Qibing Ren

Mingxin Liu, Ziqian Fan, Zhaokai Wang et al.

Unified multimodal models target joint understanding, reasoning, and generation, but current image editing benchmarks are largely confined to natural images and shallow commonsense reasoning, offering limited assessment of this capability under structured, domain-specific constraints. In this work, we introduce GRADE, the first benchmark to assess discipline-informed knowledge and reasoning in image editing. GRADE comprises 520 carefully curated samples across 10 academic domains, spanning from natural science to social science. To support rigorous evaluation, we propose a multi-dimensional evaluation protocol that jointly assesses Discipline Reasoning, Visual Consistency, and Logical Readability. Extensive experiments on 20 state-of-the-art open-source and closed-source models reveal substantial limitations in current models under implicit, knowledge-intensive editing settings, leading to large performance gaps. Beyond quantitative scores, we conduct rigorous analyses and ablations to expose model shortcomings and identify the constraints within disciplinary editing. Together, GRADE pinpoints key directions for the future development of unified multimodal models, advancing the research on discipline-informed image editing and reasoning. Our benchmark and evaluation code are publicly released.

MiniMax, Aili Chen, Aonian Li et al.

We introduce MiniMax-M1, the world's first open-weight, large-scale hybrid-attention reasoning model. MiniMax-M1 is powered by a hybrid Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architecture combined with a lightning attention mechanism. The model is developed based on our previous MiniMax-Text-01 model, which contains a total of 456 billion parameters with 45.9 billion parameters activated per token. The M1 model natively supports a context length of 1 million tokens, 8x the context size of DeepSeek R1. Furthermore, the lightning attention mechanism in MiniMax-M1 enables efficient scaling of test-time compute. These properties make M1 particularly suitable for complex tasks that require processing long inputs and thinking extensively. MiniMax-M1 is trained using large-scale reinforcement learning (RL) on diverse problems including sandbox-based, real-world software engineering environments. In addition to M1's inherent efficiency advantage for RL training, we propose CISPO, a novel RL algorithm to further enhance RL efficiency. CISPO clips importance sampling weights rather than token updates, outperforming other competitive RL variants. Combining hybrid-attention and CISPO enables MiniMax-M1's full RL training on 512 H800 GPUs to complete in only three weeks, with a rental cost of just $534,700. We release two versions of MiniMax-M1 models with 40K and 80K thinking budgets respectively, where the 40K model represents an intermediate phase of the 80K training. Experiments on standard benchmarks show that our models are comparable or superior to strong open-weight models such as the original DeepSeek-R1 and Qwen3-235B, with particular strengths in complex software engineering, tool utilization, and long-context tasks. We publicly release MiniMax-M1 at https://github.com/MiniMax-AI/MiniMax-M1.

Qibing Ren, Hao Li, Dongrui Liu et al.

Safety concerns in large language models (LLMs) have gained significant attention due to their exposure to potentially harmful data during pre-training. In this paper, we identify a new safety vulnerability in LLMs: their susceptibility to \textit{natural distribution shifts} between attack prompts and original toxic prompts, where seemingly benign prompts, semantically related to harmful content, can bypass safety mechanisms. To explore this issue, we introduce a novel attack method, \textit{ActorBreaker}, which identifies actors related to toxic prompts within pre-training distribution to craft multi-turn prompts that gradually lead LLMs to reveal unsafe content. ActorBreaker is grounded in Latour's actor-network theory, encompassing both human and non-human actors to capture a broader range of vulnerabilities. Our experimental results demonstrate that ActorBreaker outperforms existing attack methods in terms of diversity, effectiveness, and efficiency across aligned LLMs. To address this vulnerability, we propose expanding safety training to cover a broader semantic space of toxic content. We thus construct a multi-turn safety dataset using ActorBreaker. Fine-tuning models on our dataset shows significant improvements in robustness, though with some trade-offs in utility. Code is available at https://github.com/AI45Lab/ActorAttack.

Qibing Ren, Sitao Xie, Longxuan Wei et al.

Recent large-scale events like election fraud and financial scams have shown how harmful coordinated efforts by human groups can be. With the rise of autonomous AI systems, there is growing concern that AI-driven groups could also cause similar harm. While most AI safety research focuses on individual AI systems, the risks posed by multi-agent systems (MAS) in complex real-world situations are still underexplored. In this paper, we introduce a proof-of-concept to simulate the risks of malicious MAS collusion, using a flexible framework that supports both centralized and decentralized coordination structures. We apply this framework to two high-risk fields: misinformation spread and e-commerce fraud. Our findings show that decentralized systems are more effective at carrying out malicious actions than centralized ones. The increased autonomy of decentralized systems allows them to adapt their strategies and cause more damage. Even when traditional interventions, like content flagging, are applied, decentralized groups can adjust their tactics to avoid detection. We present key insights into how these malicious groups operate and the need for better detection systems and countermeasures. Code is available at https://github.com/renqibing/RogueAgent.

