40.1SIJun 2
What Makes Majority Illusion Easy to Detect?Šimon Schierreich, Ildikó Schlotter
Majority illusion is an undesirable phenomenon in social networks in which agents incorrectly perceive a minority opinion as dominant. This can severely distort collective behavior and decision-making. We study the fundamental question of detecting whether a social network allows for a majority illusion. Formally, in the $q$-Majority Illusion problem, we ask whether there exists a binary labeling of agents in which at least a $q$-fraction of agents have the majority of neighbors with the minority label. We investigate how various structural properties of the underlying social network influence the tractability of this question, and provide a detailed map of its computational complexity.
25.7GTApr 13
Navigating the Complexity Landscape of Nominee Selection in Schulze VotingKatarína Cechlárová, Jörg Rothe, Šimon Schierreich et al.
We study the Possible President problem and the Necessary President problem for Schulze voting, a rule that, due to its many desirable axiomatic properties, is popular in practice. In both problems, we are given an election with the candidates partitioned into a set of parties, and we are interested in questions about a given distinguished party. In the Possible President problem, we ask whether it is possible for the parties to each nominate exactly one candidate such that the nominee of the distinguished party is a Schulze winner of the resulting election with only the nominees running. In the Necessary President problem, we ask whether the distinguished party's nominee is a Schulze winner of the resulting election, irrespective of the nomination from the other parties. Rothe and Woitaschik have shown that Possible President is NP-complete and Necessary President is coNP-complete for Schulze elections. We complement and improve their results by a more fine-grained analysis: we determine the parameterized complexity of both problems with respect to all possible parameterizations, where we consider each of three natural parameters -- the number of voters, the maximum party size, and the number of parties -- to be either a constant, a parameter, or unbounded. In particular, we obtain dichotomies regarding the number of voters for both problems.