John Hooker

Tae Wan Kim, Tong, Lu et al.

Conversational Artificial Intelligence (AI) used in industry settings can be trained to closely mimic human behaviors, including lying and deception. However, lying is often a necessary part of negotiation. To address this, we develop a normative framework for when it is ethical or unethical for a conversational AI to lie to humans, based on whether there is what we call "invitation of trust" in a particular scenario. Importantly, cultural norms play an important role in determining whether there is invitation of trust across negotiation settings, and thus an AI trained in one culture may not be generalizable to others. Moreover, individuals may have different expectations regarding the invitation of trust and propensity to lie for human vs. AI negotiators, and these expectations may vary across cultures as well. Finally, we outline how a conversational chatbot can be trained to negotiate ethically by applying autoregressive models to large dialog and negotiations datasets.

Tae Wan Kim, John Hooker, Thomas Donaldson

An important step in the development of value alignment (VA) systems in AI is understanding how VA can reflect valid ethical principles. We propose that designers of VA systems incorporate ethics by utilizing a hybrid approach in which both ethical reasoning and empirical observation play a role. This, we argue, avoids committing the "naturalistic fallacy," which is an attempt to derive "ought" from "is," and it provides a more adequate form of ethical reasoning when the fallacy is not committed. Using quantified model logic, we precisely formulate principles derived from deontological ethics and show how they imply particular "test propositions" for any given action plan in an AI rule base. The action plan is ethical only if the test proposition is empirically true, a judgment that is made on the basis of empirical VA. This permits empirical VA to integrate seamlessly with independently justified ethical principles.

Violet Xinying Chen, J. N. Hooker

Optimization models generally aim for efficiency by maximizing total benefit or minimizing cost. Yet a trade-off between fairness and efficiency is an important element of many practical decisions. We propose a principled and practical method for balancing these two criteria in an optimization model. Following a critical assessment of existing schemes, we define a set of social welfare functions (SWFs) that combine Rawlsian leximax fairness and utilitarianism and overcome some of the weaknesses of previous approaches. In particular, we regulate the equity/efficiency trade-off with a single parameter that has a meaningful interpretation in practical contexts. We formulate the SWFs using mixed integer constraints and sequentially maximize them subject to constraints that define the problem at hand. After providing practical step-by-step instructions for implementation, we demonstrate the method on problems of realistic size involving healthcare resource allocation and disaster preparation. The solution times are modest, ranging from a fraction of a second to 18 seconds for a given value of the trade-off parameter.

Tae Wan Kim, Thomas Donaldson, John Hooker

An important step in the development of value alignment (VA) systems in AI is understanding how values can interrelate with facts. Designers of future VA systems will need to utilize a hybrid approach in which ethical reasoning and empirical observation interrelate successfully in machine behavior. In this article we identify two problems about this interrelation that have been overlooked by AI discussants and designers. The first problem is that many AI designers commit inadvertently a version of what has been called by moral philosophers the "naturalistic fallacy," that is, they attempt to derive an "ought" from an "is." We illustrate when and why this occurs. The second problem is that AI designers adopt training routines that fail fully to simulate human ethical reasoning in the integration of ethical principles and facts. Using concepts of quantified modal logic, we proceed to offer an approach that promises to simulate ethical reasoning in humans by connecting ethical principles on the one hand and propositions about states of affairs on the other.

Danial Davarnia, J. N. Hooker

Concepts of consistency have long played a key role in constraint programming but never developed in integer programming (IP). Consistency nonetheless plays a role in IP as well. For example, cutting planes can reduce backtracking by achieving various forms of consistency as well as by tightening the linear programming (LP) relaxation. We introduce a type of consistency that is particularly suited for 0-1 programming and develop the associated theory. We define a 0-1 constraint set as LP-consistent when any partial assignment that is consistent with its linear programming relaxation is consistent with the original 0-1 constraint set. We prove basic properties of LP-consistency, including its relationship with Chvatal-Gomory cuts and the integer hull. We show that a weak form of LP-consistency can reduce or eliminate backtracking in a way analogous to k-consistency but is easier to achieve. In so doing, we identify a class of valid inequalities that can be more effective than traditional cutting planes at cutting off infeasible 0-1 partial assignments.

Tae Wan Kim, Thomas Donaldson, John Hooker

"Value alignment" (VA) is considered as one of the top priorities in AI research. Much of the existing research focuses on the "A" part and not the "V" part of "value alignment." This paper corrects that neglect by emphasizing the "value" side of VA and analyzes VA from the vantage point of requirements in value theory, in particular, of avoiding the "naturalistic fallacy"--a major epistemic caveat. The paper begins by isolating two distinct forms of VA: "mimetic" and "anchored." Then it discusses which VA approach better avoids the naturalistic fallacy. The discussion reveals stumbling blocks for VA approaches that neglect implications of the naturalistic fallacy. Such problems are more serious in mimetic VA since the mimetic process imitates human behavior that may or may not rise to the level of correct ethical behavior. Anchored VA, including hybrid VA, in contrast, holds more promise for future VA since it anchors alignment by normative concepts of intrinsic value.