Chaochao Lu, Chen Qian, Guodong Zheng et al.

Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have shown impressive abilities in generating reasonable responses with respect to multi-modal contents. However, there is still a wide gap between the performance of recent MLLM-based applications and the expectation of the broad public, even though the most powerful OpenAI's GPT-4 and Google's Gemini have been deployed. This paper strives to enhance understanding of the gap through the lens of a qualitative study on the generalizability, trustworthiness, and causal reasoning capabilities of recent proprietary and open-source MLLMs across four modalities: ie, text, code, image, and video, ultimately aiming to improve the transparency of MLLMs. We believe these properties are several representative factors that define the reliability of MLLMs, in supporting various downstream applications. To be specific, we evaluate the closed-source GPT-4 and Gemini and 6 open-source LLMs and MLLMs. Overall we evaluate 230 manually designed cases, where the qualitative results are then summarized into 12 scores (ie, 4 modalities times 3 properties). In total, we uncover 14 empirical findings that are useful to understand the capabilities and limitations of both proprietary and open-source MLLMs, towards more reliable downstream multi-modal applications.

Qibing Ren, Chang Gao, Jing Shao et al.

The rapid advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) has brought about remarkable generative capabilities but also raised concerns about their potential misuse. While strategies like supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning from human feedback have enhanced their safety, these methods primarily focus on natural languages, which may not generalize to other domains. This paper introduces CodeAttack, a framework that transforms natural language inputs into code inputs, presenting a novel environment for testing the safety generalization of LLMs. Our comprehensive studies on state-of-the-art LLMs including GPT-4, Claude-2, and Llama-2 series reveal a new and universal safety vulnerability of these models against code input: CodeAttack bypasses the safety guardrails of all models more than 80\% of the time. We find that a larger distribution gap between CodeAttack and natural language leads to weaker safety generalization, such as encoding natural language input with data structures. Furthermore, we give our hypotheses about the success of CodeAttack: the misaligned bias acquired by LLMs during code training, prioritizing code completion over avoiding the potential safety risk. Finally, we analyze potential mitigation measures. These findings highlight new safety risks in the code domain and the need for more robust safety alignment algorithms to match the code capabilities of LLMs.

Shanghai AI Lab, Xiaoyang Chen, Yunhao Chen et al.

To understand and identify the unprecedented risks posed by rapidly advancing artificial intelligence (AI) models, this report presents a comprehensive assessment of their frontier risks. Drawing on the E-T-C analysis (deployment environment, threat source, enabling capability) from the Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0) (SafeWork-F1-Framework), we identify critical risks in seven areas: cyber offense, biological and chemical risks, persuasion and manipulation, uncontrolled autonomous AI R\&D, strategic deception and scheming, self-replication, and collusion. Guided by the "AI-$45^\circ$ Law," we evaluate these risks using "red lines" (intolerable thresholds) and "yellow lines" (early warning indicators) to define risk zones: green (manageable risk for routine deployment and continuous monitoring), yellow (requiring strengthened mitigations and controlled deployment), and red (necessitating suspension of development and/or deployment). Experimental results show that all recent frontier AI models reside in green and yellow zones, without crossing red lines. Specifically, no evaluated models cross the yellow line for cyber offense or uncontrolled AI R\&D risks. For self-replication, and strategic deception and scheming, most models remain in the green zone, except for certain reasoning models in the yellow zone. In persuasion and manipulation, most models are in the yellow zone due to their effective influence on humans. For biological and chemical risks, we are unable to rule out the possibility of most models residing in the yellow zone, although detailed threat modeling and in-depth assessment are required to make further claims. This work reflects our current understanding of AI frontier risks and urges collective action to mitigate these challenges.

Han Lu, Zenan Li, Runzhong Wang et al.

Solving combinatorial optimization (CO) on graphs is among the fundamental tasks for upper-stream applications in data mining, machine learning and operations research. Despite the inherent NP-hard challenge for CO, heuristics, branch-and-bound, learning-based solvers are developed to tackle CO problems as accurately as possible given limited time budgets. However, a practical metric for the sensitivity of CO solvers remains largely unexplored. Existing theoretical metrics require the optimal solution which is infeasible, and the gradient-based adversarial attack metric from deep learning is not compatible with non-learning solvers that are usually non-differentiable. In this paper, we develop the first practically feasible robustness metric for general combinatorial optimization solvers. We develop a no worse optimal cost guarantee thus do not require optimal solutions, and we tackle the non-differentiable challenge by resorting to black-box adversarial attack methods. Extensive experiments are conducted on 14 unique combinations of solvers and CO problems, and we demonstrate that the performance of state-of-the-art solvers like Gurobi can degenerate by over 20% under the given time limit bound on the hard instances discovered by our robustness metric, raising concerns about the robustness of combinatorial optimization solvers.