Mariusz Malinowski

Tianyu Sima, Mingyu Yan, Jianfeng Wen et al.

The transportation network operator (TNO) and the power distribution network operator (DNO) act non cooperatively during the scheduling process. Under the TNOs management, the distribution of charging load may exacerbate the local supply-demand imbalance in the power distribution network (PDN), which negatively impacts the secure and economic operation of the PDN. This paper proposes a profit sharing mechanism based on the principle of incentive compatibility for coordinating the transportation network (TN) and the PDN to minimize the total operation cost of the PDN. In this mechanism, the scheduling process of the power transportation system is divided into two stages. At the prescheduling stage, the TNO allocates traffic flow and charging load without considering the operation of the PDN, after which the DNO schedules and obtains the original cost. At the rescheduling stage, the DNO shares part of the saved dispatch cost to motivate the TNO to reallocate the EVs charging, which is more beneficial to the operation of the PDN. This two-stage process is then simulated by two single level models and a bilevel model. Finally, the optimal sharing ratio is identified, at which the total scheduling cost of the DNO can decrease to the lowest point when gaming with the TNO. The efficiency of the proposed mechanism is simulated via a coupled network with 12 traffic nodes and 18 electric buses. Numerical results demonstrate that the DNO can achieve the minimum total cost. Simultaneously, the TNO can also benefit from the proposed profit-sharing mechanism.

Meng Song, Xinyi Jing, Jianyong Ding et al.

Virtual energy stations (VESs) work as retailers to provide electricity and natural gas sale services for integrated energy systems (IESs), and guide IESs energy consumption behaviors to tackle the varying market prices via integrated demand response (IDR). However, IES customers are risk averse and show low enthusiasm in responding to the IDR incentive signals. To address this problem, exergy is utilized to unify different energies and allowed to be virtually stored and withdrawn for arbitrage by IESs. The whole incentive mechanism operating process is innovatively characterized by a virtual exergy battery. Peer to peer (P2P) exergy trading based on shared exergy storage is also developed to reduce the energy cost of IESs without any extra transmission fee. In this way, IES can reduce the economic loss risk caused by the market price fluctuation via the different time (time dimension), multiple energy conversion (energy dimension), and P2P exergy trading (space dimension) arbitrage. Moreover, the optimal scheduling of VES and IESs is modeled by a bilevel optimization model. The consensus based alternating direction method of multipliers (CADMM) algorithm is utilized to solve this problem in a distributed way. Simulation results validate the effectiveness of the proposed incentive mechanism and show that the shared exergy storage can enhance the benefits of different type IESs by 18.96%, 3.49%, and 3.15 %, respectively.