Susheng Wu

Yiheng Cao, Yihao Chen, Xin Hu et al.

Detecting vulnerabilities in source code remains critical yet challenging, as conventional static analysis tools construct inaccurate program representations, while existing LLM-based approaches often miss essential vulnerability context and lack grounded reasoning. To mitigate these challenges, we introduce VulWeaver, a novel LLM-based approach that weaves broken program semantics into accurate representations and extracts holistic vulnerability context for grounded vulnerability detection. Specifically, VulWeaver first constructs an enhanced unified dependency graph (UDG) by integrating deterministic rules with LLM-based semantic inference to address static analysis inaccuracies. It then extracts holistic vulnerability context by combining explicit contexts from program slicing with implicit contexts, including usage, definition, and declaration information. Finally, VulWeaver employs meta-prompting with vulnerability type specific expert guidelines to steer LLMs through systematic reasoning, aggregated via majority voting for robustness. Extensive experiments on PrimeVul4J dataset have demonstrated that VulWeaver achieves a F1-score of 0.75, outperforming state-of-the-art learning-based, LLM-based, and agent-based baselines by 23%, 15%, and 60% in F1-score, respectively. VulWeaver has also detected 26 true vulnerabilities across 9 realworld Java projects, with 15 confirmed by developers and 5 CVE identifiers assigned. In industrial deployment, VulWeaver identified 40 confirmed vulnerabilities in an internal repository.

Yiheng Huang, Zhijia Zhao, Bihuan Chen et al.

The model context protocol (MCP) standardizes how LLMs connect to external tools and data sources, enabling faster integration but introducing new attack vectors. Despite the growing adoption of MCP, existing MCP security studies classify attacks by their observable effects, obscuring how attacks behave across different MCP server components and overlooking multi-component attack chains. Meanwhile, existing defenses are less effective when facing multi-component attacks or previously unknown malicious behaviors. This work presents a component-centric perspective for understanding and detecting malicious MCP servers. First, we build the first component-centric PoC dataset of 114 malicious MCP servers where attacks are achieved as manipulation over MCP components and their compositions. We evaluate these attacks' effectiveness across two MCP hosts and five LLMs, and uncover that (1) component position shapes attack success rate; and (2) multi-component compositions often outperform single-component attacks by distributing malicious logic. Second, we propose and implement Connor, a two-stage behavioral deviation detector for malicious MCP servers. It first performs pre-execution analysis to detect malicious shell commands and extract each tool's function intent, and then conducts step-wise in-execution analysis to trace each tool's behavioral trajectories and detect deviations from its function intent. Evaluation on our curated dataset indicates that Connor achieves an F1-score of 94.6%, outperforming the state of the art by 8.9% to 59.6%. In real-world detection, Connor identifies two malicious servers.