Xinhe Wang

Yunxuan Fang, Xinhe Wang

Hardware-aware training (HAT) is widely used to improve the robustness of neural networks on non-ideal AI accelerators, such as analog in-memory computing (IMC) systems. However, not all hardware-induced distortions are equally compensable by training. This paper presents a diagnostic framework that models hardware non-idealities as structured perturbations of the forward operator and evaluates their compatibility with gradient-based optimization. We analyze six representative perturbation classes--read noise, variability, drift, stuck-at faults, IR-drop, and ADC discretization--and identify three key diagnostics: gradient expectation consistency, bounded gradient variance, and non-degenerate sensitivity. Our results show a clear separation between perturbations that can be compensated by HAT and those that consistently break optimization. This provides practical guidance for hardware-software co-design, clarifying which non-idealities can be addressed at the training level and which require circuit-, architecture-, or calibration-level mitigation. This study should be interpreted as a controlled empirical analysis under vanilla forward-perturbation HAT, rather than as a universal theory of hardware-aware training.

Xinhe Wang, Pingbang Hu, Junwei Deng et al.

Data attribution aims to quantify the contribution of individual training data points to the outputs of an AI model, which has been used to measure the value of training data and compensate data providers. Given the impact on financial decisions and compensation mechanisms, a critical question arises concerning the adversarial robustness of data attribution methods. However, there has been little to no systematic research addressing this issue. In this work, we aim to bridge this gap by detailing a threat model with clear assumptions about the adversary's goal and capabilities and proposing principled adversarial attack methods on data attribution. We present two methods, Shadow Attack and Outlier Attack, which generate manipulated datasets to inflate the compensation adversarially. The Shadow Attack leverages knowledge about the data distribution in the AI applications, and derives adversarial perturbations through "shadow training", a technique commonly used in membership inference attacks. In contrast, the Outlier Attack does not assume any knowledge about the data distribution and relies solely on black-box queries to the target model's predictions. It exploits an inductive bias present in many data attribution methods - outlier data points are more likely to be influential - and employs adversarial examples to generate manipulated datasets. Empirically, in image classification and text generation tasks, the Shadow Attack can inflate the data-attribution-based compensation by at least 200%, while the Outlier Attack achieves compensation inflation ranging from 185% to as much as 643%. Our implementation is ready at https://github.com/TRAIS-Lab/adversarial-attack-data-attribution.