefs. We introduce a heuristic algorithm to dynamically compute information-disclosure policies for the entrepreneur, followed by an empirical evaluation to demonstrate its competitiveness over the widely-adopted immediate-disclosure policy. Our results demonstrate that the immediate-disclosure policy is not optimal when backers follow thresholding policies despite its ease of implementation. With appropriate heuristics, an entrepreneur can benefit from dynamic information disclosure. Our work sheds light on information design in a dynamic setting where agents make decisions using thresholding policies.

Wen Shen, Cristina V. Lopes, Jacob W. Crandall

With proper management, Autonomous Mobility-on-Demand (AMoD) systems have great potential to satisfy the transport demands of urban populations by providing safe, convenient, and affordable ridesharing services. Meanwhile, such systems can substantially decrease private car ownership and use, and thus significantly reduce traffic congestion, energy consumption, and carbon emissions. To achieve this objective, an AMoD system requires private information about the demand from passengers. However, due to self-interestedness, passengers are unlikely to cooperate with the service providers in this regard. Therefore, an online mechanism is desirable if it incentivizes passengers to truthfully report their actual demand. For the purpose of promoting ridesharing, we hereby introduce a posted-price, integrated online ridesharing mechanism (IORS) that satisfies desirable properties such as ex-post incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and budget-balance. Numerical results indicate the competitiveness of IORS compared with two benchmarks, namely the optimal assignment and an offline, auction-based mechanism.