Ludwig Dierks, Nils Olberg, Sven Seuken et al.
To find families for the more than 70,000 children in need of adoptive placements, most United States child welfare agencies have employed a family-driven search approach in which prospective families respond to announcements made by the agency. However, some agencies have switched to a caseworker-driven search approach in which the caseworker directly contacts families recommended for a child. We introduce a novel search-and-matching model that captures the key features of the adoption process and compare family-driven with caseworker-driven search in a game-theoretical framework. Under either approach, the equilibria are generated by threshold strategies and form a lattice structure. Our main theoretical finding then shows that no family-driven equilibrium can Pareto dominate any caseworker-driven outcome, whereas it is possible that each caseworker-driven equilibrium Pareto dominates every equilibrium attainable under family-driven search. We also find that, within our model, when families are sufficiently impatient, caseworker-driven search is better for all children. We numerically illustrate that most agents are better off under caseworker-driven search across a wide range of parameter values. Finally, we present an empirical study of an agency that switched to caseworker-driven search, finding a three-year adoption probability that outperformed a statewide benchmark by 44.9%, along with a statistically significant 54% higher adoption hazard rate.